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Natalia Loukacheva 
 
 
Developments in the Arctic and Antarctica continue to be the subject of 
growing public interest and academic, political, scientific, and media dis-
course. The global magnitude of the changes that are currently taking place 
in the Polar Regions, also influence legal developments. Furthermore, the 
growing importance of both the Arctic and the Antarctica in various areas of 
global, regional, national and sub-national development requires further 
inquiry into the role of law in dealing with many of the current and emer-
ging issues relevant to both Poles. Although law is not a panacea for all is-
sues, it has its own role to play in dealing with many of them.  
A broad overview of Polar law issues was presented in the pioneering 
Polar Law Textbook, N. Loukacheva ed. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Tema Nord 538: 2010 (www.norden.org). This new textbook 
further draws upon Polar law as an evolving and developing field of stud-
ies which is gaining increasing recognition and intersects with many other 
areas in the social sciences and humanities. This Polar Law Textbook co-
vers a number of topical issues and new developments that were not dis-
cussed in the 2010 book. All chapters were written in the period Septem-
ber 2012 to February 2013 and bring a wealth of new information toge-
ther on Polar law.  
Since our productive cooperation in 2009–2010, the Nordic Council of 
Ministers (NCM), under the auspices of its Arctic Cooperation Programme, 
has continued to show leadership in the promotion of legal values within 
the Nordic, Arctic and global community by endorsing the Polar Law 
Textbook II project. This initiative was housed in 2012–2013 by the Mas-
ter’s Programme in Polar Law run by the University of Akureyri, Iceland. 
The new textbook project was led by Dr. Natalia Loukacheva who also 
served as the book editor. The textbook is the outcome of a broad colla-
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boration process and of efficient teamwork between an international 
group of 15 well-known experts in the area of Polar law and related stud-
ies, including: academics, politicians, practitioners, and Arctic indigenous 
peoples (see biographies). This cooperation was possible due to our 
shared belief that despite existing resources, there is further need to ad-
vance legal information and knowledge globally.  
The NCM provided generous support to enable this educational tool to 
be produced. It can be ordered in hard copy form from the NCM and, im-
portantly, it is also electronically available on the NCM website to encour-
age all readers interested in Polar law to access this book freely. It is 
hoped that this will enable readers located in remote Arctic areas, and 
across the globe, to have better access to the legal educational tools and 
information presented herein.  
The main objectives of this textbook are: to disseminate new 
knowledge on the most topical legal and political developments in the 
Polar Regions; to further promote legal and inter-disciplinary education in 
and for remote Northern areas; to strengthen cooperation within the Nor-
dic region and with interested stakeholders (e.g., the textbook is useful for 
the Arctic Council and its working groups, University of the Arctic, and 
many educational programmes globally). It is also hoped that this text-
book will provide the basis for future long distance courses in Polar law 
and that it will also facilitate Nordic synergy and inter-disciplinary dia-
logue by advancing further collaboration within the Nordic/Arctic region 
and beyond. In spite of its primary educational focus, this textbook con-
tains useful information for both lawyers and non-lawyers, as well as for 
others interested in the subject of Polar law. It explores a variety of legal 
issues in the Arctic and Antarctica, but also covers the relevant aspects of 
geopolitics, security, governance, search and rescue, resources, biodiversi-
ty, and other political developments.  
Structurally, the book is written as a textbook where all chapters have, 
to a certain degree, been written in the form of lectures and include in-
formation for further reading. The textbook is divided into 15 chapters the 
scope of which focuses on questions of: Polar law, geo-politics, security, 
and the Arctic Council (e.g., its search and rescue agreement, climate 
change initiatives, etc.,) (see chapters by Loukacheva, Heininen, Vasiliev 
and Koivurova); issues of environmental law, climate change, resources, 
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energy, biodiversity and continental shelves (see chapters by Baker, 
Bankes, Bastmeijer, Fitzmaurice, Koivurova, McDorman and Pettersson); 
developments in governance (self-governance, good governance, devolu-
tion), Human Rights and the rights of indigenous peoples (see chapters by 
Alfredsson, K. á Rógvi, Penikett, Ravna, and Lykke Thomsen). Despite its 
comprehensiveness, this textbook is limited in scope necessarily leaving 
room for further research and collaboration in the field of Polar law.  
The opinions expressed in this textbook do not necessarily reflect the po-
sition of the NCM. The contributors hope that this book will encourage those 
interested in Polar law to pursue further studies, research or participation in 
the many, both Arctic and Antarctic-related, initiatives currently ongoing. 
Further information about this textbook can be received from the text-
book editor Dr. Natalia Loukacheva at natalial@unak.is or at n.loukacheva@ 
utoronto.ca or from the website of the NCM www.norden.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Polar Law Developments 
and Major Trends  
Natalia Loukacheva  
1.1 Polar Law 
The growing importance of both Polar Regions in various areas of global, 
regional, national and sub-national development necessitates that further 
inquiry be made into the role of law in addressing the many current and 
emerging issues relevant to the Arctic and Antarctica. In light of the fun-
damental changes taking place in these areas, law is not a panacea for all 
questions, but it has its own important role to play in dealing with many of 
them. It should be noted however that generalisations on this issue are 
not feasible as each legal challenge may require a specific solution and a 
detailed analysis of the case in question.  
Current Polar law developments also indicate that both Polar Regions 
will continue to be the focus of growing political, international, scientific, 
media and public discourse for the foreseeable future. Polar law is an 
evolving area of study which is in the process of gaining increased recog-
nition and significance at the academic level and in international fora. 
Although various approaches exist to the understanding of Polar law, 
“broadly speaking, “polar law” is a developing field of law that deals with 
the international and domestic legal regimes that are applicable to the 
Arctic or the Antarctic, or both” (Loukacheva in Polar Law Textbook 
2010:13). For example, it covers international law treaties that address 
specific issues related to each Polar Region (i.e., the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; the Agreement on the 
Conservation of Polar Bears (the Arctic)); international treaties that apply 
to both Polar Regions (i.e., the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
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the Sea). Polar law also covers the domestic law of the Arctic States and 
others with special reference to the Arctic, or certain regulations resultant 
from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings incorporated into the 
national legal systems of respective Consultative parties and, in some 
cases, non-consultative parties. The sub-national legislation of Arctic ju-
risdictions and the Aboriginal (customary law) of Arctic indigenous peo-
ples should, in addition, also be considered here as they form an im-
portant part of the Polar law framework.  
Conceptually, Polar law includes both “hard law” – legally binding (e.g., 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, etc.,) and “soft-law” – non-legally binding 
(e.g., various Memorandums of Understanding concluded by Arctic stake-
holders; declarations of the Arctic Council, etc.) instruments. It embraces a 
“bipolar” approach – considers legal regimes for the South and North 
Poles, and intersects with several branches of law (e.g., Human Rights 
Law, Constitutional Law, Law of the Sea, Environmental Law, Resources 
Law, Wildlife Law, Transportation Law, Aboriginal Law, Trade Law, Law 
of Sustainable Development, to name but a few).  
Polar law is also developing as an educational tool and discipline in-
ternationally (e.g., Polar Law programme at the University of Akureyri, 
Iceland; Law of the Sea programme at the University of Tromsø, Norway; 
specialised courses and programmes at the University of Lapland, Finland 
and at several Universities in Canada; numerous international Polar law 
related conferences and workshops; specialised recently established pub-
lications like the Yearbook of Polar Law (Akureyri, Iceland & Rovaniemi, 
Finland); The Arctic Review on Law and Politics (Norway); The Arctic 
Herald (Russia); Northern Public Affairs (Canada), the Polar Journal (Aus-
tralia); the Arctic Yearbook (University of the Arctic and Northern Re-
search Forum), and specialised networks (e.g., the Arctic Law Thematic 
Network of the University of the Arctic (Rovaniemi, Finland), Thematic 
Network Group on Legal Issues in the Arctic of the Northern Research 
Forum, (Akureyri, Iceland, etc.)). 
Polar law is also developing as a practical tool and as a useful instru-
ment in dealing with various legal and related issues both internationally 
and domestically. Furthermore, as a discipline, Polar law is closely inter-
twined with several areas of the social sciences and humanities (e.g., In-
ternational Relations, Political Science, Economics, Human Geography, 
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etc.). It is evident that a multi-disciplinary approach and the gai-
ning/sharing of information with other sciences are going to influence the 
future development of Polar law. 
Despite some obvious similarities between both the Arctic and Antarctica, 
de facto, there are differences in their legal regimes. These differences can, in 
part, be explained by the vivid distinctions that can be drawn between the 
Poles (see Polar Law Textbook 2010). Nevertheless, changes in these areas 
suggest that there are issues of common concern which affect further legal 
and other developments (e.g., climate change, environmental matters, biodi-
versity, questions of “sovereignty” – stewardship, shipping, etc.).  
A broad overview of Polar law questions was given in the pioneering 
2010 Polar Law Textbook (see: www.norden.org). This new textbook 
reflects on information mainly from September 2012 to February 2013 
and covers topics that were not previously discussed thus illustrating the 
wealth of new information available on Polar law and the constant evolu-
tion of this field of studies. 
1.2 Major Trends and Arctic Geo-politics 
Recent Polar law developments have been sharpened by the magnitude of 
the changes occurring in both Polar Regions and globally. Polar law inter-
sects with other areas and, arguably, its development is significantly influ-
enced by global and many geo-political trends. It should be noted however 
that the definition of geopolitics, which has multiple approaches, is be-
yond the scope of this study.  
This section attempts to analyse some of those trends, predominantly in 
the Arctic context, although Antarctica is also important. Antarctic geo-
politics are strongly influenced by several factors, including: the sovereignty 
provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which “froze” claims 
to territorial sovereignty for the duration of the Treaty; by science, which 
contributes to the exercise of geopolitical power; global environmental and 
resource discourse/concerns (e.g., ozone depletion, climate change, etc.); 
implications of growing tourism activities not just for the environment but 
also for geopolitical and legal issues in relation to the Antarctic Treaty Sys-
tem (ATS), etc. Furthermore, the shift in geopolitics is defined by the fact 
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that they are not as state-centric as before (Chaturvedi 2009). New con-
cerns and questions which impact the legal and geopolitical framework of 
the South Pole are emerging (e.g., continental shelf issues, climate change, 
jurisdictional issues of tourism, the development of bio-prospecting, or the 
role and status of NGOs in the geopolitical scene and the ATS, etc.,) (see 
Koivurova, McDorman and Bastmeijer in this textbook).  
The current situation in the Arctic and the emergence of a new geopo-
litical framework are being tested by a raft of challenges heightened by 
globalisation, climate change, uncertainty in respect of just how some of 
these issues may unfold, and by the shifting geopolitical, security and eco-
nomic environment in the region. To some degree these challenges have 
modified existing views, concerns, legal disagreements and political col-
laboration among several Arctic States and other interested stakeholders. 
This in turn led to a greater legal, political and scientific discourse over 
emerging and clashing Arctic interests and the need for more coherent 
policies and responses to the growing multitude of Arctic issues. It also led 
to the emergence of a diverse number of actors among Arctic, non-Arctic 
States, a supranational entity like the EU, sub-national units, indigenous 
groups and Northerners, etc., who are keen to have a greater say in the 
political, resource, economic, social development, possible claims, cooper-
ation, and other key initiatives that are relevant to the North.  
To date, numerous scientific, trade, economic, industrial, military, so-
cial, political, environmental and legal activities in the region indicate that 
we are in the midst of a tremendous process of transformation that will 
influence the Arctic long into the future, as well as its peoples and deve-
lopments well beyond the Arctic rim. Although the Arctic States cooperate 
and agree on many fundamental issues, important concerns as regards the 
impacts of this “transformation” on the North nevertheless remain. Thus, 
there is a need to find feasible common solutions for an adequate sustain-
nable development, environmental stability and security, adaptation to 
climate and other changes, human capital and capacity-building.  
Arguably, the main pillars of this transformation are focused on: 
 
 New geo-politics, including security and Arctic policies; 
 Addressing existing and emerging environmental matters; 
 Solving outstanding jurisdictional disagreements; 
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 Resource development (both renewable and non-renewable), control, 
supply and sustainable use; 
 New shipping routes and questions of navigation, transportation, 
marine regulation, search and rescue activities, Arctic Ocean 
governance, biodiversity, etc.; 
 New intellectual frontiers for scientific, knowledge-based technologies, 
research and collaboration; 
 Innovation in Arctic governance (its process, structures, and 
practices); the human rights approach to dealing with Arctic matters; 
 Preparedness and capacity to tackle future challenges and concerns, 
with respect to the local and global outcomes of Arctic developments.  
 
In addition, legal issues and Arctic geopolitics are interconnected with a 
number of developments that are influenced by several pivotal factors, 
such as: 
The drastic environmental change caused by ongoing climate change, 
environmental pollution and hazards (e.g., Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs), Arctic haze, heavy metals (i.e., Mercury), Black Carbon, etc.). The 
outcomes of the human-induced actions that raised transnational and 
regional interest in various areas of development (i.e., human, industrial, 
technological, resource sourcing, increasing tourism and ship-
ping/navigation, etc.) in the context of ecological fragility, and threats to 
the vulnerable biodiversity, wildlife, eco-balance and traditional ways of 
life of Arctic peoples.  
The unprecedented geo-political changes that are signified by shifting 
geopolitical realities and the interests of Arctic and some non-Arctic 
States; new approaches to multilateral/ bi-lateral diplomacy, partnerships 
and collaboration with special reservation to the national interest, deci-
sion-making, geopolitical advantages and responses to security threats 
and risks, to ensure peace and stability in the region. 
Technical and knowledge-generating capacity evolution which in light 
of these multiple changes served as a catalyst for the integration of sci-
ence, diplomacy and policies, framed the region as a new intellectual fron-
tier with opportunities for multi-disciplinary research, innovation, know-
how, and technology (i.e., digital democracy, tele-medicine, long-distance 
high tech education, video-conferences, satellites, etc.). 
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A new era of Arctic politics and the role of the region in global affairs, 
the increasing importance of legal instruments and regimes in tackling 
pending and emergent juridical matters are also issues that may potential-
ly impact the region.  
This listing of major factors is not exhaustive and is also significantly 
shaped by a range of general and Arctic-specific issues. As such, the Arctic 
geopolitical framework is currently influenced by:  
 
 Unpredictability and uncertainty over how geopolitical matters may 
unfold in light of the ongoing evolution of Arctic and global politics and 
interests, and the difficulties inherent in generating precise scientific or 
other data due to technological, security or political limitations; the 
shortcomings associated with evaluations on the costs and benefits of 
conducting projects with a high price tag – uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of risks versus benefits (e.g., fluctuations in the global prices of 
some resources; information on potentially vast untapped Arctic 
offshore resources precipitated media speculation about “the race” for 
their control in the areas beyond the current national jurisdictions of the 
Arctic States). In addition, a certain amount of misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding occurred in respect of various Arctic-related 
developments due to the superficial collection and presentation of 
information by some media sources and the creation of the “media” 
frenzy over questions that in reality entail routine legal developments 
(e.g., speculation over possible conflicts on overlapping continental shelf 
entitlements). Clearly, the inadequate level of public knowledge on 
Arctic matters could have an influence on the political behaviour of 
Arctic stakeholders and may cause unnecessary tensions to emerge in 
respect of certain geopolitical issues. Moreover, Arctic geopolitics are 
particularly conditioned by political correctness and are thus quite 
sensitive to “unexpected” policy-statements, or to seemingly innocuous 
omissions made by politicians, influential public figures, or the media.  
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 The increasing complexity of the issues and networks that form Arctic 
geo-political settings and their inter-connectivity with other matters 
(i.e., legal, economic, social) presents another area of concern. This 
often leads to a certain measure of issue inter-dependence between 
those areas/questions and the necessity for a multifaceted approach to 
their resolution.  
 The rapidity of the demographic, human, cultural, economic, 
environmental, ecological, and political changes often simply overwhelm 
the available measures to address them adequately, the capacity of 
institutional instruments and the adaptive capability of stakeholders 
involved in geo-politics to respond properly to these developments.  
 The dynamic character of Arctic geopolitics and their development as a 
process, but with only some degree of flexibility and limitations (e.g., 
national concerns of Arctic States). The constant transformation and 
evolution of Arctic politics, Arctic governance and its institutions, thus 
calls for a re-evaluation of geopolitical settings and innovation in 
decision-making; the re-distribution of power and control by several 
stakeholders in and beyond the region and the need to maintain a 
balance among the international, regional, sub-regional, national and 
local interests and activities of the state and non-state actors involved in 
the region’s geopolitics (e.g., devolution processes versus centralisation; 
the gap between traditional hunting practices and knowledge of Arctic 
indigenous peoples and the pressure for modern industrial economic 
development, scientific findings or legal regulations (bans) in respect of 
certain species – i.e., polar bears, seals, whales, etc.). 
 By global pressures (e.g., globalisation, climate change, global trade, 
etc.,) which have profound ramifications for the region, and, vice versa. 
For example, the increasing importance of the Arctic in global affairs 
and forums, global interest in the Arctic as a new frontier for 
resources, energy supply and security, have positioned the Arctic as an 
important region within the newly emerging geostrategic framework.  
 The particularities of Arctic development with respect to geography, 
demography, climate, human capital, diversity, economics (e.g., the 
dominant role of the public sector), infrastructure, means/costs of 
communication and politics have also contributed to the changing 
geopolitical nature of the region. Despite the existence of some 
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opportunities for economic and social development a number of well-
known shortcomings exist in respect of human, political and economic 
capacity-building across many parts of the region. Those shortcomings 
do not help Northerners in their aspirations to have a greater say in 
how major Arctic-related issues develop, or to create a better dialogue 
and/or partnership with regional, national and global communities. 
Existing challenges such as: unemployment, poverty, poor housing and 
living conditions, health and other social ills, and the continuing high 
level of dependency on welfare or external funds/transfers, as well as 
limited opportunities for sustainable existence and business in many 
parts of the region, also influence geo-political trends. As far as Arctic 
politics are concerned, one can argue that underdeveloped and the still 
nascent/ad hoc structure of Arctic institutions and regulatory regimes, 
as well as the non-implementation or usage of existing mechanisms, 
hamper the legitimacy of these instruments/measures and their 
capacity to deal with changes and thus, often, present a challenge to 
geo-political development.  
 
Despite all of this the emergence of civil society in the Arctic and of a new 
generation of political actors represented by indigenous leaders and other 
Northerners, has had a pivotal significance for geopolitics in the Arctic. 
There is no doubt that with the new found political maturity of Northern 
activists and the evolution of their political movement, after decades of 
decolonisation, negotiations and the recognition of the rights of Arctic 
indigenous peoples, these powerful new voices have an increasingly im-
portant influence over the development of geopolitical settings that are 
inclusive of the interests and concerns of Arctic peoples. Furthermore, the 
trans-national and multi-layered nature of Arctic geopolitics and the glob-
al nature of the issues in question point to the growing cooperation of 
Arctic and non-Arctic actors. This trend is set to continue in the near fu-
ture as is the need for inclusiveness in respect of the different stakehold-
ers able to contribute to these Arctic-related issues. In other words, we 
will continue to witness increasingly multidimensional collaboration 
among the Arctic and non-Arctic States, NGOs, civil society and others in 
addressing common values, interests and other relevant issues globally 
and locally. In so doing, however, the overcoming of disagreements and 
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clashes of interest among various Arctic and non-Arctic actors, state and 
non-state organisations, indigenous groups, Northerners and nation-
al/local interests presents a particular challenge to the stability and co-
herence of geo-politics in the region. Last but not least, security issues and 
in particular the need for a broad understanding of existing and emergent 
security threats (e.g., environmental, climate change, energy or food secu-
rity, terrorism, etc.), in the context of a new geopolitical paradigm are also 
crucial in the formation of the geo-political framework.  
Clearly, all of these factors and trends leave room for further analysis. 
The Arctic is a distinct region in global and regional politics; a region of 
great diversity which is manifested at several levels. In many ways the 
Arctic is different from the Antarctic (for detailed comparisons of both 
Polar Regions see Polar Law Textbook 2010). In the next section we will 
look at the main pillars of recent Polar law developments with reference, 
where feasible, also to the Antarctic.  
1.3 The Main Pillars of Development 
The pillars of contemporary development are conditioned by several gen-
eral trends, which, in a nutshell, can be summarised as: 
 
 The growth of multilateral diplomacy, cooperation, inclusiveness and 
partnership with a variety of Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders (the 
same is relevant to the Antarctic).  
 The growing importance of civil society, non-state actors and their 
organisations in addressing matters of relevance to the Arctic. 
 The need for a common policy and shared responsibility for a number 
issues of common concern in light of ongoing transformation in both 
Polar Regions (e.g., environment, the role of both Poles in the face of 
global changes, transportation/navigation, etc.). 
 The need for a proactive approach and preparedness for forthcoming 
challenges and the emergence of opportunities to the common benefit 
of all interested in developments in both Polar Regions. 
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 The increasing necessity for innovation, knowledge-building, and 
research capacities to fill existing and emerging gaps (new scientific 
data, information, and research collaboration among various sciences, 
including law). For example, how to deal with challenges of Antarctic 
and Arctic biodiversity in light of climate change, or with new realities 
of shipping and navigation? Is current scientific data adequate and 
scientific knowledge sufficient to support existing legal disagreements 
or other developments in the Arctic? 
 
The necessity of new approaches to the re-distribution of power, policy-
making and control over regulation and administration of certain issues 
(e.g., the potential for mining in Antarctica may become a key issue in 
the future, etc.). With these trends in mind current Polar law develop-
ments are arguably now centred on several areas which will continue to 
form the crux of geopolitical and legal debate in the near future. These 
areas are as follows: 
Environment – (e.g., environmental protection, conservation, and moni-
toring, issues of pollution, biodiversity, wildlife, climate change, environ-
mental law instruments and measures – both the Arctic and the Antarctic). 
Both Poles are sensitive to changes in global eco-systems. Thus, for exam-
ple, increased activities in shipping and tourism suggest the need for fur-
ther consideration and regulation with regards to vulnerable and fragile 
eco-bio systems. Furthermore, environmental hazards and concerns in 
and beyond the Arctic and Antarctica and their connectivity to global 
chains (e.g., the risk of oil spills, the ramifications of global climate 
change), create new challenges to the frameworks of Arctic and Antarctic 
governance. Specifically on biodiversity and climate change issues see the 
chapters by Fitzmaurice, Bankes and Koivurova in this textbook.  
Resources – both regions are currently experiencing a number of general 
issues relating to resources. As noted previously, mineral development in the 
Antarctic is currently forbidden but it may become an issue in the future. 
Clearly, the topics of resource riches, rights, access, extraction, control, shar-
ing and redistribution of benefits, preservation, impacts on livelihood and 
other areas of development in the Arctic are likely to remain focal points in 
the legal and geopolitical discourse. However, in both Polar Regions, matters 
of genetic and bio resources, fish stocks, certain marine mammals, water, 
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tourism, etc., share common concerns and thus benefit from lessons that can 
be learned from scientific and ecosystem-based management practices versus 
other measures, sustainable use and environmental protection. Thus, to re-
flect on recent developments in this area, in their chapters, Bankes, Baker, 
Bastmeijer, Fitzmaurice, and Pettersson analyse various aspects of renewable 
and non-renewable resources in the Polar Regions.  
Governance – in both Polar areas this term may cover various dimen-
sions (e.g., marine, scientific, energy, continental shelf, climate, indigenous 
(the Arctic), resource, environmental, institutional, etc.), questions of ocean 
governance (e.g., shipping, navigation, transportation), environmental secu-
rity and protection, and jurisdictional capacity, governmental mechanisms, 
the practices of the Antarctic Treaty System and institutions of Arctic gov-
ernance (including devolution and self-government processes – e.g., Cana-
dian North (Yukon, NWT and Nunavut) (see Penikett in this textbook), 
Greenland’s 2009 self-government agreement (see Kleist in Polar Law Text-
book 2010), the legal and political evolution of the Faroe Islands (see K. á 
Rógvi in this textbook), the implementation of principles of good govern-
ance (see Alfredsson in this textbook)). Despite some similarities (i.e., the 
desire of sub-national authorities to assume greater responsibility over 
their own lives primarily by means of the transfer of essential jurisdictions – 
e.g., resources, from the centre to sub-national governments), in each entity 
devolution has its own variables relating to the particularities of the local 
and national constitutional, economic, and political settings. Usually, high 
hopes are raised in connection with devolution and self-governance as it 
often augurs the prospect of a more prosperous and sustainable future for 
local communities. Important developments are also occurring in the field 
of human rights – Arctic indigenous peoples’ rights that can be regarded 
within the framework of indigenous governance. As Ravna shows in his 
detailed analysis of Saami legal status, their rights and customary law in 
Norway, and Lykke Thomsen in her analysis of rights of the Inuit of Green-
land in light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, de-
spite some progress in the recognition of indigenous rights, significant is-
sues for further concern and consideration remain (see Ravna and Lykke 
Thomsen in this textbook). 
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Each of these aspects can be regarded under a “governance” umbrella 
and taken together they constitute core legal and political issues. A special 
sub-set of questions is also covered by security and airspace develop-
ments (on security in the Arctic see Heininen in this textbook).  
Finally, this chapter will look at some of the most recent developments 
that have taken place in Polar law since 2010. Importantly, all of the trends 
and developments described here are often interconnected with each other 
and thus they should be seen in the context of a comprehensive overview. 
1.4 Recent Developments 
Since the 2010 publication of the Polar Law Textbook several important 
events have taken place in the field of Polar law. 
One set of developments occurred in the area of Arctic governance. 
Although its framework is still marked by great complexity while, in addi-
tion, operating at several, often ad hoc levels, fundamental changes have 
occurred in one of its key institutions – the Arctic Council. Despite conti-
nuing criticism since in creation in 1996 the Council has, time and again, 
proven its ability to function quite effectively as well as being open to 
further change which may in the future even lead to its becoming a fully-
fledged international organisation.  
Since the 2009 Tromsø Declaration the Council has introduced several 
important reforms which have changed its architecture and jurisdiction. 
Such reforms specifically concern the 2011 decision taken at the Ministerial 
meeting in Nuuk to establish the Arctic Council’s permanent secretariat and 
launch it no later than at the next Ministerial meeting (i.e., in 2013). This 
secretariat is expected to bring more continuity and efficiency to the Coun-
cil’s operational capacity (interestingly, the ATS has had such a body for 
almost ten years); the elaboration of agreed criteria for the Arctic Council 
observers; the launching of the first-ever collective financial foundation of 
the Council – the Project Support Instrument to finance the Council’s envi-
ronmental projects; and, most interestingly for Polar law development, this 
relates to the historic first ever binding Agreement under the auspices of 
the Council. Thus, in May 2011 the pioneering Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic opened a new 
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chapter in Polar law (see Vasiliev in this textbook). In May 2013 a new legal-
ly binding agreement on the prevention of marine oil pollution and re-
sponse in the Arctic, came into existence as a result of the Council’s diligent 
work and success; its ability to show leadership, finding a compromise and 
cooperation on common issues of vital importance despite the potential for 
clashes over internal national interests and agendas.  
The significance of these two agreements cannot be overstated. Con-
cluded under the auspices of the Arctic Council by eight Arctic States, 
these initiatives indicate that the Council has evolved from its advisory 
mandate into a more influential body able to react and be responsive to 
the most telling challenges facing the region both in terms of practical and 
political significance. Although both agreements contain some legally non-
binding appendixes, they are based on existing international treaties and 
domestic legislation dealing with the subject matter of these documents, 
and are binding on the Arctic States that endorsed them under the aegis of 
the Council. These agreements prove that, while remaining a “soft-law” 
body, the Council has “moved” to the use of “hard-law” instruments on 
issues of relevance to both the Circumpolar Region and to the internatio-
nal community more generally. 
Reforms of the Council also show that it is becoming the key player in 
the institutional structure of Arctic governance and that the time has 
come for deeper cooperation with others to avoid much of the criticism 
in respect of overlapping and the lack of a clear agenda in dealing with 
issues of shared responsibility and concern. It still however remains to 
be seen whether the Council will broaden its mandate to include tradi-
tional security issues (for example, the 2012 Goose Bay meeting of chiefs 
of defence of the Arctic States – members of the Arctic Council, has given 
an impetus within the Council to discussion of the expansion of its the-
matic scope to address even issues of military security which are cur-
rently excluded from the Council’s mandate). Clearly, even now, in light 
of its main focus on the environment, climate change and sustainable 
development, indirectly, the Arctic Council already deals with security 
and other questions of safety in the region. Another unresolved concern 
here was the matter of “inclusiveness” in respect of non-Arctic actors 
having access to the Council’s “club.” Should the Council embrace all 
non-Arctic actors, which applied for observer status or which have al-
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ready been granted, on an ad hoc basis, temporary observer status (e.g., 
the European Commission)1 in the Council’s activities given the fact that 
it is impossible to do any kind of business in the Arctic “unilaterally,” or 
there are other avenues for cooperation with de facto non-Arctic play-
ers? In other words, reform of the Council remains a “work in progress” 
but the results will have a major geopolitical impact on the state of af-
fairs in the region and beyond the Arctic rim. In this respect the Antarc-
tic governance situation is much less “pressurised”. 
Another interesting trend is the need to deal with the new role of non-
state actors and civil society in the process of Arctic cooperation and go-
vernance. Clearly, it is not only about the role of states any more, although all 
eight Arctic States continue to play a major role, both domestically (e.g., in 
responding to the transformation of the Arctic and in setting out new priori-
ties all of them have revised or issued new Arctic policies from 2007–2013; 
most of the Arctic States are now also displaying increased military capacities, 
including improved military vessels, icebreaker’s fleets and equipment, mili-
tary activities in the High North, enhanced air patrolling, etc., as part of the 
process of asserting their sovereignty) and internationally (states are major 
actors and each Arctic State is searching for its special niche and for greater 
credibility in dealing with Arctic-related matters). Furthermore, Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden, as EU members, will need to coordinate their Arctic 
policies with the EU’s own Arctic policy which is presently under develop-
ment; there are questions also over the potential roles of Norway and Iceland 
which have European Economic Area (EEA) agreements with the EU (Iceland 
has started a process of negotiation towards EU accession but its outcome 
remains unclear at the current time of writing). Interesting questions also 
arise in light of Greenland’s self-governance and its special arrangements with 
the EU. If Greenland is to become a new Arctic State, the role of this Arctic 
entity may become pivotal to the region.  
 
────────────────────────── 
1 Although ad hoc observer status in the Arctic Council is no longer granted, a special exclusion was made 
in Nuuk in May 2011 vis-a-vis 5 “old observer applicants” – the European Commission, Italy, China, Japan, 
and South Korea –after decision on new observers was taken at the Arctic Council Kiruna Ministerial 
meeting on May 15, 2013, the European Commission still holds it. 
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Today’s geopolitical reality also points to the aspirations of several 
non-Arctic States (e.g., China, Japan, S. Korea, India) and international 
and/or supranational organisations like the EU to become greater players 
in Arctic affairs. The EU has made several statements and undertaken 
numerous studies to prove that in spite of the lack of geographic proximi-
ty (with the exception of Sweden, Finland and Denmark/Greenland al-
though Greenland is not a part of the EU), the Union has its own expertise 
and role to play in the Arctic.  
Despite these developments, it is also clear that we are witnessing the 
growing importance and activism of, for example, indigenous organisa-
tions in the lobbying of their interests and in partaking in decision-making 
that concerns their homelands. For instance, the temporary suspension in 
2012 of the activities of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of 
the North and Far East (RAIPON) as a result of internal conflicts and poli-
tics in Russia, was given international resonance on the part of other in-
ternational indigenous groups and Arctic stakeholders, including an 
agreed statement of the Arctic Council in support of this organisation. 
Furthermore, there are numerous examples of region to region or infor-
mal collaboration of non-state stakeholders in advancing their needs and 
interests at the economic, cultural, educational, scientific and political 
levels internationally.  
Notwithstanding existing differences in national priorities and posi-
tions among the Arctic States (e.g., Arctic Ocean States vs. non-coastal 
Arctic States) and well-developed state level cooperation, non-state col-
laboration will continue to influence the state of affairs in the region, and, 
to a certain degree, all these Arctic stakeholders and others are interde-
pendent and share common areas of concern or benefits that may be best 
delivered by means of multilateral dialogue and partnerships. Thus, on the 
one hand, the Arctic States will have to find a balance in addressing mat-
ters of cooperation with non-Arctic States and among each other; on the 
other hand, they will also need to enhance collaboration with their sub-
regional units, indigenous and other NGOs and NPOs. These developments 
suggest that the structure of Arctic governance shall continue to be 
shaped by agendas of many multi-level governance participants operating 
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within the context of various forms of collaboration within and beyond 
the Arctic rim.  
Another set of developments took place under legal and political frame-
works. Legal and political challenges in both Poles have been extensively 
studied. Politically, new areas of cooperation have emerged. Thus, as al-
ready mentioned, in 2012 the first ever meeting of the chiefs of defence of 
all eight Arctic States was initiated by Canada and took place in Goose Bay. It 
shows that we are moving to more trust and partnership even in such a 
traditionally sensitive area as military collaboration; this is something 
which promises to change our understanding of security in the North. 
The most recent developments also deal with the resolution of some 
long-standing legal disagreements. Thus, in September 2010 after 40 
years of negotiations Norway and Russia signed the Treaty on Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
which was subsequently ratified by both states and entered into force and 
is seen by experts as an example of successful diplomacy and fruitful co-
operation for the benefit of both nations.  
In November 2012 Canada and Denmark reached an important albeit 
tentative agreement on the establishment of the maritime boundary in the 
Lincoln Sea (the body of water north of Ellesmere Island and Greenland). 
Once ratified, this agreement will modernise provisions of the 1973 Agree-
ment between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government 
of Canada relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Green-
land and Canada which created the current boundary south of the Lincoln Sea. 
Another long-standing disagreement over Hans Island was excluded from 
these negotiations and at the time of writing is still unresolved.  
The well-publicised matter of the extension of continental shelves in 
the Arctic is taking place within a process specified by the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. Of all Arctic States that are expected to extend their 
shelves beyond 200 nautical miles at the current time of writing Norway 
is the only one that has received recommendations on its 2009 submis-
sion and has proceeded to delineate its outer limit; Russia is expected to 
re-submit additional data in 2014, while Canada and Denmark are prepar-
ing to do so in 2013 and 2014 respectively. It is expected that United 
States may ratify UNCLOS in the near future, albeit it already collects all 
required data to sustain its possible submission to the commission on the 
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limits of the continental shelf. As analysed by McDorman in this textbook, 
the question of continental shelves is also relevant to the South Pole, al-
though at the moment, it presents greater interest in the Arctic as there is 
currently a “race” there among the Arctic Ocean states to collect the ne-
cessary geological and other scientific data to assist their entitlement ap-
plications. There may be some areas of overlap with respect to the Lo-
monosov and Mendeleev ridges but this is not expected to cause any in-
ternational conflict. 
Another important development focuses on the significant projected 
increase in Polar shipping and the navigation and transportation issues 
that follow from this. Due to climatic change, the reduction of sea ice, the 
growing global demand for resources and advanced technology (e.g., bet-
ter vessels and more efficient ice-breakers) and the prospects of new 
shipping routes are more promising than ever. For example, the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) in Russia is rapidly becoming a new “Panama canal” in 
the North and it is no accident that in 2012 new legislation on the NSR 
was introduced and entered into force in early 2013.  
At the global level, the development of an adequate and efficient Polar 
shipping regime which would guarantee security, reliability, environmen-
tal stability and safety with the growth of trade/commercial, tourism and 
even military shipping, is important. For example, with regards to the 
Arctic, important recommendations on a more effective Arctic Ocean go-
vernance regime were issued (e.g., the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping As-
sessment (AMSA) report of the Arctic Council).  
Furthermore, although there are procedures in place for vessels that 
operate both in the Arctic and Antarctica – “the Practical Guidelines for 
Ballast Water Exchange in Antarctic waters” (see Koivurova in Polar Law 
Textbook 2010), unresolved issues remain with regards to shipping (e.g., 
the need for legislation on marine protected areas as a protective measure 
from shipping in the Arctic). Thus, expectations are high in relation to the 
adoption, by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), of a legally-
binding Polar Code by 2015–2016 that would replace the 2009 shipping 
guidelines which apply to both Poles but are not legally-binding. 
In addition, important legislative initiatives are currently being for-
warded within the various Arctic States at the domestic level (e.g., Russia 
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is currently working on a new law dealing with its Arctic Zone which will 
define the special or beneficial treatment given to its Arctic regions). 
To conclude, improved shipping and resource accessibility precipitated 
by climatic change and various technological advances presents new chal-
lenges for both Polar Regions and puts “pressure” on some Arctic States to 
resolve existing disagreements before this “new” reality emerges. We are 
thus clearly in an era of transformation regionally, nationally and globally 
with both positive and negative impacts on the Poles. For Polar law, in light 
of this situation, the tendency from states to deal with long unresolved legal 
and political disagreements as soon as possible is set to continue.  
Although both Poles share some commonalities, developments at each 
pole are happening under different legal regimes. Thus, for a number of 
reasons, there are no prospects of an Arctic Treaty similar to that in the 
Antarctic; we could, however, see the development of several legal 
regimes for specific issues (e.g., Fisheries). One option here is to em-
ploy an eco-system based management approach via a regional agree-
ment on fisheries. The development of an adequate scientific plan for 
Arctic fisheries may therefore be essential in addressing the challenges 
of IUU (illegal, unreported, and unregulated) fishing and the conduct of 
sustainable fisheries (e.g., concerns for over-fishing/over-exploitation 
of fish and marine Arctic resources, emergence of new species, etc.).   
Furthermore, the legal entrenchment of the principle of demilitarisa-
tion in the Arctic, as is the case with respect to the South Pole, is simply 
not possible. Although in the Arctic, the trend towards increasing military 
capabilities is manifested within legitimate frameworks under the banner 
of national security and ensuring peace and stability in the region. More-
over, as far as the matter of sovereignty is concerned, in the Antarctic it is 
“frozen” by Art. IV of the 1959 Treaty (for detailed explanations of this 
issue see Polar Law Textbook 2010 & Chaturvedi 2009); in the Arctic, 
territorial sovereignty claims have now been settled except for the long-
pending dispute between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island. The 
assertion of Arctic sovereignty marks the political agenda of some Arctic 
States (e.g., Canada), although this is manifested by increasing considera-
tion of the assertion of stewardship in the region as opposed to overuse of 
the rather ambiguous term, “sovereignty”.  
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Another important area is that of resource development. In addition to 
the current focus on untapped fossil-fuels and minerals in the Arctic, wa-
ter and bio-resources are set to gain greater strategic importance in both 
Polar Regions. In that regard, questions of ownership, resource benefits, 
and the legal status of icebergs, the value, protection and usage of fresh 
water, ice, snow etc., may raise legal and/or political issues while presen-
ting economic opportunities, for instance in relation to the further deve-
lopment of bio-prospecting and genetic resources – as they can generate 
opportunities for new sources of energy, produce pharmaceutical break-
throughs and positively impact the food production and other industries.  
Global pressures in both Polar Regions are becoming more evident 
than ever, thus, Polar law will continue to develop in the nexus with poli-
tics, various sciences and as a part of a process of legal globalisation.  
Further reading 
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www.arctic-herald.ru 
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Questions 
 How will Polar law (which areas) develop further in the light of 
ongoing changes taking place in both Polar Regions? 
 What are the most important new issues in the field of Polar law? 
 What can the Polar Regions learn from each other in terms of legal-
political frameworks? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Security in the Arctic 
Lassi Heininen 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the course of the last decade the Arctic has witnessed a manifold 
growth in its geostrategic importance and in the level of global interest 
directed toward the region. This new found interest has undoubtedly 
influenced changes in Northern security (see Heininen 2010). This chap-
ter aims to look at various aspects and features of Northern security, or 
security of the Arctic region, as an appreciation of these basic security 
issues is essential for a broader understanding of the state of Arctic affairs 
as security ultimately has an impact on many of the other developments 
that concern the entire North.  
Looking back we can see that the current situation in respect of North-
ern security has been shaped by global political developments. In the 
1990s a significant change occurred in the international system, as well as 
in its security environment, when the Cold War (period) ended and the 
Soviet Union collapsed. This saw an initial reduction in military and politi-
cal tension, and was followed by international cooperation, (strategic) 
partnerships, and stability. A period of disarmament followed, which in-
cluded significant arms control actions such as the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty of 1996, and culminating in the 2010 START – Strategic Arms 
Reduction – Treaty between the Russian Federation and the USA. This 
basic change in the distribution of power at the system level saw the 
emergence of a new kind of dominance by one superpower, the USA. At 
the same time, we experienced a modernisation of the military with eco-
nomic and technical developments emphasising quality over quantity and 
a reform of military alliances, such as, for instance the North Atlantic Trea-
38 Polar Law Textbook II 
ty Organisation (NATO) which became a global actor with the extension of 
its activities “out of area”.  
In combination these factors precipitated something of a global geopo-
litical transformation from confrontation to collaboration and ultimately 
had a direct impact on the Arctic region and on Northern security calcula-
tions in particular. As a result of these changes, the scope of security in the 
Arctic moved from a traditionally military logic to one centred on other 
less tangible aspects, such as the environment, which is of vital im-
portance to the residents and people(s) of the North. It was indeed no 
accident that it was among Northerners in the late 1980s that growing 
concern emerged in respect of long-range (air and water) pollution and 
radioactivity which was, ultimately, reflected in the “environmental awa-
kening” in international affairs and specifically by the emerging discourse 
on environmental security. The result was that Northern security became 
both more comprehensive and complex as it now encompasses not only 
traditional military concerns but also other and broader issues relating for 
instance to environmental and human issues such as the impact of climate 
change (Heininen 2013). To understand the current security context in 
the Arctic one has thus first to understand the nature of security and its 
emerging general definitions. 
2.2 Definition of Security 
What is security? Unfortunately there is no single answer to this question. 
The reality is that security is not an objective concept but rather is a rela-
tive one and thus is socially constructed. In addition it includes aspects 
relating to individual, societal and environmental security. To begin to 
conceptualise this the term “securitisation” was coined which, in the 
opaque language of security discourse, is meant to signify that almost all 
issues are not increasingly “securitised”, as the Copenhagen School (on 
security studies) has argued (e.g., Buzan 1991). Security is, however, a 
complex notion which can also include nationalistic and militaristic as-
pects (e.g., environmental security risks as a result of military activities) 
(Deudney 1999). There are thus many ways to understand, determine and 
interpret “security”.  
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When defining security – the basic starting point is often: Whose secu-
rity are we talking about? Several actors and subjects (of security) exist, 
even the “owners” of security can, to some extent, also be identified. They 
are: the state – a nation, an individual/citizen, society, the international 
community/humankind. 
Unlike traditional military security which dominated for many years 
and in line with which the state, defined by the political and economic 
elite(s), is the main subject, gradually, it became evident that there is a 
need to broaden the interpretation of this approach into a more compre-
hensive concept. Thus, security became increasingly viewed from a 
broader perspective with different subjects of security now recognised. 
Accordingly, human beings as well as peoples/nations should be deter-
mined as the subjects of security. This approach, however, makes it diffi-
cult to have an objective definition of security, especially in terms of what 
it is that is to be secured. Currently, there are several ongoing discourses 
on security and its concepts – e.g., the main ones include tradition-
al/national security, environmental/ecological security, human security, 
civil/civic security, energy security, and also “economic” security, “cyber” 
security and “climatic” security, etc.  
With regards to the Arctic, it is also relevant to consider “regional se-
curity” which is based on regional particularities (Bailes & Cottey 2006) 
such as institutional and international cooperation and region-building, 
all of which are affected by globalisation and by global pressures and 
flows of globalisation, etc. These factors are significant in the Arctic con-
text and help us to define certain special features of Northern security 
(see Heininen 2010):  
 
 The so-called technology model of geopolitics – which states that if 
technology allows it, any part of the physical space of the earth can, 
and will, be used for military purposes – has been implemented in the 
Arctic since the second World War (e.g., installations of the nuclear 
weapon systems during Cold War);  
 Relationship between the environment and security/the military (e.g., 
environmental degradation of radar stations from the DEW Line in 
North America); 
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 Indigenous peoples and the military (e.g., conflict of interests between 
military training and reindeer herding in some Northern parts of 
Fennoscandia); 
 Nuclear safety (e.g., dumped radioactive waste, accidents with nuclear 
submarines); 
 Energy security (e.g., danger and risk of oil spills); and  
 The physical impact of climate change and the related “uncertainties” 
(e.g., the traditional diet of some Arctic indigenous peoples is in a 
danger).  
 
Another important factor as regards to Arctic security relates to the fact 
that there are several types of security, and “Northern security” (or securi-
ties) is potentially impacted by all of them. On the one hand, these nume-
rous types of security are closely related to each other while, on the other, 
they are intertwined with both regional and global issues. Arguably, most 
worldwide global problems, or threats, which impact the Circumpolar 
North – either by being physically present in the region, (e.g., the case of 
nuclear weapons, and long-range air and water pollution), or through 
various indirect impacts (e.g., the scarcity of resources, climate change) – 
deal with security and include a security aspect. This chapter further ex-
plores some of these types.  
2.3 Environmental Security in the Arctic 
“Environmental security” is intertwined with the environment and envi-
ronmental issues, such as nature protection (e.g., Dalby 2002). Environ-
mental degradation has impacted the Arctic region for decades. However, 
its threat was only really recognised and understood as late as the 1980s, 
mainly due to the clear impact long-range air and water pollution from 
southern latitudes began to have on the northernmost latitudes. The most 
notable examples here include: persistent organic pollutants (POPs), air 
pollution and mercury, radioactivity in some parts of the Arctic, and the 
phenomenon of Arctic haze. For instance, DDT and PCB as POPs were 
transported as long-range contaminants from the agricultural and indus-
trialised areas in the mid-latitudes of Europe and North America to the 
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Arctic by sea currents and air masses (AMAP 2002). Furthermore, the 
impacts of long-range air and water pollution, and nuclear safety, became 
the first reason for environmental concern among Northerners as well as 
the first indicator of the existence of acute global environmental problems 
in the highest latitudes of the globe (Heininen 2013). All of this also indi-
cated that environmental or ecological security was becoming increasing-
ly relevant to the general welfare of the Arctic.  
Clearly, the notions of security and the environment share a number of 
vital interrelations. For example, because of the multi-functional environ-
mental impacts of the military in peacetime, one can define the following 
main aspects of environmental security (see: Galtung 1982; Westing 1989; 
Heininen 1994):  
 
 Use of strategic minerals (i.e., copper, lead), of energy (i.e., oil as fuel), 
of land, water and air (for bases, infrastructure, patrolling and 
exercises), of intellectual resources, and of toxics, chemicals, and 
radioactive materials;  
 Pollution and CO2 emissions;  
 Nuclear and other accidents; and  
 Implications of disarmament (e.g., pressures on the environment due 
to the destruction of a chemical weapon etc.).  
 
Regardless of military activities, other aspects of environmental security 
in the Arctic are related to the exploitation of (non-renewable) natural 
resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) via activities such as: mining and oil 
drilling, industrial activities, transportation and traffic, the settlements 
and infrastructure. Moreover, real environmental concern exists over the 
possibility of future oil spills as a result of, for example, the growing 
transportation of heavy oil and liquid gas (LNG) from the Barents Sea area 
to Central and Southern Europe and North America, in addition to the 
potential consequences of other intensive sea traffic issues. 
Furthermore, at the turn of the century nuclear safety became a sym-
bol or metaphor of the new brand of international cooperation on the 
Arctic environment and environmental protection, even influencing the 
security discourse among the Arctic States (e.g., Heininen & Segerståhl 
2002). This was prompted by the problem of radioactivity in the Arctic, 
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particularly in the Barents Sea region. Since the 1990s this trans-national 
problem had arisen as a result of several events (i.e., dumped nuclear 
waste and nuclear tests in the region; the leaking UK nuclear power sta-
tion (Sellafield) on the coast of the Irish Sea). In addition other problema-
tic spots also require further measures (e.g., Andreeva Bay storage facility 
for radioactive waste-nuclear fuel from the Northern Fleet in Russia). Due 
to this, nuclear safety, i.e., issues relating to nuclear waste, spent fuel and 
nuclear weapons and plants, became an urgent item on the political agen-
da of the Arctic States. To date, the issue has mostly been kept under con-
trol, but because of its complexity and multi-functional impacts on both 
humans and the environment, it will likely remain an important matter for 
Arctic environmental security for the foreseeable future. 
Another important aspect of security in the Arctic deals with climatic 
change and its physical impacts in, and beyond, the region (e.g., ACIA 
2004). It already threatens the security of many Northern peoples and 
individuals in the Arctic and beyond, and there is no doubt that climate 
change has (had) a special influence on re-defining Northern security, as 
well as on the state of security in the Arctic. It is also manifested in why it 
was so relevant to (re)define security and to promote the concept of com-
prehensive security (Heininen 2010). In particular it reveals that the main 
reason behind this concept relates to our concern with the environment 
and nature as essential prerequisites for human existence. 
Over the course of the past two decades numerous studies and the re-
cord of ongoing cooperation among Arctic indigenous peoples on climate 
change issues have revealed several impacts on Northerners and their 
livelihoods with regards to security (i.e., food security, fishing, hunting, 
reindeer herding – ability to maintain traditional ways of life, etc.). The 
environmental security concerns of Northerners have in addition been 
raised with regards to POPs and other matters.  
Thus, there is clearly now growing concern on the part of Arctic indi-
genous peoples over environmental issues perhaps encapsulated in a 
rising environmental “consciousness” primarily targeted against the mo-
dern socio-economic development, related in particular to uncontrolled 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and the consequent degradation of the 
environment, and increasing vulnerability to natural and technological 
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hazards, unsustainable natural resource extraction as well as the related 
political issues of instability and social unrest.  
All in all, concern with the state of the environment is both natural and es-
sential to the survival of Northern indigenous peoples and other Northerners. 
The current state of the Arctic ecosystem with all the pollution and various 
other risks and threats, such as climate change, provides a concrete example 
of environmental security in general. In particular, it shows how important it 
can be to the region and its people(s). All of this also illustrates how closely 
environmental and human security are connected. Thus, this chapter will now 
seek to further explore the basic features of human security in the Arctic. 
2.4 Human Security in the Arctic 
The concept of “human security” focuses on individuals and their everyday 
security needs rather than on a nation or society as a whole. Here indivi-
duals are the subject of security. The implementation of comprehensive 
security includes a reference to the practical issues impacting a human 
beings’ life, such as ensuring good health and social and economic well-
being as well as the ability to live ones’ life in peace without interruption 
from conflict, war or violence. Thus, it entails the everyday security of 
ordinary people which is affected by traffic pollution or other kinds of 
environmental degradation; industry or other large-scale processes utili-
sing natural resources, poverty, hunger, thirst, or personal violence, and, 
more recently, by the physical impacts of climate change or other rapid 
environmental changes. On the other hand, comprehensive security also 
includes more immaterial values like political freedom, democracy, human 
rights, and freedom from a range of threats and risks, such as disasters, 
pollution and other environmental problems, hunger and starvation, di-
seases or other illness, and terrorism. It can also be interpreted to include 
cultural survival, freedom of expression and security of communication 
(e.g., Poverty&Environmental Times 2004, 6). Thus, human security also 
includes the linkage to human rights. Broadly speaking, human beings 
have the need to be made to feel secure in their everyday lives. 
Indeed, here human beings are the subjects of security. Furthermore, 
human security is a widened concept of security understood as freedom 
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from fear, freedom from want and can be interpreted to address 
categories of security, such as economic, health, food, personal, political, 
community, and environmental (e.g., Hoogensen et al. 2009). Due to the 
fact that human security has also influenced discourse in Arctic research – 
for example in the context of climate change, or with regards to oil and gas 
drilling – it has been interpreted by many as a component of Northern 
security. In the early1990s the idea of the good polity of citizens meaning 
some sort of “community” and the concept of “civil security” as per Grif-
fiths (1993) emerged to emphasise human beings as citizens with their 
intrinsic rights and duties. 
Broad concepts of security are not just theoretical or academic as these 
concepts are now widely accepted both in national and international con-
texts and used by many political actors. For example, this approach was 
adopted by the Canadian Government in the 1990s (Dwivedi et al. 2001), 
while the concept of “human security” was popularised through the United 
Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR) again, in the 1990s. In 
general the UN has provided an important international platform for the 
discourse on human security. The work undertaken to define human 
security by the UNHDR was continued by the UN in its Human Security 
Resolution 1325 (UN Security Council 2000) on gender equality, among 
other things the resolution declares the need “to protect women and girls 
from gender-based violence […] in situations of armed conflict.” Further, it 
is already practice in several, though not all, parts of the globe.  
One aspect of human security is, as noted previously, “food security”, 
which can entail a scarcity of traditional dietary and food staples. It has 
been documented by many studies (e.g., Paci et al. 2004) that climatic 
changes in the Arctic have a direct impact on the availability of food sta-
ples and thus affect the traditional dietary arrangements of indigenous 
peoples. This in turn has raised concerns over food security – safety, pri-
marily relating to potential access to traditional means of subsistence such 
as hunting and fishing in some Arctic areas (e.g., Canada’s Arctic) and the 
ability of indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional livelihood and 
practices. This also led to uncertainty regarding the future of these prac-
tices. Each of these issues precipitated changes with regards to adaptation 
to climate change, as it may be too late to mitigate its consequences in 
most instances. Those adaptation measures are currently manifested in 
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various strategies based on resilience and the usage of traditional and 
local knowledge. 
The questions raised by climate change thus not only concern the envi-
ronment and environmental security but also the impacts of high rates of 
anticipated warming on natural systems and human communities (e.g., 
IPCC 2007). Moreover, the uncertainty associated with climate change is, 
as Gleditsch (2008) puts it, one of the most serious effects people(s) and 
society(s) face, and all of this fundamentally impacts their everyday (hu-
man) security. As has already been noted, this has a direct impact on the 
Arctic. Furthermore, one can draw connections between human security 
and civil security which is intertwined with food safety and supply.  
In sum, climate change already challenges and indeed threatens the se-
curity of many Northern peoples as well as the stability of Northern set-
tlements. In specific terms it poses major risks to coastal communities 
(e.g., Shishmaref community in Alaska). Therefore, climate change with its 
physical impacts and the associated levels of uncertainty it produces, has 
become an important security issue and thus a significant day-to-day fac-
tor in the lives of Northern peoples, and thus of the Arctic States.  
2.5 Energy Security in the Arctic 
“Energy security” is an important and developing issue in the Arctic. In 
terms of general comprehensive definitions, energy security includes not 
only security of supply, but also security of investment, as well as of the 
environment, and energy cooperation or dialogue. In the Arctic, energy 
security has a growing strategic importance for the national interests of a 
state in ensuring its access to energy resources; it also plays a key role in 
foreign policy as well as in the economics of a state.  
Arctic energy security has become a highly political and strategic issue 
as, according to rough estimations, a significant share of the world’s un-
discovered oil and natural gas are located north of the Arctic Circle, main-
ly in the shelf of the Arctic Ocean. The potential for new found riches of 
the High North is then the major driving force in the littoral states’ desire 
to seek extensions to their continental shelves. Although this is totally in 
accordance with UNCLOS rules, as the Russian expedition to the bottom of 
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the North Pole in August 2007 confirmed, in the media, it has been edito-
rialised as constituting a “race” for energy resources and thus the poten-
tial incubator of emerging conflicts (e.g., Beary 2008).  
This alone does not justify the strategic position given to energy secu-
rity in the Arctic. One additional factor is required to confirm the im-
portance of energy security in the region and this is what is generally 
termed, the “Arctic paradox” (e.g., Palosaari 2012). Accordingly, climate 
change has acted here like a trigger to increase the utilisation of natural 
resources and made the potential energy resources of the shelves of the 
Arctic Ocean strategically important. Therefore, in relation to Arctic ener-
gy security climate change can be viewed as a more important factor than 
the scarcity of conventional oil. 
All in all, energy security has become a significant new factor in the ri-
sing strategic importance of the Arctic in world politics and in the increas-
ingly globalised world economy due to the rich energy resources of, or 
options to harvest them within, the region, particularly those of Norway, 
Russia and the United States. In addition to the routine defence of national 
security and state sovereignty, these Arctic States have taken on the re-
sponsibility to protect strategic energy resources, such as oil and natural 
gas deposits, and ensure their safe transportation. Furthermore, these 
states are ready to guarantee energy security by the military means, if 
necessary. This is in line with the traditional viewpoint of Realpolitik, and 
that of classical Geopolitics, emphasising state hegemony and national 
interests, such as state sovereignty, economic welfare and prosperity and 
traditional, national security. As such, we will now turn to a discussion of 
traditional security. 
2.6 Traditional Security in the Arctic 
“Traditional security” generally means weapon-oriented, unilateral and 
national military security (see: Newcombe 1986), where a state is the 
subject of security. This means that security, or peace, is guaranteed by 
the military, or by military deterrence. Further, the pursuit of national 
security is taken as a guarantee of state sovereignty and thus national 
security does not have a price.  
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The military aspect of national security includes all aspects of normal 
national defence and routine patrolling (e.g., activities of strategic nuclear 
submarines, SSBNs and long-range strategic bombers), testing of wea-
pons/weapon systems, deployment of weapon systems, radar stations and 
forces, the training of and military exercises performed by troops. It also 
includes the whole nuclear weapon system (e.g., permanent weapons such 
as testing, land-based deployment, bases for ships and aircraft, and sto-
rage; transit – ships, aircraft, port calls and staging by aircraft; weapons-
related involvement – missile testing, surveillance/communication, and 
uranium; non-weapon involvement – dumping, storage, provision, and 
nuclear energy) and its implementations.  
In the Arctic context, traditional security means several things. Cur-
rently, there is no military tension in the Arctic, however, the region con-
tinues to host important military structures and armies, especially the 
nuclear weapons system of the USA, and that of the Russian Federation. It 
is also a strategic area for the testing of new weapons and arms systems. 
As noted previously, NATO is still present in the High North and in addi-
tion to its traditional role as a transatlantic organisation for collective 
defence, it has recently expressed more interest in the Arctic region.  
As such, a complex continuity of high military-political importance ex-
ists. While in some parts of the Arctic military bases and radar stations 
have been closed and activities concluded or decreased, in other parts 
military areas have been extended and new areas are being used by the 
military such as, for example, on land in Alaska, Northern Greenland and 
the Kola Peninsula and in marine areas in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean. All in all, the military presence in the region, either for routine 
military defence, control of national borders and the enforcing of sover-
eignty or for global and strategic military hegemony through the deploy-
ment of nuclear weapon systems, consists of several kinds of military 
structures, functions and activities (Heininen 2010).  
Based on SIPRI’s detailed study of “Military Capabilities in the Arctic” 
(Wezeman 2012) the following military structures can be found in the Arctic:  
 
 Military structures for defence, patrolling, guarding (e.g., Coast Guards, 
SSBNs); surveillance, monitoring (e.g., radars, satellites), for attack 
(e.g., combat aircraft, nuclear attack submarines, SSNs); 
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 Military exercises (e.g., Northern Edge/ Alaska Shield Exercise, 
Norwegian-Russian joint exercises, etc.), weapon’s and strategy 
testing, and military and cold weather training; 
 The command, control, communications and intelligence, or C3I, 
systems including radars, satellites and other surveillance systems 
(e.g., the North-American Air Defence system – NORAD, The US radar 
base in Thule, Greenland; and the US National Missile Defence system – 
NMD), and reconnaissance aircraft; 
 The nuclear weapon systems of Russia and the USA, including strategic 
nuclear-powered submarines (e.g., older Russian SSBNs are being 
modernised and new ones already have this equipment and can 
operate under sea ice), attack submarines (e.g., most of US ones are 
able to operate under the sea ice). 
 
The testing of new weapons, arms systems and military applications, mili-
tary training and exercises in the Arctic has, in addition, become a vital func-
tion of the military. Arguably, this is a result of the political attitude which 
suggests that the conduct of such activities is technically more suitable in 
these sparsely-populated “empty” northern areas. Moreover, as noted pre-
viously, this occurs despite the fact that such activities have implications for 
the fragile Arctic ecosystem and may cause environmental pollution, thus, 
clearly, threatening both environmental and human security. 
The Arctic States have, however, undertaken only a limited modernisa-
tion of their military equipment, and adjustments to their force levels and 
structures (Wezeman 2012). Despite a lack of real nuclear disarmament in 
the region, and the fact that the Arctic is becoming more accessible, these 
changes in military capabilities have little, if nothing, to do with any po-
tential, or claimed, power projection into the Arctic. In reality they much 
more readily reflect a significant change of power in global balance. The 
defence of national security and sovereignty has, however, due to climate 
change become a sensitive issue to some Arctic States (e.g., Canada’s 
Northwest Passage; Russia’s Northern Sea Route).  
Moreover, climate change has already been interpreted as a potential 
threat to national sovereignty, and thus become a relevant security factor 
from the point of view of traditional security, in sparsely-populated Arctic 
areas. Furthermore, in the traditional national security terms climate 
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change plays a dualistic role because, on the one hand, it makes it easier to 
gain access to the icy northern seas thus helping to potentially increase 
the utilisation of natural resources and their transportation. While on the 
other, it acts like a trigger, or it is used as an excuse, for the militarisation 
of the area, or for new national claims to expand the right to utilise natural 
resources. Consequently, the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, as well as 
NATO, have become more interested in non-military aspects of security of 
the Arctic. This is unlikely, however, to precipitate an armed race for Arc-
tic riches. One consequence of this is that sometime in the future, the issue 
may become a traditional security issue demanding traditional answers, 
such as more military defence. Although it has been shown that climate 
change security is rooted in issues of both environmental and human se-
curity, it remains important to re-define the security dimension of climate 
change and to emphasise its global factor in the promotion of stability.  
The military presence in the Arctic, which is primarily due to the legacy 
and “militarisation” of the Cold War period, thus remains in place. There are 
no imminent military security threats in the foreseeable future, but a “new” 
threat such as climate change has been taken into consideration in the theo-
retical discourse, and new points of view and premises added to that of 
traditional security. Interesting enough, the nuclear safety issue has already 
prompted a change in the definitions used in security discourse(s) and with 
climate change discourse having the potential to do the same.  
2.7 Conclusion  
Many global problems broadly relating to security issues can be witnessed 
in the Arctic (e.g., nuclear weapon systems, radar and missile defence 
systems, climate change, long-range pollution, ozone depletion, etc.). As 
has been shown above, despite the fact that the general definition of secu-
rity can be employed in the Arctic region, Northern security nevertheless 
has its own specific additional features which are reflective of Northern 
particularities. The evolution of Northern security has been gradually 
developing and has witnessed major changes since the end of the Cold 
War seeing numerous new developments over the past two decades. As a 
result, the shift from “confrontation” to stability and institutionalised 
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peaceful cooperation has also had a significant influence on the general 
state of security in the region. The Arctic, as of 2013, is then highly stable 
and is based on a well-established process of institutionalised interna-
tional cooperation. No indications currently exist of rising tensions which 
are likely to be translated into armed conflict or other serious internal 
security issues. In conclusion, since the end of the Cold War Northern 
security has become more comprehensive and complex primarily through 
the inclusion of its aforementioned environmental and human aspects. 
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Questions 
 How do you see the future of Northern security developing, and are 
there any emerging issues or new challenges on the horizon?  
 What types of security are relevant to the Arctic region, or can be 
considered for further studies?  
 What is the role of a security institution, if any? 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Agreement on 
Cooperation on Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic – A New 
Chapter in Polar Law 
Anton Vasiliev 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent political, technological and climatic changes have transformed the 
perception of the Arctic region, within its boundaries and beyond, from 
the traditional view – of an unreachable and almost unliveable corner of 
the world – to the new understanding – which sees it as an area of innova-
tive progress and as a land of huge opportunities. Technological progress 
has allowed reaching out for something that was previously unthinkable 
while climate change and the continuous and rapid thawing of the Arctic 
sea ice are making Arctic mineral resources and shipping routes more 
accessible. The economic development of the Arctic is now occurring and 
presents enormous possibilities, attracting human, fiscal and business 
capital to the region. This development is focused essentially on the explo-
ration and extraction of oil and gas. For example, industrial drilling on the 
Arctic continental shelf starts on the Prirazlomnoe and the Goliath oil rigs 
in the Russian and Norwegian parts of the Barents Sea in 2013. Substan-
tial developments in Arctic tourism can also be seen (e.g., cross-polar air 
flights, cruise tours, and trips to the North Pole), as well as developments 
in navigation mainly in relation to the Northern Sea Route which has seen 
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a significant increase in international transit shipping. The expansion of 
economic activity in the Arctic brings a greater human presence which 
entails growing risks to peoples and their livelihood in the still extremely 
harsh natural conditions of the High North with its low temperatures, 
periods of darkness, ice, permafrost, etc.  
These newly emerging Arctic realities suggest an increasing need for 
collaboration between the various relevant stakeholders across a variety 
of issues. That is why, in parallel with the developments outlined above, 
we are also witnessing a substantial expansion of cooperation between 
the Arctic States and the increasing role of the Arctic institutions among 
which the Arctic Council plays a key and ever growing role since its incep-
tion in 1996. One of the primary dimensions of the Council’s work focuses 
on issues of emergency prevention, preparedness and response (EPPR) in 
the Arctic. Thus, this chapter looks at the evolution of the Council’s work, 
initiatives and outcomes in this area. More specifically, it looks at the de-
velopment of the pioneering and first-ever binding agreement prepared 
under the aegis of the Arctic Council, namely, the Agreement on Coopera-
tion on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR) 
which came into existence in May 2011. I served as a Co-chair of the Arctic 
Council Task Force on SAR from 2010–2011, however, the views ex-
pressed here do not necessarily reflect the position of the Arctic Council 
and, as such, should be viewed as personal based on my own experience 
and understanding of this issue. 
3.2 The Arctic Council and its Agenda on EPPR 
As ensuring the safety and security of its citizens is one of the basic func-
tions of any state, cooperation in the prevention of and in combating 
emergencies has become, since its establishment, one of the highlights of 
the Arctic Council’s agenda. It is no accident that one of the specialised 
working groups of the Arctic Council became the “EPPR”– a group respon-
sible for the issues of emergency prevention, preparedness and response. 
This group was actually established even earlier than the Council, in 1991, 
within the framework of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
forum, which preceded the creation of the Arctic Council. From the outset, 
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the EPPR was engaged in many projects, driven by justified expectations 
that increased international cooperation between the Arctic States could 
to a certain extent compensate for the deficiencies in the relevant national 
capabilities and that the sharing of relevant information could be benefi-
cial for all. The EPPR succeeded in undertaking many projects and gained 
a lot of important and positive experience. Although the output of the 
EPPR was limited to scientific studies, the accumulation of best practices 
and producing non-binding recommendations, it was in this group where 
the idea of not only theoretical, but also practical and multilateral coope-
ration in search and rescue (SAR) and, more generally, in fighting emer-
gencies in the Arctic, was first discussed. 
3.3 The Development of the SAR Instrument Proposal 
These Arctic Council discussions culminated in the emergence of several 
initiatives from the Arctic States and other interested stakeholders. For 
example, the Russian Federation was the first to formulate a concrete 
proposal to work out an agreement in this field, initially tabled within the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) in 2003, and in 2004 in the Arctic 
Council. The negotiations within the BEAC ultimately resulted in the ela-
boration and signing in 2008 in Moscow of the Agreement between the 
governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the European Commis-
sion) on Cooperation within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Prepar-
edness and Response.2  
Despite this positive development within the Arctic Council the pro-
posal did not win immediate consensus support, although it did became 
“food for thought” in the capitals of the Council’s Member States. Mean-
while, the Arctic Council began work on a more global framework project 
led by the Russian Federation and Norway – “Safety systems in implemen-
────────────────────────── 
2 http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Agreement_Emergency_Prevention_Preparedness_and_ 
Response_English.pdf 
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tation of economic and infrastructural projects in the Arctic.” This project 
was adopted at the Council’s Ministerial meeting in Tromsø in April 2009, 
which noted its comprehensive character and importance in minimising 
the risks of increased human activity. This project provided a general 
framework for movement towards the construction of a future region-
wide collaborative safety system able to manage and counter all kinds of 
man-made catastrophes and other emergencies. Its discussion in an Arctic 
Council context stimulated further consideration in the national capitals, 
which resulted in a formal proposal by the USA in the Arctic Council to 
start negotiations on the SAR instrument. This proposal was also adopted 
by the Tromsø Ministerial meeting which approved the formation of a task 
force authorised to develop and finalise negotiations on an international 
instrument on collaboration on Arctic search and rescue operations by the 
2011 Ministerial meeting of the Council.  
3.4 The SAR Instrument Task Force and its Work 
In conformity with its mandate, the Arctic Council SAR Instrument Task 
Force was initiated in December 2009. The group consisted of around 60 
participants. The Russian Federation and the USA co-chaired the negotia-
tions held within this Task Force. Being its Russian co-chair, I would like 
to pay tribute to the professionalism and dedication demonstrated 
throughout the negotiations by my distinguished Task Force co-chair, 
Ambassador David Balton from the US State Department. It is also evident 
that the negotiations would not have led to a meaningful conclusion with-
out the interested and creative work undertaken by all of the Arctic Coun-
cil member state delegations – Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of 
America. The delegations were comprised of representatives from various 
relevant national ministries and agencies – defence, transport, national 
security, emergencies, coast guards and others. Representatives from the 
Arctic Council’s “Permanent Participants” – associations of indigenous 
peoples of the North – were invited to all rounds of the talks; although 
they were not able to attend (the negotiators were the governmental de-
legations, representing the relevant institutions with direct responsibili-
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ties and capacities for SAR operations). The negotiations enjoyed the close 
attention of the Danish chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2009–2011, 
including the Chair of Senior Arctic Officials, Ambassador Lars Møller. Co-
chairs have also regularly briefed the Council on the intermediary out-
comes of the Task Force’s endeavours. 
The negotiations required five full Task Force sessions. These meetings 
were held in 2009–2010 in Washington, Moscow, Oslo, Helsinki and Rey-
kjavik respectively with the kind sponsorship of the governments of the 
host countries. In order to facilitate the final “polishing” of the agreed text 
teleconferences were organised. In accordance with the principles of the 
Arctic Council, all issues arising in the context of the negotiations were 
resolved by consensus. The negotiations represented a process of very 
intensive and detailed discussion. The working atmosphere was business-
like, friendly and constructive. All were united by a common task and in 
the end it was fulfilled right on time. In my judgment, this inaugural nego-
tiation process between all the Arctic States per se will be conducive to the 
further strengthening of mutual understanding, trust and cooperation in 
the Arctic. It was a significant and a useful experience. 
3.5 Key Features of the SAR Agreement 
The issue of the legal nature of the instrument was actively debated at the 
first three sessions. The reasoning of those who advocated a legally bin-
ding instrument, rather than a politically binding memorandum of under-
standing or declaration, ultimately prevailed, which immediately added 
importance to the negotiation process. Its product became an Agreement 
on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic, signed in Nuuk, Greenland, 12 May 2011.  
As has been emphasised in its Article 2, “The objective of this Agreement 
is to strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue co-operation 
and coordination in the Arctic.” In essence, the Agreement is about better 
regional cooperation and coordination in extending free help to people in 
distress in the Arctic, irrespective of who they are, how they got there and 
what they were doing. The Agreement does not however deal with the issue 
of salvage in relation to ships, aircraft or other hardware – though this could 
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become an area of cooperation and the subject of subsequent agreements. 
The focus of the SAR Agreement is thus placed firmly on saving people 
caught in distress in the Arctic.  
The Agreement is based on the existing and valid universal international 
documents, namely, the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR Convention), the 1944 Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention), and the International Aeronautical and Ma-
ritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual, published by IMO and 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation), which the Arctic States will 
continue to comply with. All principles, mechanisms, rights and obligations 
provided in these documents shall be fully respected and implemented.  
The same understanding applies to the existing bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and memorandums (e.g., Agreement between the Government of 
the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on co-
operation in maritime and aeronautical search and rescue in the Baltic Sea; 
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Go-
vernment of the Russian Federation concerning cooperation on searches for 
missing persons and the rescue of persons in distress in the Barents Sea; 
Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Canada, the United 
States and the United Kingdom concerning search and rescue; Agreement by 
and between the Government of the Finnish Republic and the Government of 
the Russian Federation about cooperation to avert disasters and to prevent 
their consequences; Agreement between the Government of the republic of 
Finland and the Government of the Russian Federation regarding cooperation 
in respect of maritime and aeronautical search and rescue; Agreement be-
tween the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Sweden regarding cooperation in respect of maritime and aero-
nautical search and rescue; Search and Rescue Agreement between Com-
mander, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific, and Commander, Seventeenth 
Coast Guard District United States Coast Guard, Juneau, Alaska; Agreement 
between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on cross-border collabora-
tion with the aim of preventing or limiting personal injury and damage to 
property or the environment; Operational Agreement between the Swedish 
and the Danish aeronautical and maritime search and rescue services; Opera-
tional Agreement between the Swedish and Norwegian authorities, responsi-
ble for aeronautical and maritime search and rescue; Agreement between the 
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Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on maritime search and rescue; Agreement be-
tween the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden concerning cooperation in respect of aeronautical 
and maritime search and rescue; Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concern-
ing cooperation in respect of aeronautical and maritime search and rescue; 
Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic region on 
cooperation within the field of emergency prevention, preparedness and 
response, and others), although the 2011 pan-Arctic SAR Agreement will take 
precedence over them.  
The text of the Agreement incorporates a preamble, 20 articles and one 
annex. The Agreement also has three appendices attached to it. While the 
Agreement builds on the existing international instruments, it does not 
simply reproduce their contents as applied to the Arctic, but rather has 
significant added value.  
3.6 Key Provisions of the SAR Agreement 
First, as a result of long negotiations, the parties to the Agreement (i.e., the 
governments of the 8 Arctic States) have established their distinct zones 
of responsibility as per this Agreement, named “search and rescue re-
gions.” The description of the geographical scope of the Agreement for 
each party is provided in the Annex to the Agreement, which is an integral 
part of the agreement and is thus legally binding. The flight information 
zone borders of the Chicago Convention were taken as a basis for the rele-
vant division lines between the SAR zones of responsibility. However, 
some division lines were adjusted and agreed bilaterally during separate 
consultations in the Task Force and were subsequently corrected by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the new flight infor-
mation zone borders. Experts from ICAO took part in several rounds of 
negotiations and were instrumental in providing the Task Force with up-
dated technical information. As regards the southern limits of the zones of 
responsibility, each country took its own decision. The Agreement clearly 
states that the delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to 
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and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States 
or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction. Such delimitations 
are made and applied exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement. 
The clarification of the SAR regions (responsibility zones) of the parties 
has practical significance, eliminating grounds for possible misjudgements 
on whose responsibility it is to initiate and coordinate the SAR operation. 
This also takes away any grounds for possible misinterpretation of the situ-
ation, the division of labour or the distribution of roles between the states 
and their relevant agencies thus also facilitating quicker search and rescue. 
These provisions are of the utmost importance as when you are saving peo-
ple’s lives time is everything. An illustrative map of the geographical zone of 
application of the Agreement was prepared, but it was not made a part of 
the agreement and serves only for explicative purposes.  
Secondly, the parties have clarified which specific agencies in their 
own countries are responsible for different aspects of SAR operations and 
other activities, proceeding from the premise that a three-layered com-
mand system is in place everywhere. This command system includes: 
 
 Competent authorities;  
 Agencies responsible for SAR operations; 
 Rescue coordination centres. 
 
These specific agencies are listed in the appendices to the agreement 
which are of an informative nature only and thus are not legally binding. 
Any party can unilaterally adjust/update this information on its relevant 
agencies and inform the other parties about the changes in the appendices 
through the depositary of the Agreement.  
The “competent authorities” denote the political level in the SAR deci-
sion-making hierarchy, “agencies” are the governing units with either a 
territorial or a functional sphere of competence, and “rescue coordination 
centres” are the units which undertake the practical SAR work and pos-
sess the necessary equipment and personnel.  
Such clarification is important in a practical sense because it reduces 
the need to engage in length inter-state communications at the onset of 
any new incident and clearly allocates responsibility to specifically named 
actors for all imaginable phases of the SAR activities, including SAR opera-
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tions. In practical terms this helps to identify all the addresses of the par-
ticipants in respect of SAR activities and – where an incident does occur – 
ensures that they can be reached immediately just by pressing one com-
puter button, as everything is now pre-programmed. 
Importantly, this clarification also had a positive feedback impact on 
the clarification of the division of labour in respect of SAR activities in the 
Arctic within some states because the existence of a large number of par-
ticipating ministries, agencies and units did not generally allow for the 
creation of a streamlined and coherent SAR management system in coun-
tries where multiple agencies had emerged in this field.  
Thirdly, the parties have introduced simplified regime for entry into 
each other’s territory for search and rescue purposes, including for refuel-
ling. Indeed, it has now become a legally binding obligation to use the 
most expeditious border crossing procedure possible for the SAR person-
nel and equipment of the other parties to the agreement for these ends. 
These provisions will also help to speed up the arrival of international 
assistance thus making SAR operations more efficient. 
Fourthly, the parties have also reached agreement on a whole series of 
cooperation measures in relation to the implementation of the Agreement. 
They include, inter alia, the exchange of information (such as: communica-
tion details; information about search and rescue facilities; lists of available 
airfields and ports and their refuelling and resupply capabilities; knowledge 
of fuelling, supply and medical facilities; information useful for training 
search and rescue personnel); the exchange of experience; arranging ex-
change visits between search and rescue personnel; joint review of actual 
SAR operations; implementation of joint research and development initia-
tives; conducting regular communications checks and exercises, etc.). These 
measures enhance the level of preparedness of the personnel involved in 
possible SAR operations, simplify people-to-people contacts, raise the level 
of awareness of partner capacities and reinforce predictability in respect of 
practical actions in the course of SAR operations. 
The Agreement provides for a mechanism to oversee its own imple-
mentation. All the relevant decisions shall be taken at the regular meeting 
of the parties. Possible disagreements on the application and/or interpre-
tation of the Agreement are to be resolved through direct negotiations.  
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These are the major areas where the Agreement constitutes a signifi-
cant regional step forward compared to the established global legal re-
gime on maritime and aeronautical search and rescue. But it also stipu-
lates that the parties shall cooperate with non-Arctic States if they are able 
to contribute to the conduct of search and rescue operations. These non-
parties shall be obliged to help in accordance with the basic international 
SAR conventions, although they will not enjoy those extra benefits which 
the Arctic States will provide to each other according to the Agreement.  
3.7 Importance of the SAR Agreement 
3.7.1 Practical Significance  
The Agreement has both practical and political importance. In practical 
terms, it is supposed to decrease reaction times thus increase operational 
effectiveness. In so doing it also provides additional incentives for the 
further exploration and development of the Arctic.  
The Agreement shall be implemented upon its entry into force; the 
agreement has come into force in January 2013. Importantly, even before 
the formal entry of the Agreement into force the member states began to 
implement it de facto. In September 2011, Canada – the depository of the 
Agreement – initiated the first table-top exercise, held in Whitehorse (Yu-
kon), within the framework of the Agreement. All the Arctic States sent 
their SAR representatives to the exercise which explored a number of 
scenarios relating to vessel and airplane accidents in the Russian Arctic 
and the consequent multinational SAR operation. According to both or-
ganisers and participants these were very successful and useful exercises.  
In September 2012 Denmark initiated the first field exercises within 
the framework of the Agreement, its scenario being a cruise ship accident 
in the Greenland Sea. This was also a really useful event. Both Canada’s 
and Denmark’s exercises have confirmed the strong interest of the Arctic 
States in SAR cooperation and the high practical value of the Agreement. 
It should also be noted that from the outset of the process all of the partic-
ipants exchanged information about their available SAR capacities in the Arc-
tic and their actual use. The general picture in the region however remains 
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patchy with national capacities remaining very limited and modest for the 
most part, although there are some exceptions. The implementation of the 
Agreement will undoubtedly encourage the more effective use of all available 
SAR resources through cooperation, but in reality this cannot substitute for 
efforts to enhance national SAR capabilities in the Arctic which should take 
priority. The Agreement itself does not contain any direct obligations on this 
issue, indeed, Article 12 states in this regard that “Implementation of this 
Agreement shall be subject to the availability of relevant resources.” 
Nevertheless, the discussion of the new Arctic realities and of the inevi-
table growth of risks in the Arctic that took place throughout the negotia-
tion process will, hopefully, be conducive to the re-invigoration of national 
efforts in this regard. For example, after the signature of the Agreement in 
2011 the Russian Federation took a domestic decision to establish, by 2015, 
ten new and well-equipped SAR monitoring and coordination stations (run 
by EMERCOM, the Russian Ministry of Emergencies) in various Arctic towns 
and ports spread evenly along the Northern Sea Route.  
Interestingly, the limited SAR capabilities of the Arctic States could be 
enhanced by the military vessels, airplanes and other infrastructures lo-
cated in the Arctic or in close proximity to it. But this was not discussed at 
the negotiations or reflected in the Agreement. Nevertheless, the possibili-
ty of military assistance to ensure the implementation of the Agreement 
and in relation to other emergency operations in the Arctic was one of the 
main topics of discussion at the first ever meeting of the Chiefs of Defence 
and senior military officials of the 8 Arctic States, held by Canada at Goose 
Bay Air Base (Labrador) in April 2012. No doubt, possible cooperation 
between the military will be a major additional asset in the practical im-
plementation of the Agreement. In addition, SAR cooperation in the Arctic 
clearly also provided the impetus for multilateral cooperation between 
the region’s militaries and highlights one of the important political impli-
cations of the Agreement. 
3.7.2 Political Importance of the SAR Agreement 
In addition to the points highlighted above, the main political value of the 
Agreement comes from the fact that this is the first ever legally binding 
document elaborated under the aegis of the Arctic Council and the first 
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truly pan-Arctic legally binding document (the only other multilateral 
Arctic binding document, the 1973 Polar Bear Agreement, was signed by 
only five of the eight Arctic States – Canada, Denmark, Norway, the USA, 
and the USSR).  
The signing of the SAR Agreement is a manifestation of the new level of 
trust and cooperation in the Arctic and further illustrates the ability of all 
Arctic States to agree among themselves and bear responsibility for the 
state of affairs in the Arctic. It is, of course, a major contribution to the 
Polar/Arctic law.  
The Agreement lays out the ground-breaking precedent of a legally 
binding decision taken by the Arctic Council. Previously, all “products” of 
the Council were limited to declarations – political recommendations 
which, although they were agreed upon by the member states, were not 
legally binding. This Agreement is thus a clear step forward in the process 
of the gradual strengthening of the Arctic Council, the key multilateral 
institution in the Arctic. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The SAR Agreement opens up a new chapter in terms of Polar/Arctic law 
and charts the ongoing evolution of the Arctic Council. At the 2011 Minis-
terial Meeting of the Council in Nuuk, Greenland, important decisions on 
its strengthening were taken, including making more binding decisions, 
along with the establishment of its standing secretariat with its own 
budget, and the streamlining of the relationship between the Council and 
observers. In my mind, this is a step forward in the gradual transfor-
mation of the Arctic Council, which is currently only a “forum,” albeit a 
high-level intergovernmental forum, into a full-fledged international or-
ganisation. However, as the Council’s decisions are taken by consensus, 
this transformation may still require some time. 
The signing of the Agreement has raised the level of expectations of the 
Arctic Council. As always, one success brings about the taste for more. 
Building on this successful experience, the Arctic Council has taken the 
decision to establish for the period of the Swedish chairmanship, in the 
period 2011–2013, a new Task Force to develop an international instru-
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ment on Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response, a no less 
important issue in respect of Arctic cooperation. Negotiations were ap-
parently highly productive in this regard and it is expected that a new 
legally binding pan-Arctic agreement will be prepared and signed at the 
next Arctic Council ministerial meeting in May 2013. In this sense, the SAR 
Agreement has paved the way for other legally binding pan-Arctic instru-
ments, which will build on it while using it as a precedent and as an intel-
lectual and political foundation. In a broader sense, being itself a product 
of the “warming” of the political climate in the Arctic, it significantly raises 
the level of collaboration between all of the Arctic States. 
The significance of the SAR Agreement goes far beyond its practical 
contents. In short, this is history made today. It will always be remem-
bered as such, as a major step on a way to a new, peaceful, prosperous and 
safe Arctic.  
Further reading 
The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic, 12 May 2011: www.arctic-council.org  
Questions 
 What are the key factors that contributed to the evolution of the Arctic 
Council and its willingness to move from traditional soft-law 
instruments towards legally-binding ones, e.g., the SAR Agreement? 
 Does the SAR Agreement have a significant impact on general 
cooperation and the wider state of affairs in the Arctic? 
 What are the other areas in which the Arctic Council could show 
further leadership and affirm itself as the primary institution for 
multilateral cooperation in the Arctic?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Polar Regimes Tackling 
Climate Change 
Timo Koivurova 
4.1 General Framework of Climate Regime in the 
Polar Regions 
Climate change as a global problem was first addressed in the context of 
the UN climate regime, which commenced with the adoption in 1992 and 
entry into force, in 1994, of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Given that this treaty, which commands almost 
universal support, lays out only very general climate change mitigation 
and adaptation duties for states, it was only natural that states negotiated 
a Protocol (Kyoto Protocol) to lay down binding emission reduction tar-
gets for the industrialised states in 1997 (entry into force in 2005). The 
first commitment period, within which industrialised states were ex-
pected to cut their greenhouse gas emissions, ran from 2008 to 2012.  
It is still the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (including a vast number 
of conferences and meetings between the parties and where the decisions 
are taken detailing these rules) – the so called climate regime – that pro-
vides the framework under which any mitigation measures to tackle the 
problem of climate change are sought. The December 2012 climate regime 
meeting in Doha was able to agree on a second commitment period for 
some industrialised states, led by the European Union and Australia, but 
many others dropped out. Of the Arctic States, Russia did not join the se-
cond commitment period and Canada had already withdrawn from the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2011 while the United States had never been a party to 
it. Yet, perhaps the most important future decision achieved in the context 
of the climate regime was at the 2011 Durban Climate Conference where 
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the states agreed to negotiate “a protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all 
Parties.” The formulation does not however make it clear what kind of a 
legal outcome the parties actually committed themselves to. The goal of 
this negotiation process is nevertheless to set binding emission reductions 
after 2020 for all parties – even industrialising countries and the United 
States. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities thus 
seems to be gradually releasing its grip in the climate regime.  
There is however no reason to celebrate this achievement as it seems 
likely that the world community will not be able to keep the rise in global 
temperature below two degrees, the figure which constitutes the accepted 
threshold that cannot be exceeded if the objective recorded in the UN-
FCCC, namely, the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system (Article 2), is to be observed. Most scien-
tific evaluations state that if we intend to keep the temperature rise below 
two degrees above pre-industrial levels, global emissions should be at 
their highest in 2015 decreasing steadily thereafter with the legal treaty 
entering into force as late as 2020. 
Even if the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is not 
formally a part of the climate regime, it has been the scientific data that 
the IPCC collects and synthesises that has influenced the course of the 
climate regime. In the most recent 2007 Inter-Governmental Panel as-
sessment on Climate Change, both Polar Regions were deemed to be expe-
riencing the ongoing impacts of climate change (as they were in the 2001 
IPPC Assessment). The impacts on the Arctic are, however, much more 
pronounced. As numerous scientific studies have shown, climate in the 
region is an indicator of climate change worldwide. Moreover, climate 
change in the Arctic has been recognised for some time. Average tempera-
ture has risen twice as fast in the Arctic as those in the rest of the world. 
Of particular interest however is the rapidly receding and thinning Arctic 
Ocean sea ice, which demonstrates how quickly climate change is pro-
gressing – 2012 marked the lowest summer sea ice extent since satellite 
measurements began in 1979. The rise in temperature will moreover have 
overwhelming repercussions for the region’s ecosystems though it will 
also render its economic potential more accessible. The retreat of the sea 
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ice among other changes has however brought about opportunities for 
economic development and, in turn, prompted numerous studies on how 
the region’s oil and other natural resources could be exploited, its tourism 
potential increased, and its navigational waterways utilised. The impacts 
of climate change to the Antarctic are less pronounced, even if there is 
clear evidence that Antarctica (especially the Antarctic Peninsula) and the 
Southern Ocean faces various impacts. Yet, as the IPCC 2007 report points 
out, changes in Antarctica are difficult to predict though they are likely to 
be of significant importance, given that in the long-term these processes 
have the potential to have an irreversible impact on ice sheets, global 
ocean circulation and sea-level rise, each of which potentially have both 
regional and global impacts. 
This difference in the impact of climate change in respect of the Polar 
Regions is reflected in the way the two polar regimes have responded to 
the challenge of climate change. For example, the Arctic Council has come 
up with innovative ways of tackling climate change regionally while the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has seen less ambitious policy responses.  
As Chaturvedi shows, there was a definite reluctance in Antarctic Trea-
ty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) to deal with climate change until the 
middle 2000s (starting gradually from 2004 onwards), even if IPCC Re-
ports highlighted Antarctica as an area of special concern as early as 2001; 
climate change was dealt with under various agenda items, for instance, in 
the most recent ATCM in Hobart Australia 2012 it was addressed in the 
context of “Climate Change Implications for the Environment: Strategic 
approach.” It was however the 2009 Climate Change and Environment 
Report prepared by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
(SCAR) that was instrumental in raising the profile of climate change at 
the ATCM’s. The Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the impacts of 
climate change for the management and governance of the Antarctic re-
gion was held in Norway in April 2010 producing 30 recommendations 
for adoption by the XXXIII ATCM in Uruguay in May 2010; most of these 
recommendations were based on the SCAR report and had the effect of 
raising the profile of climate change in the ATS. Chaturvedi (2012:279) 
estimates that “climate change will be somewhere near the top of the 
agenda of future ATCMs”, even if its current position is still fairly weak. 
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Both polar regimes have, however, acknowledged the challenges cli-
mate change poses, in particular in the future. Moreover, they affirmed in 
their joint 2009 Washington Declaration that scientific information from 
the Polar Regions should feed into our overall understanding of climate 
science, with the findings produced in the context of the IPCC seen as par-
ticularly relevant. As the Arctic Council has already made a real effort to 
address climate change, it will be useful in the remainder of this chapter to 
focus on its efforts to influence the mitigation of climate change and the 
adaptation efforts undertaken to combat its impacts. It will, moreover, be 
important here to examine the ways in which this soft-law based and in-
ter-governmental regional body has been able to function in a policy area 
that needs, primarily, to be tackled globally. 
4.2 Arctic Council and Climate Change  
Climate change presents a policy problem that requires concerted action 
across the whole of international society. All states and other stakeholders 
need to come up with a series of joint actions to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gases, given that all of them contribute their production (even 
if to varying degrees), and climate change will impact us all. This does not 
mean that the biggest greenhouse gas emitters should not shoulder most 
of the reduction measures. It is the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities that underlies the climate change regime (1992 UNFCCC, 
its 1997 Kyoto Protocol and all decisions and measures taken under the 
climate meetings), which functions as the main mechanism by which the 
international community tries to both curb greenhouse gas emissions and 
adapt to their inevitable consequences. This principle means that the in-
dustrialised states are obligated to take the lead in tackling climate 
change, while developing states need only take lesser measures (for in-
stance, they do not have to commit to any binding emission reductions).  
Moreover, even if climate change is a global problem, it does not mean 
that no one is legally responsible for its impacts, even if this may be diffi-
cult to establish. For example, the international Inuit Circumpolar Council 
– an indigenous NGO representing these Arctic peoples – in its 2005 peti-
tion to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights tried to demon-
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strate that the United States has violated several of the human rights of 
the Inuit via its irresponsible climate policy. In a similar vein, Small Island 
states whose land is expected to inundate because of rising sea levels, 
have pondered various ways of litigating against the biggest greenhouse 
gas emitter states but none of this has, as yet, led to any action.  
What then can an intergovernmental regional soft-law forum – such as 
the Arctic Council – do to contribute to the mitigation of climate change 
globally and to help in adapting to its consequences locally?  
4.2.1 Scientific Influence 
The scientific results of research on climate change will form the basis of 
the way in which it is tackled even if it is also true that the current climate 
regime has not been taking scientific results as seriously as it perhaps 
should have. It is science that has established that our globe is warming, 
and therefore that its climate has changed in numerous ways, it is there-
fore also science that we have to rely on (in large part) when deciding 
measures on climate change. 
The Arctic Council has made its strongest impact on mitigation 
measures via sponsoring large-scale scientific assessments, starting with 
the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). It was the ACIA – an 
assessment conducted by 300 scientists and indigenous traditional 
knowledge experts – that established the Arctic as a barometer of climate 
change, a region where the average surface temperatures change (both 
past and in the future) twice as fast as in the rest of the world. ACIA also 
established climate change as a cross-cutting policy issue within the 
Council and was followed by many other relevant scientific assessments, 
such as the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA). From the 
viewpoint of climate change adaptation, the most important project so far 
is the Council’s 2007 project on Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate 
Change in the Arctic (VACCA), which focused on collecting and disseminat-
ing information on various adaptation measures taken in the Arctic. 
More importantly, ACIA led also to specific projects highlighting the im-
portance of the Arctic as part of the global climate system. The 2011 Snow, 
Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) project highlighted the 
importance of Arctic surfaces, the melting of which will further accelerate 
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climate change, both regionally and globally. The taskforce on short-lived 
climate forcers (such as black carbon) increased knowledge on the path-
ways transferring black carbon to the Arctic and what policy measures are 
available to counter this. Nevertheless, what is important here is that the 
Arctic Council taskforce has not only taken up the issue (as well as others, 
such as methane) of reduction measures in larger international policy-
making fora (such as in International Maritime Organisation – IMO) but also 
demonstrated that the Arctic States can do a lot themselves. 
There have been numerous ways in which these Arctic Council spon-
sored scientific endeavours have influenced policy. For instance, the 2004 
ACIA was the first regional climate change assessment to demonstrate the 
importance of the Arctic’s place in the functioning of the global climate 
system. The influence of the ACIA can be seen not only via the research 
results themselves but also in the fact that many of the same scientists 
that were implementing ACIA also took part in the 2007 IPCC assess-
ments. Hence, given that IPCC assessments have, and continue to be, im-
portant for the development of the global climate regime, the Arctic Coun-
cil has done its part in contributing to the global science of climate change. 
It can also be argued that by placing a considerable importance on climate 
change impacts in the Arctic the Council has also increased awareness of 
the consequences of climate change and thereby induced awareness of the 
need for both mitigation and adaptation measures in particular. 
4.2.2 Direct Policy Influence 
As argued above, the main way in which the Arctic Council has been able 
to influence policy is via sponsoring climate science. Has the Arctic Council 
then been making decisions that have exerted influence on climate policy 
and law? ACIA did contain policy recommendations albeit very weak, 
mainly encouraging the dissemination of the results of the assessment, 
and how climate change should become a cross-cutting issue in the Coun-
cil. The main question evidently is whether the Council has been able to 
act as a platform for its member states to act in a global climate regime. 
After all, the Council member states and permanent participants were able 
to influence the negotiations of the global 2001 Stockholm persistent or-
ganic pollutants convention and were able to agree in AMSA that they 
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would support the negotiations in IMO to transform the non-binding Polar 
Code into a legally binding one. The Council has thus shown that it can be 
used as a vehicle for strong international environmental policy by Arctic 
actors, if they so desire. 
The Arctic States have indeed issued joint statements in the climate 
regime annual conferences of parties, e.g., in conferences of the parties 
in Cancun, Mexico (2010) and in Doha, Qatar (2012). The most recent 
statement, made by all the Arctic Council member states in 2012 in Do-
ha, expresses particularly strongly the concerns these states have over 
developments in the Arctic: 
“Arctic sea ice is rapidly diminishing. September 2012 saw the lowest sea 
ice extent observed in modern times. Summer sea ice extent in 2012 was 
only half of the (1980–2000) average summer sea-ice extent […] Re-cord 
high temperatures and surface ice melt were recorded over the Greenland 
Ice Sheet in the summer of 2012. We are now witnessing feedbacks from 
changes in Arctic snow and ice conditions to the global climate system and 
there is justified concern that Arctic warming will spur further melting and 
global warming.” 
They also urge the international community to “implement additional 
measures to address short lived climate forcers, including through cuts in 
emissions, which can help to slow Arctic near-term warming” and affirm 
that “Arctic States will continue to spearhead these efforts.” They also 
signal that they are committed to strong efforts to avert climate change 
and “to limit the rise of global temperature to below 2 degrees Celsius, 
thereby avoiding potentially irreversible changes to the Arctic and global 
climate.” These are very strong words especially from countries like the 
United States, Russia and Canada. 
Evidently, these joint statements by the Arctic Council member states 
do not reflect the realities of the climate policies of the very same states. 
As mentioned above, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol (with 
effect from 14 December 2012) a protocol to which the United States nev-
er even become a party. Even Russia did not commit to a second commit-
ment period target under the Kyoto Protocol. It is thus quite clear that 
climate policy is such a big policy area for these states that it is not Arctic 
considerations alone that dictate the way they conduct their climate poli-
cy, but rather other more broad-based considerations.  
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4.3 Conclusion 
It is fair to say that the Arctic Council has been able to find itself something 
of a niche here, where it can fulfil an important function in the struggle 
against climate change. By sponsoring major scientific assessments, it can 
help deepen our knowledge in relation to the importance of Arctic climate 
change impacts on the world as a whole and in so doing, at least in its own 
way, contribute to the design of better climate mitigation policies. It is likely 
however that the most important function these Council assessments have 
had is to raise the level of awareness among the residents in the Arctic of 
the changes they will face, which, in turn, has arguably induced greater 
awareness of the need for adaptation to climate change in the region. 
Even if the Arctic Council member countries, together with the region’s 
indigenous peoples, have been able to act in concert in some global policy-
making processes, tackling climate change is just too high-level a policy 
area for Arctic considerations alone to play a role in the way the Arctic 
States conduct their mitigation policies. Even in the field of adaptation, the 
national strategies of the Arctic States do not greatly flag up the Arctic as a 
special place of concern. Although the Arctic does play an important sym-
bolic role in the fight against climate change in general, it does not figure 
prominently in the climate policies of the Arctic Council member states. 
Both Polar regimes do have the opportunity to raise the profile of their 
climate change policies. With the ongoing increase in the level of scientific 
knowledge, the ATS has gradually taken up climate change as an issue of 
concern, and there are signs that climate change issues will play a more 
prominent role in the ATS in the future. It seems that the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties are now increasingly ready to take action in the con-
text of the global climate change regime. This is important, given that the 
Polar Regions play a very significant role in how climate change evolves, 
and in very concrete terms: e.g., the more the ice sheets of Greenland and 
the Antarctic melt, the quicker the sea level rises. It is nevertheless im-
portant for the two Polar regimes to go beyond what they are doing al-
ready by providing their climate science results to the IPCC while also 
undertaking joint actions in global climate change conferences. 
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Further reading 
Antarctic Treaty-Arctic Council Joint Meeting Washington Ministerial Declaration 
on the International Polar Year and Polar Science, see at 
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/other/2009/121340.htm 
Sanjay Chaturvedi. “The Antarctic “Climate Security” Dilemma and the Future of 
Antarctic Governance,” in Alan D. Hemmings, Donald R. Rothwell & Karen N. 
Scott (eds.), Antarctic Security in Twenty First Century. (London: Routledge, 
2012): 257–283.Timo Koivurova, Eva Carina H. Keskitalo & Nigel Bankes (eds.), 
Climate Governance in the Arctic. (USA: Springer, 2009). 
Doha Statement (Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, United States of America. Statement to Unfccc Cop XVIII), 
2012. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/press-room/653-
arctic-states-release-unfccc-cop-18-statement 
Final Report of the Thirty-ﬁfth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Hobart, 
Australia), 11–20 June 2012, Volume I, at 
http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM35/fr/ATCM35_fr001_e.pdfIPCC – Climate 
Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and vulnerability (execu-
tive summary, chapter 15 Polar Regions, Arctic and Antarctic), at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch15s15-es.html 
Questions 
 Why do you think it is difficult to take up climate change as a policy 
problem to be addressed in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings? 
 How would you suggest the Arctic Council could function more 
effectively in the global climate regime? 
 How can the Polar Regimes co-operate together to strengthen the 
measures used to combat climate change globally? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The International Legal 
Regime of the Continental 
Shelf with Special Reference 
to the Polar Regions3 
Ted L. McDorman 
5.1 History and Basic Legal Features 
Lawyers and scientists have differing understandings of the term conti-
nental shelf. In straight-forward terms, the physical continental shelf is 
one component of the continental margin that involves the shelf, slope and 
rise. These are described as distinct physical features. The legal under-
standing of the continental shelf is premised on the physical but is one of 
legal definition, as will become clear below, is not necessarily related to 
the physical features. An obvious situation of the physical-legal distinction 
concerns Antarctica, where, as explained below, there is a physical conti-
nental shelf adjacent to the continent, but debate whether there is or can 
be a legal continental shelf. 
────────────────────────── 
3 Much of this chapter has come from papers written by the author over the years with appropriate 
modification. Also, Professor McDorman is currently on secondment to the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade working on Canada’s submission on the 
outer limits of its continental shelf. The contents of and views contained in this chapter are personal and 
do not reflect the views or opinions of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, or the Government of Canada. 
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The history of the international legal regime of the continental shelf is 
closely linked to hydrocarbon resources. The first international instru-
ment dealing with the continental shelf, albeit using the phrase submarine 
areas and “sea-bed and sub-soil” outside territorial waters rather than 
continental shelf, was the 1942 Treaty between the United Kingdom and 
Venezuela in respect of the Gulf of Paria, which involved the division of oil 
fields. In order to deal with the increasing level of offshore oil activity in 
the Gulf of Mexico, the United States through the 1945 Truman Proclama-
tion on the Continental Shelf asserted exclusive U.S. authority over the 
resources in the continental shelf adjacent to the United States. Many 
States, in particular Latin American States, made similar continental shelf 
claims in the immediate post-Truman Proclamation period. 
The principal features of the international legal regime of the continen-
tal shelf were solidified in the 1950s in the preparatory work undertaken 
leading up to the First U.N. Conference on the Law of Sea in 1958. The 
principal features, set out in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf and repeated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, largely 
reflect the economic and geopolitical importance, for coastal states, of 
controlling offshore hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in their 
adjacent seafloor areas.  
 
 The international legal basis of a coastal State’s authority over a 
continental shelf is adjacency. The International Court of Justice in the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases introduced the concept of 
“natural prolongation” in the context that a coastal State has rights 
over the area of the continental shelf “that constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory.”  
 The nature of coastal State’s rights over the continental shelf is 
“sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its 
natural resources” and these rights are exclusive to that State. Thus, 
the international legal right is not ownership per se and is focused on 
natural resources (mineral resources and sedentary fish species).  
 Coastal States are legally able and have the exclusive authority to 
construct and maintain installations and other structures for the 
purposes of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the 
continental shelf.  
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 Coastal State rights over the continental shelf do not depend upon 
occupation or an express proclamation. The International Court in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases commented “that the rights of the 
coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf […] exist ipso 
facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land. In short, 
there is […] an inherent right” (para. 19). The basic importance of this 
is that every coastal State has an adjacent continental shelf without the 
necessity of making a public claim.  
 The rights of a coastal State over the continental shelf “do not affect the 
legal status of the superjacent waters” or the airspace above those 
waters. In the 1958 wording, the waters were referred to as high seas, 
while in the 1982 wording no reference is made to high seas.  
 
The legal regime of the continental shelf is functionally based in that the 
adjacent coastal State has exclusive authority over exploration and exploi-
tation of the natural resources of the shelf but other uses of the shelf, for 
example the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, are subject to rea-
sonable measures, open to all States.  
5.2 Outer Limit of the Shelf 
5.2.1 Overview 
What the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention did not accomplish was the 
establishment of a definable outer limit of the continental shelf. Article 1 
of the 1958 Convention provided two criteria for the outer limit of the 
shelf – the seabed and subsoil within the envelope of waters to a depth of 
200-metres “or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources.” The term “ex-
ploitability” was seen as being tied to hydrocarbon exploration and devel-
opment possibilities and the unwillingness of coastal States to forego ac-
cess to these resources in their adjacent offshore areas. Moreover, as a 
matter of law, “exploitability” was flexible and ambiguous.  
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Unlike in 1958, during the negotiation of the LOS Convention (the Third 
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973–1982) there was a necessity to 
provide for a definitive outer limit of the continental shelf because of the 
“Common Heritage of Mankind” and the International Seabed Authority 
(ISBA), since the ISBA and the Common Heritage were to apply to the mi-
neral resources of the seafloor beyond national jurisdiction, in other words 
beyond the outer limits of coastal States’ continental shelves.  
The first step respecting the location of the outer limit of the continen-
tal shelf was the acceptance that all coastal States could apply the legal 
regime of the continental shelf to the seafloor out to 200 nautical miles 
regardless of whether the physical continental margin reaches that far. 
While the continental shelf regime is legally distinct from the 200-n. mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and predates the emergence of the EEZ in 
international law and practice, it is generally accepted that a coastal State 
within its EEZ has exclusive rights as regards respecting all the resources 
therein and this includes the resources of the seafloor of the EEZ.  
The second outer limit step involved the situation where the physical 
continental margin extended beyond 200-n. miles. Here compromise was 
necessary between those States which took the view that international 
law already acknowledged exclusive coastal State authority over the shelf 
beyond 200-n. miles based on inherent rights and “exploitability” and 
those States seeking to limit coastal State continental shelf authority at 
200-n. miles. The negotiated compromise involved three new and distinc-
tive features of the legal continental shelf regime:  
 
 A complex formula for determining the outer limit of a State’s 
continental shelf beyond 200-n. miles;  
 The establishment of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (Commission), a body composed of science specialists, designed 
to interact with States in applying the above complex formula; and  
 Coastal State sharing of revenues with the international community 
respecting mineral resources exploited by a coastal State from the 
shelf area beyond 200-n. miles.  
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5.2.2 The Criteria 
The criteria agreed upon in the LOS Convention to be applied by a coastal 
State in determining its outer limit in respect of the continental margin 
beyond 200-n. miles is succinctly set out below.  
 
 Pursuant to Article 76(4), an envelope for the outer limit of the margin 
is first created by determining the foot of the continental slope and 
then constructing:  
o A line connecting the outermost points where “the thickness of 
sedimentary rocks is at least one % of the shortest distance from 
such point to the foot of the continental slope.” 
o A line connecting points “not more than 60 nautical miles from 
the foot of the continental slope.” 
 The envelope created by Article 76(4) is subject to two constraints. 
The lines created pursuant to 76(4) are not to extend beyond: 
o 350-n. miles from a State’s baselines. 
o 100-n. miles from the 2,500 metre isobath. 
 For submarine ridges, the 350-n. mile constraint applies. However, for 
“submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental 
margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs,” either 350-n. 
miles or 100-n. miles from the 2,500 metre isobath is the constraint.  
 There is a general limitation that the continental margin does not 
include the oceanic floor with its oceanic ridges. 
 
The criteria are not easily applicable in any given situation because of 
the technical and definitional difficulties of determining the thickness 
of sedimentary rocks, the foot of the continental slope, the 2,500 metre 
isobath, and distinguishing among submarine ridges, oceanic ridges, 
and submarine elevations that are natural components of the continen-
tal margin.  
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5.2.3 Process 
The LOS Convention provides that a coastal State is to submit information 
supporting its proposed outer limit of its “legal” continental shelf to the 
Commission. The Commission is to consider the submitted material and 
make recommendations to the submitting State regarding the information 
received and the relevant Article 76 criteria. There are two points to note 
here. First, the authority of the Commission is solely as regards the outer 
limit of the continental shelf. Second, it is the coastal State not the Com-
mission that determines the outer limit of its continental shelf beyond 
200-n. miles. This is consistent with the reality that the determination and 
delineation of a maritime boundary is a political act of a coastal State. It is 
also worth noting the practice that is developing in respect of the relation-
ship between submitting States and the Commission is that submitting 
States are treating the Commission, while not as a court, nevertheless as a 
body whose opinion (recommendations) matter and, as result, as a body 
which needs to be satisfied. The outcome of the application of the outer 
limit criteria and process is described in Article 76(8) of the LOS Conven-
tion – the “limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of 
these recommendations shall be final and binding.” There is debate about 
upon whom the limits established by a coastal State are “final and bind-
ing” – the State establishing its outer limits; all State Parties to the LOS 
Convention; all States.  
In the 2012 Bay of Bengal Case (Bangladesh/Myanmar), the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was confronted with the 
question of the relationship between the continental shelf outer limit cri-
teria and procedures (the Commission) in the LOS Convention and the 
international legal right of a State to its adjacent continental shelf. Put 
differently, can a coastal State only exercise jurisdiction over the re-
sources of the continental shelf beyond 200-n. miles after the Commission 
has dealt with the outer limit of the coastal State’s shelf? The ITLOS an-
swered no, stating that: “A coastal State’s entitlement to the continental 
shelf exists by the sole fact that the basis of entitlement, namely sover-
eignty over the land territory, is present. It does not require the estab-
lishment of outer limits” (para. 409). In the preceding paragraph, the 
Judgment provides that entitlement to the continental shelf does not de-
pend “on any procedural requirements” (para. 408). Thus, as was also 
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already noted a State has an inherent right to a shelf beyond 200-n. miles 
(where it physically exists) and the LOS Convention provides a procedural 
opportunity to establish the outer limits of that shelf that will enhance the 
opposability of those limits vis-à-vis other States or, as it has been de-
scribed, the Commission process provides legitimacy to a coastal State’s 
outer limits.  
5.2.4 Submissions to the Commission and Submission 
“Politics” 
The most significant unforeseen development in respecting the continen-
tal shelf in the first thirty years of the LOS Convention has been the num-
ber of States of the view that they have a legal continental shelf beyond 
200-n. miles adjacent to their coasts. During the negotiation of Art. 76 it 
was projected that 30 or so States had adjacent continental margins be-
yond 200-n. miles that would result in the employment of the outer limit 
criteria and procedures of Art. 76. What has occurred, however, has far 
exceeded that number. 
The first submission to the Commission was from Russia in 2001. Since 
then, the Commission had received 60 submissions of information respect-
ing the outer limits of a continental shelf and an additional 45 notices of 
intent by States to make future submissions. These numbers involve a de-
gree of double-counting since some States, for example Ireland, have made 
two separate submissions, one for its proposed outer limit of shelf area 
adjacent to Ireland on the Porcupine Abyssal Plain and another as part of a 
Joint Submission with France, Spain and the United Kingdom regarding the 
Celtic Sea and Bay of Biscay. Double-counting also arises, for example, re-
garding Cuba, which submitted a notice of intention to submit and shortly 
thereafter made its Submission to the Commission. The number of States 
having made either a submission or indicated an intention to submit is ap-
proximately 80 with Canada, the last of the original 30 States that are party 
to the Convention, to join the list in 2013.While the LOS Convention is clear 
that the work and recommendations of the Commission are “without preju-
dice” to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States 
with opposite or adjacent coasts, nevertheless, the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission provide States with the opportunity to “block” the Commission 
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from proceeding to consider submissions where a “dispute in the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf between opposite or adjacent States or in other 
cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes” exists. This has occurred, for 
example, between Argentina and the United Kingdom as regards the shelf 
area adjacent to Malvinas/the Falkland Islands. Regarding Iceland’s block-
ing of a submission made by Denmark, see below.  
In many situations, submission “politics” have been neutral or even posi-
tive. Many States in the preparations for their submissions have communi-
cated with neighbouring States that may be affected in order to obtain a “no 
objection” from that State for the Commission to proceed to consider the 
submission, subject to the “without prejudice” understanding. One recent 
such example is Canada’s “no objection” note verbale to Denmark’s submis-
sion concerning the shelf area beyond 200-n. miles within the Labrador Sea 
(over which Canada will also be making a submission), that was the product 
of the close cooperation between the two States. In the case of Australia and 
New Zealand, the 2004 boundary agreement that applies to the EEZ and 
continental shelf beyond 200-n. miles appears to have been motivated by 
the desire of the two States to resolve their boundaries before proceeding to 
the Commission. The 2010 Norway-Russia Maritime Boundary Agreement, 
which deals with only a small area of continental shelf beyond 200-n. miles, 
but a much larger area within 200-n. miles, may have been facilitated by the 
discussions between the States on their respective submissions to the 
Commission. Innovatively, Denmark, Iceland and Norway through the 2006 
Agreed Minutes have essentially agreed on the delimitation of the “southern 
banana hole” in the Northeast Atlantic pending their submissions to the 
Commission and re-commendations supporting their individually proposed 
outer limits in the “banana hole”.  
5.2.5 Revenue-Sharing 
Thus, far there has been no production of mineral resources beyond 200-n. 
miles to which the revenue-sharing (Art. 82) provision would apply. It is diffi-
cult to predict when and to whom the Art. 82 obligation will first apply with 
there being no obvious situation on the horizon. Moreover, the provision is 
not without interpretative complexities that the coastal States with the poten-
tial for resource production beyond 200-n. miles will need to face. 
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5.3 The Continental Shelf in the Arctic  
5.3.1 Overview 
The five States that border the central Arctic Ocean basin, Canada, Den-
mark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States, in word and 
deed, apply the international law of the sea to the Arctic Ocean in much 
the same manner as all coastal States deal with their adjacent ocean 
areas by reference to the law of the sea. This is the case even though the 
Arctic Ocean, especially the central Arctic Ocean basin, is a unique, sensi-
tive and relatively pristine marine environment and this includes the 
“special” nature of the impact that developments in the Arctic environ-
ment (global climate change) may have on global weather, sea-levels, 
ocean currents, etc. While during the negotiation of the 1982 LOS Con-
vention little attention was paid to the Arctic Ocean, it was not totally 
absent from consideration. It has been observed that: “The fact that the 
Arctic rarely received specific mention (at the negotiations) – by virtue 
of an unspoken “gentleman’s agreement” among Arctic and non-Arctic 
nations – took little away from the general applicability of the Conven-
tion to the Arctic” (Johnston ed., 1982:12).  
While the Arctic Ocean was not at the forefront of State considerations 
during the negotiation of the continental shelf beyond 200-n. miles, the 
Arctic Ocean was not entirely absent from their thinking. During the nego-
tiations on the criteria to be adopted in respect of the outer limit beyond 
200-n. miles, the United States, for example, had concerns about the pos-
sible misuse by Russia of Arctic ridges as a means of claiming large areas 
of the Arctic Ocean. Moreover, in 1980 the United States made it clear that 
it viewed the Chukchi Plateau in the central Arctic Ocean basin as being a 
“submarine elevation” and thus the feature was not to be understood to be 
a submarine ridge, one of the key factors in the outer limit criteria. In the 
May 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the five Arctic Ocean States endorsed that: 
“the law of the sea provides important rights and obligations concerning 
the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf” and that the 
States were committed to “this legal framework and to the orderly settle-
ment of any possible overlapping claims.” Further, in reference to the 
continental shelf, protection of the marine environment, freedom of navi-
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gation, marine scientific research and other uses of the sea, the five Arctic 
Ocean States made it clear that they saw “no need to develop a new com-
prehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.” This 
does not preclude, however, the development of international treaties and 
other instruments dealing with specific matters. 
Despite the above, as noted at the beginning of the chapter, the media 
story respecting the seafloor in the Arctic Ocean is often that the bordering 
States are desperately “scrambling” to assert claims in order to eventually 
reap the anticipated bonanza of hydrocarbon and other potential mineral 
wealth in the seafloor. The depositing of a Russian flag on the seafloor at the 
North Pole in early August 2007 was an exceptional publicity event which 
encouraged the media narrative of conflict and sovereignty assertion re-
specting untold energy riches in the Arctic Ocean. While over-hyped there is 
the possibility of hydrocarbon and other energy and mineral resources in 
the seafloor of the Arctic Ocean. At present, however, most of the known 
resources are within the 200-n. mile zones of the Arctic States.  
5.3.2 Outer Limits 
What “scramble” has been taking in the Arctic Ocean amongst the borde-
ring States has been one of acquiring scientific data respecting the geologi-
cal and morphological features and other physical properties of the conti-
nental margin in the Arctic Ocean. In December 2001, the Russian Federa-
tion submitted to the Commission information respecting its proposed 
outer limit of the continental margin beyond 200-n. miles. The Executive 
Summary contained coordinates and maps which indicated that the Rus-
sian-claimed area covered a large wedged-shaped portion having as its 
endpoint the North Pole. The Commission has requested that additional 
information be provided respecting the continental shelf outer limit pro-
posed by Russia in the Arctic Ocean. Russia has indicated that it will pro-
vide such information in due course. It is anticipated that Canada will be 
submitting information to the Commission on its proposed continental 
shelf outer limit in the Arctic Ocean in 2013 and Denmark/Greenland is 
expected to follow suit in 2014. Both Canada and the Denmark/Greenland 
have “unofficial” charts and maps on websites and elsewhere, which pro-
vide pictorial guidance in respect of possible shelf areas beyond 200-n. 
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miles that may be enclosed by proposed outer limits. The United States is 
not a party to the LOS Convention and thus is under no obligation to sub-
mit information to the Commission. The United States has, however, indi-
cated its intentions to act in a manner consistent with the wording of Art. 
76 and, like Canada and Denmark/Greenland, has made public charts and 
maps on websites and elsewhere indicating areas of the continental shelf 
beyond 200-n. miles in the Arctic Ocean. 
Only Norway has submitted information to the Commission, received 
recommendations and announced that it will proceed with outer conti-
nental shelf delineation on the basis of the its recommendations. The area 
involved is a small slice beyond 200-n. miles northwest of Svalbard. 
Iceland, Denmark and Norway have coordinated their submissions to the 
Commission in respect of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas within the so-
called “banana hole” as a result of the above-noted 2006 Agreed Minutes. 
Norway has received recommendations in respect of that part of its submis-
sion that dealt with the “banana hole”, the Commission has however yet to 
deal with the submissions of Iceland and Denmark. Iceland’s 2009 submission 
to the Commission also deals with an area to the southwest of Iceland and 
southeast of Greenland on the Rekyjanes Ridge. To the southeast of Iceland 
and south of the Faroe Islands is the Hatton-Rockall area. In December 2010, 
Denmark made a submission to the Commission respecting this area and in 
2011 Iceland responded by blocking the Commission from dealing with the 
Danish submission noting that the area “is part of the Icelandic continental 
shelf but is subject to overlapping claims by Denmark on behalf of the Faroe 
Islands and the United Kingdom.” (Iceland, Note Verbale, 5 April 2011, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk54_10/ 
isl_5apr11.pdf.)  
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5.3.3 Bilateral Agreements 
There are three maritime boundary agreements that deal with shelf areas 
within the central Arctic Ocean basin. The 1990 United States – Soviet 
Union (now Russian Federation) Agreement, which also deals with the 
Bering Sea, establishes the boundary for the territorial sea and the 200-n. 
mile zones of the two States in the Arctic Ocean and indicates, in Art. 2, 
that the line extends into the Chukchi Sea should the continental margin of 
both States extend beyond 200-n. miles. The 1990 Agreement is, there-
fore, a complete boundary for the two States in the Arctic.  
In 2006, Denmark/Greenland and Norway (Svalbard) completed a con-
tinental shelf and fisheries zone maritime boundary agreement. The line 
appears to follow an equidistance line utilising the coasts of both Green-
land and Svalbard. This Agreement supports the view of Norway that 
Svalbard is capable of generating offshore zones and is to be taken into 
account in maritime boundary delimitation.  
The 1957 Norwegian – Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) Agree-
ment, delineates the maritime boundary between Norway and the Russian 
Federation for a distance of 24.35-n. miles within the Varanger Fjord. The 
exciting new agreement is that between Norway and the Russian Federa-
tion entered into in 2010. The Agreement is the result of nearly 40 years 
of negotiation and creates a single line for the EEZ and continental shelf 
area beyond 200-n. miles through the Barents Sea and into the central 
Arctic Ocean basin.  
Canada and Denmark have a continental shelf boundary from Davis 
Strait to the Lincoln Sea. The boundary terminates in the Robeson Channel 
before entering the Lincoln Sea that is part of the Arctic Ocean and, thus, is 
incomplete. There is also a small gap in this maritime boundary as a result 
of the sovereignty dispute over Hans Island.  
The Jan Mayen Case between Denmark and Norway before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice resulted in 1995 in a maritime boundary agreement 
between the two States. This was followed in 1997 with a maritime 
boundary accord between Iceland and Denmark/Greenland and a subse-
quent one between Greenland and Iceland. The 1990s flurry of activity 
followed two agreements in the early 1980s between Iceland and Norway 
delimiting their respective fishery zones and continental shelf and ended 
with agreement on a tri-junction point between the three States. 
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5.3.4 Overlapping Claims Disputes 
There are only two cases in the central Arctic Ocean basin where there are 
clear situations of overlapping claim disputes. One is between Canada and 
the United States in the Beaufort Sea and the other is between Canada and 
Denmark/Greenland in the Lincoln Sea. Both involve overlapping 200-n. 
mile zone claims. As regards the continental shelf beyond 200-n. miles in 
the central Arctic Ocean basin, there are as yet no overlapping claim dis-
putes as none of the States have officially indicated the extent of their 
continental shelves beyond 200-n. miles.  
It is however quite likely that there is an area of continental shelf beyond 
200-n. miles adjacent to the Beaufort Sea that may be subject to overlapping 
Canadian and U.S. claims. It has been noted that beyond 200-n. miles strict 
equidistance, favoured by the United States within 200-n. miles, rather than 
an extension of the 141st meridian, favoured by Canada within 200-n. miles, 
becomes more favourable to Canada and less favourable to the United 
States. The two States are cooperating in the collection of data and mapping 
respecting the seafloor area (possible continental shelf) adjacent to the 
Beaufort Sea. It is reported that Canada and the United States are in the 
early stages of discussions about the Beaufort Sea dispute. 
As already noted, the 1973 Canada – Denmark/Greenland Continental 
Shelf Agreement does not extend into the Lincoln Sea. It is however re-
ported that both States accept that equidistance should be used to deline-
ate their overlapping territorial sea and 200-n. mile zone claims in the 
Lincoln Sea. It is likely that the continental shelf in the Lincoln Sea area 
extends beyond 200-n. miles from each State. It is reported that Canada 
and Denmark/Greenland are engaged in negotiations on some of the 
above matters. 
The possible dispute between Norway (Svalbard) and Den-
mark/Greenland regarding claimed continental shelf areas beyond the 
200-n. mile limits in the Arctic basin is referred to in their 2006 bilateral 
Agreement and the 2006 Norwegian submission to the Commission. In 
Norway’s submission to the Commission it was indicated that Den-
mark/Greenland did not object to the Commission considering the Nor-
wegian proposed outer limit in this area and that a maritime boundary 
will be negotiated between the two States.  
90 Polar Law Textbook II 
It may be the case that Russia will have a continental margin area be-
yond 200-n. miles in the Arctic Basin that overlaps with shelf areas of both 
Denmark/Greenland and Canada. In response to the 2001 Russian sub-
mission to the Commission, both Denmark and Canada explicitly noted 
that the Russian submission and any recommendations by the Commis-
sion were “without prejudice to the delimitation of the continental shelf” 
between the States. In the case of Denmark/Greenland, the seafloor area 
in question is most likely to be related to the Lomonosov Ridge. The sea-
floor area in question between Canada and Russia may also involve the 
Lomonosov Ridge as well as the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge. Until Canada and 
Denmark/Greenland indicate the extent of their continental shelf in the 
central Arctic Ocean basin, it is unclear whether or not there exist over-
lapping claims. This should become clearer when Canada and Den-
mark/Greenland submit their information to the Commission on their 
proposed continental shelf outer limits.  
5.4 The Continental Shelf in the Antarctic? 
As noted in the first paragraph of this Chapter, there is little doubt that 
there is a physical continental shelf adjacent to the Antarctic land mass. 
The question is whether, pursuant to the LOS Convention, there exists a 
legal continental shelf. More generally, the reality of the continental shelf 
and Antarctica is that a series of questions remain to be answered.  
Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United 
Kingdom – the Antarctic 7 – have territorial claims in Antarctica and, of 
course, there is part of Antarctica that is unclaimed by any State. States such 
as – India, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia and the United States, among oth-
ers – do not recognise the territorial claims of any of the “Antarctic 7” and 
ipso facto, that any of the “Antarctic 7” States are capable of having an adja-
cent legal continental shelf.  
Further complicating the situation is Article IV(2), seen as the critical 
provision of the Antarctic Treaty respecting potential continental shelf 
jurisdiction both within and beyond 200-n. miles. Article IV(2) provides: 
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“No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. 
No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereign-
ty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”  
Does an Antarctic State’s assertion of authority over an area of continental 
shelf adjacent to its claimed territory constitute a “new claim” or an “en-
largement of an existing claim”? If yes, then the assertion of authority by 
the Antarctic State is inconsistent with Article IV(2); if no, then the asser-
tion of authority is not captured by Article IV(2).
4
  
Australia, Argentina and Norway have submitted information on their 
proposed outer limits of shelf areas adjacent to their claimed territory in 
Antarctica to the Commission understanding that, because of the obvious 
legal and political uncertainty, the Commission will not be able to deal 
with the submitted material.  
Beyond the reach of the Antarctic Treaty, are sub-Antarctic islands un-
der the authority of Australia, France and Norway and the islands of dis-
puted authority between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Submissions 
of information respecting proposed outer limits have been made to the 
Commission in respect of these islands.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The international legal regime of the continental shelf has a distin-
guished history and is largely set out in the LOS Convention. The core 
parameters of the regime are well understood and applied in a con-
sistent manner by States. On bilateral matters, States have been involved 
────────────────────────── 
4 These questions of interpretation are however more complex than perhaps they first appear. See, for 
example, Stuart B. Kaye, “The Outer Continental Shelf in the Antarctic” in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald 
R. Rothwell, eds., The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 2001), at 133–136. Another question worthy of consideration here is whether the unclaimed 
land area on the Antarctic continent is legally capable of having an adjacent continental shelf. Again, see 
Kaye, at 131–133 for arguments. 
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with continental shelf overlaps and related issues for decades. What has 
been new in the last decade is the application of the criteria in Art. 76 
respecting the outer limits of the legal continental shelf by States and the 
engagement of States with the Commission. 
Issues regarding the continental shelf in Antarctica have been largely 
ignored as compared to those pertaining to the continental shelf in the 
Arctic Ocean. An entire industry has been created raising deeply-felt 
concerns over a “race for the resources” on the ocean floor. The frenzy 
was undoubtedly ignited by the flag planting “photo opportunity” con-
ducted by the Russians at the North Pole. This has been coupled with:  
 
 The reduction both in the presence and thickness of ice attributed to 
global climate change;  
 Reports of oil and gas riches in the Arctic, with the overlooked fine print 
that most of these resources are most likely to be on land areas and 
ocean areas within 200 n. miles; and  
 The activities of Arctic coastal nations in gathering scientific evidence for 
submissions of proposed shelf outer limits to the Commission as 
required by the LOS Convention.  
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Questions 
 What explanation can be given for the complexity of the Article 76 
criteria for determining the outer limit of a State’s legal continental 
shelf? 
 For the Arctic coastal States, what is the current balance that exists 
between cooperation and conflict/competition in respect of the 
continental shelf? What factors could lead to changes in the existing 
balance? What do you think the balance will be in 20 years? 
 Many aspects of the continental shelf regime set out in the 1982 LOS 
Convention are part of customary international law. Which, if any, parts 
of the continental regime in the LOS Convention are not part of 
customary international law? 
 There is no doubt that the continental shelf regime in the LOS 
Convention applies as regards the Arctic Ocean. If the LOS Convention 
regime was not applicable, (a) what regime might the States have agreed 
upon for the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean; and (b) what regime 
might the world have agreed upon for the continental shelf in the Arctic 
Ocean?  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Arctic Biodiversity and 
Marine Wildlife 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
6.1 Introduction: Arctic Biodiversity  
The subject-matter of Arctic biodiversity is an issue of great concern. In 
2008 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) passed a reso-
lution expressing “extreme concern” over the impacts of climate change 
and other multiple stressors on Arctic indigenous peoples, other commu-
nities, and biodiversity. The Arctic Biodiversity Selected Indicators of 
Change 2010 report provides evidence that some of those anticipated 
impacts on Arctic biodiversity are already occurring. Although climate 
change is a pervasive stressor, negative effects on Arctic biodiversity can 
also be observed deriving from long range transport of contaminants, 
harvesting of wild species, and resource development. 
This chapter will outline some general issues relating to Arctic biodiversi-
ty. Apart from numerous publications on this subject-matter, anyone interest-
ed in this area should follow the work of the Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna (CAFF) working group of the Arctic Council. CAFF’s mandate is to ad-
dress the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and to communicate its findings 
to the governments and residents of the Arctic, helping to promote practices 
which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. The CAFF’s 
projects provide data for informed decision-making in resolving the challeng-
es which are now arising in trying to both conserve the natural environment 
and permit regional growth in the Arctic.  
This work is based upon cooperation between all Arctic countries, in-
digenous peoples, international conventions, and organisations. Thus, 
CAFF serves as a vehicle of cooperation on species and habitat manage-
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ment and utilisation; sharing information on management techniques and 
regulatory regimes, and ensures the facilitation of more knowledgeable 
decision-making. It also provides a mechanism to develop common re-
sponses on issues of importance for the Arctic ecosystem such as: devel-
opment and economic pressures, conservation opportunities, and political 
commitments. In order to successfully conserve the natural environment 
and allow for economic development, comprehensive baseline data is 
required, including the status and trends of Arctic biodiversity, habitats, 
and ecosystem health. CAFF is developing the framework and tools neces-
sary to create a baseline of current knowledge, and to provide dynamic 
assessments over time. It is expected that this evolving, sustainable, and 
responsive approach will produce more regular, timely, and flexible anal-
yses on topical issues of Arctic biodiversity. 
Biodiversity is defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD)(see below) in the following manner: “Biological diversity means the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological com-
plexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, be-
tween species and of ecosystems” (Art. 2). There are several different 
definitions of biological diversity (none are however official,) for scien-
tific definitions of biodiversiy (see: <http://biodiversity.ca.gov/ 
Biodiversity/biodiv_def2.html>).  
6.1.1 Arctic Biodiversity – Threats for Fauna and Flora  
The key findings by UNEP indicate that Arctic biodiversity is threatened. 
For example, tundra ecosystems are being replaced by evergreen shrubs. 
Furthermore, due to climatic changes, permafrost is decreasing in the 
Northern peatlands. 
As noted above, of all the stressors influencing Arctic biodiversity det-
rimentally, climate change is the most significant. However, other stress-
ors such as contaminants are also negatively impacting Arctic biodiversi-
ty. For example, a high level of PCBs was found in polar bears; we are cur-
rently also witnessing habitat fragmentation; there are linkages between 
industrial development and unsustainable harvest levels. It is also ob-
served that warming climate results in increased shipping and resource 
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development (oil and gas exploration) with potential for increased pollu-
tion which will adversely affect biodiversity. In addition, full knowledge of 
the current state of marine resources in the Arctic, especially in the areas 
beyond state jurisdiction, is currently lacking due, in part, to ongoing and 
rapid climatic challenges (Rayfuse, 2008:3).  
According to various estimates, the majority of Arctic species are cur-
rently stable. For instance, populations of very abundant seabirds remain 
generally at good levels. Freshwater Arctic char populations are healthy in 
comparison to those in southern locations (Reist & Sawatzky, 2010:43). 
However, some of the most important species to Arctic indigenous peo-
ples, such as caribou and wild reindeer, are declining. As to vertebrae, the 
Arctic Species Trend Index (ASTI) shows a 10% overall decline in terres-
trial population. ASTI is an index that tracks trends in over 300 Arctic 
vertebrate species; it describes overall trends across species, taxonomy, 
ecosystems, regions and other categories. Currently, information on the 
size of Arctic species is deemed inadequate (Hohn &Jaakkola, 2010:10). 
For example, the information on polar bears – one of the most charismatic 
Arctic species – is only known for 12 out of 19 sub-populations, 8 of these 
are declining (Lunn et al., 2010:27). Out of 6 sub-species of red knot three 
are declining while the other three are either suspected of being in decline 
or their status is unknown (Sitters et al., 2010:34). Marine fish show a 
trend towards a northward shift in the distribution of some species in 
both exploited and unexploited stocks. It is possible that such a shift is the 
result of climate change in addition to other pressures such as overfishing.  
6.1.2 Protected Areas 
Protected areas play a fundamental role in maintaining and conserving 
Arctic and global biodiversity and habitats, as they are central to the poli-
cy of protecting migrating species. The lack of programmes which specifi-
cally relate to the Arctic in international environmental instruments effec-
tively highlights the importance of developing a “circumpolar protected 
areas strategy” for the Arctic, with the participation of indigenous and 
local peoples (Barry & McLennan, 2010:98). The first protected areas in 
the Arctic were established in Sweden and Alaska at the beginning of the 
20th century. In the 1970s the establishment of protected areas began to 
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increase significantly with the establishment of the Greenland National 
Park. By 1980, 5.6% of the Arctic was classified under some degree of 
protection. At present 11% of the Arctic (about 3.5 million km2, has pro-
tected status in 1127 protected areas). The level of protection however 
differs somewhat across these areas. In addition, over 40% of Arctic pro-
tected areas have a coastal component but for the majority of these areas 
it is not possible at present to determine the extent to which they incorpo-
rate the adjacent marine environment (Barry & McLennan, 2010:97). 
Climate change has undoubtedly influenced the way in which protected 
areas have been established. Traditionally, they have been based on either 
the protection of unique habitats or the concept of ecological representivity. 
Under this system important areas that are sufficiently large and contain 
targeted components of ecological biomes are selected for protection. The 
changes caused by climate change in Arctic ecosystems complicate this 
approach to protected areas. It may be that what is singled out for protec-
tion at present has been altered or lost through climate change (e.g., due to 
the northward shift of species, greening of the Arctic, the growth of invasive 
species, and so on). Therefore it is of the utmost importance for environ-
mental conservation not only to apply measures within protected areas but 
also beyond their boundaries as currently unprotected areas often become 
crucial corridors connecting species migrations (Ibid. 96). 
Marine ecosystems in the Arctic enjoy lesser protection than terrestrial 
ones. This is now a serious issue because of the more rapid than anticipa-
ted melting of Arctic sea ice. This melting will have a detrimental effect on 
the population levels of Arctic marine mammals, fish, benthic communi-
ties, and seabirds. This effect is, moreover, still not fully understood.  
The 2008 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) recognised the im-
portance of the conservation and sustainable use of wetland biodiversity – 
and peatlands in particular – in addressing climate change. The most im-
portant factor for the effective protection of Arctic ecology is the coopera-
tion of all Arctic States and establishment of an efficient network between 
these states (Barry & McLennan 2010, 98). Such a network has emerged in 
the context of the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP), 
which constitutes the main element of the CAFF working group. It re-
ceived official endorsement from the Group on Earth Observations Biodi-
versity Observation Network (GEO BON) in January 2012. CBMP now 
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belongs to the GEO BON regional network Arctic-BON. It is the biodiversi-
ty component of the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON) and 
the official Arctic Biodiversity Observation Network of the Global Earth 
Observations Biodiversity Observation Network (GEO BON). The Group on 
Earth Observations Biodiversity Observation Network – GEO BON – coor-
dinates activities relating to the Societal Benefit Area (SBA) on Biodiversi-
ty of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). Some 100 
governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations 
are collaborating through GEO BON to organise and improve terrestrial, 
freshwater and marine biodiversity observations globally. Its other goal is 
to make their biodiversity data, information and forecasts more readily 
accessible to policy-makers, managers, experts and other users. Moreover, 
GEO BON has also been recognised by the Parties to the CBD. 
The CBMP is an international network of scientists, government agen-
cies, indigenous organisations and conservation groups working together 
to harmonise and integrate efforts to monitor the Arctic’s living resources. 
The CBMP includes over 80 organisations and 700 individuals. The 
CBMP’s goal is to facilitate more rapid detection, communication, and 
response with respect to the significant biodiversity-related trends and 
pressures affecting the Circumpolar world. 
6.1.3 Main Underlying Principles of Biodiversity 
Management  
A number of key principles can be identified as crucial in Arctic biodiversi-
ty management. The first is the precautionary approach/principle. This 
principle states that in order to protect the environment, where threats of 
serious or irreversible damage to it arise, the lack of full scientific certain-
ty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation. 
The precautionary approach (principle) is one of the underlying principles 
of the conservation of fish stocks, as it was expressly introduced in the Fish 
Stocks Agreement (FSA) (see below). The FSA is probably the most important 
global international instrument in achieving the sustainable use of fish stocks. 
The precautionary principle is also featured in some of the regional fisheries 
treaties. It is widely known that the precautionary principle has generated an 
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extensive body of literature and has been the subject of continuing discussion 
as to its legal nature, effectiveness and implementation.  
The concept of sovereignty raises complex questions with many at-
tached elements. For the purposes of this chapter, I will only look at the 
issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, i.e., fish stocks or 
transboundary natural resources. The principle of Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources is the primary general principle underlying the 
exploitation of fish stocks. This implies permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources (which is connected to the flag state jurisdiction on the high 
seas) in areas under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. For example, the 
relevant convention here, the CBD, introduces provisions on the national 
regulation of biological diversity, i.e., diversity here is a state sovereignty 
issue. However, other principles of international law, such as common 
concern in relation to biodiversity (included in the preamble of this con-
vention) impose certain limitations on the sovereign rights of states.  
These rights have to be distinguished according to the zones in which 
the fish stocks are found (i.e., the high seas; the territorial sea; or the Ex-
clusive Economic Zone – EEZ) and whether they are confined to one zone 
or are transboundary. The rights constituting sovereignty over natural 
resources comprise a nexus of rights and, accordingly, they include the 
right to possess, to use and to manage. From these rights follows the right 
of a state to the exploration and exploitation of its natural resources and 
also the right to profits obtained from these resources. Permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources is not currently absolute but rather is li-
mited by several legal and economic factors. These factors are:  
 
 The principle that permanent sovereignty must be exercised for the 
benefit of national development as well as the well-being of people;  
 The state has a duty to compensate foreign investors whose property 
has been expropriated following legal proceedings; 
 The state has the duty to protect the interests of indigenous peoples; 
 And, lastly that the state has the duty to cooperate (by way of 
notification and consultation) in relation to shared natural resources.  
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There are several limitations on state sovereignty in relation to shared 
resources deriving from customary international law and treaties, such as: 
the prohibition on causing transboundary environmental damage, a rule 
of customary international law which has been enshrined in Principle 21 
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment and Principle 2 
of the 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development. Coope-
ration between states in respect of transboundary resources is very im-
portant in relation to fish stocks, which are, for instance, found in different 
EEZs. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) has sev-
eral provisions concerning such fishery resources (see below).  
6.2 Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity  
Special mention must also be made here of the situation of indigenous peo-
ples and the protection of biodiversity. The Arctic is, for example, home to 
both the Inuit (Canada, Greenland, Chukotka and Alaska) and Sami peoples 
(Norway, Finland, Sweden and Russia). The indigenous peoples of the Arctic 
have a special relationship with nature and therefore with biological diver-
sity. This special relationship is acknowledged by the ILO’s 169 convention 
on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in Article 15 (this 
1989 convention entered into force in 1991, Denmark and Norway are the 
Arctic States who are parties to it). 
The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
also contains several provisions which relate to the special relationship of 
indigenous peoples with nature and natural resources (see: Arts. 25–27). 
Another aspect of biodiversity and indigenous peoples relates to the store of 
“traditional knowledge” associated with genetic resources (see below). 
The human rights aspect of the indigenous rights and biodiversity is-
sue, generally relating to cultural heritage protection based on the com-
mon Article 1 of the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“IC-
CPR”) and the 1966 UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights 
(ICSECR) which grants to all peoples the right to “freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources” is also an important consideration here. 
Article 27 of the ICCPR is of fundamental relevance to the relationship 
between indigenous peoples and nature (biodiversity). 
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The importance of biodiversity in relation to indigenous peoples is 
documented by the relevant clauses in terms of the state’s international 
obligations in respect of cooperative conservation in certain treaties con-
cluded, for example, between indigenous peoples and Canada. Thus, the 
Yukon Final Agreement calls for Canada to make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that Yukon First Nation interests are represented when issues 
involving fish and wildlife management arise in international negotiations. 
The Labrador Inuit Final Agreement includes similar provisions concer-
ning aquatic plants, fish habitat, management and stocks. Agreements 
with Yukon First Nation and the Sahtu Dene and Métis confirm that 
amendments to international treaties should not diminish indigenous 
peoples’ rights (see: Penikett, 2010:15). 
6.3 International Instruments Relevant to the 
Protection of Arctic Biodiversity and Marine 
Wildlife  
6.3.1 Introduction  
No one treaty, concluded among the Arctic States, currently exists cove-
ring the protection of Arctic biodiversity in its entirety. The Arctic is how-
ever addressed by several global, and regional as well as other specific 
treaties pertaining to particular marine species (e.g., polar bears). There 
are also a number of declarations dealing with Arctic biodiversity, which 
are, unlike treaties, of a non-binding nature, and, as such, are referred to 
as “soft law” documents.  
6.3.2 General Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs) Relevant to the Arctic  
Several existing global MEAs currently play a role in the preservation of 
Arctic biodiversity. These are the following: the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD); the World Heritage Convention; the Convention on Wet-
lands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention); the Convention 
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on the Conservation of Migratory Species; and the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).  
The CBD and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
The CBD was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1994; it currently has 
193 state signatories. All Arctic States (with the exception of the United 
States) ratified this Convention. The CBD was signed, along with the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, at the Rio United Nations mee-
ting. The CBD is the first treaty to adopt a holistic approach to biodiversity, 
i.e., to address all aspects, from conservation to access and biotechnology 
(Art. 1). It is a framework Convention, which, while laying down general 
principles can also be supplemented by Protocols (Bowman et al., 597). The 
Preamble and Articles 3, and 15 recognise states’ sovereign rights over the 
exploitation of their natural resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies. The Convention further states in its Preamble that the conservation 
of biological diversity is the “common concern of mankind,” which has given 
it, to a certain extent, an international dimension. It may be noted, however, 
that the CBD does not recognise the internationalisation of biological re-
sources, either in terms of their ownership or their control (Bowman et al., 
598). The jurisdictional scope of the CBD is set out in Art. 4 which reads: 
“subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in re-
lation to each Contracting Party: (a) In the case of components of biological 
diversity, in areas within the limits of its national jurisdiction; and (b) In 
the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their effects occur, 
carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national 
jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”  
The CBD does not, however, define what is meant by “conservation.” Sus-
tainable use is defined in Art. 2 as meaning “the use of components of bio-
logical diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term 
decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the 
needs and aspirations of present and future generations.” 
The key provision of the Convention relates to “in situ” conservation 
which is defined in Art.2 as: “…conditions where genetic resources exist 
within ecosystems and natural habitats, and, in the case of domesticated 
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or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed 
their distinctive properties.” It is further described in Art. 8. 
Also of relevance here is the notion of “ex situ” conservation by which 
is understood “the conservation of components of biological diversity 
outside their natural habitats” (Art. 2), further described in Art. 9. The 
CBD is also based on the eco-system approach, which means “a dynamic 
complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-
living environment interacting as a functional unit” (Art. 2).  
The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisa-
tion of genetic resources is one of the fundamental objectives of the CBD, 
set out in Art. 1. This issue is elaborated further in Art. 15 and specified in 
even greater detail by the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity. This protocol was adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties to the CBD at its tenth meeting on 29 Octo-
ber 2010 in Nagoya, Japan and shall enter into force 90 days after the date 
of deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification (see: www.cbd.int).  
The CBD and the Nagoya Protocol are very important in relation to the 
traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples (Art. 8(j) of the CBD). Article 
8(j) refers to the promotion of the wider application of knowledge, inno-
vations and practices of indigenous and local communities with their ap-
proval and involvement, and to encouraging the equitable sharing of the 
benefits of utilisation arising therefrom. This Article also deals with intel-
lectual property rights obtained over subject matter arising from the use 
of traditional knowledge.  
In its Preamble the Nagoya Protocol acknowledges the 2007 UNDRIP 
(see above) and obliges state parties, inter alia, to take measures to ensure 
that “traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that is held 
by indigenous and local communities is accessed with the prior and in-
formed consent or approval and involvement of these indigenous and 
local communities” (Art. 7, see on this subject: International Law Associa-
tion, Final Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Sofia Conference 
2012, http://www.ila-hq.org, 22–23).  
The Protocol is an international agreement which promotes sharing 
the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources in a fair and 
equitable manner, including the maintenance of appropriate access to 
  Polar Law Textbook II 105 
genetic resources and the appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, 
taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, 
and appropriate funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of bio-
logical diversity and the sustainable use of its components.  
The Cartagena Protocol to the CBD on Biosafety was adopted on 29 
January 2000 and entered into force on 11 September 2003. Of the Arctic 
States only Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are party to it. Pursu-
ant to Art. 19, para 3, of the CBD, the Conference of the Parties, by its deci-
sion II/5, established an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety to 
develop a draft protocol on biosafety. Their objective was specifically to 
focus on the transboundary movement of any living modified organism 
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. This Protocol 
is an international treaty governing the movement of living modified or-
ganisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology from one country 
to another. Article 1 of the Protocol sets out the main objective which 
notes that: 
“In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of 
this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in 
the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms 
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements.” 
Article 3(g) defines LMOs as follows: “[...] living organism[s] that possess-
es a novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of 
modern biotechnology.” The main regulatory technique is included in Art. 
7, i.e., the advanced informed agreement (AIA) procedure which is aimed 
at ensuring that contracting parties are provided with the information 
necessary to make informed decisions prior to agreeing to import LMOs 
into their territory.  
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The UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (the WHC)  
This convention was signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. It has 189 
state signatories; all of the Arctic States have ratified this convention. The key 
point is contained in Art. 4 which imposes a duty on state parties to ensure 
the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to 
future generations of cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal 
value situated on their territory and belonging primarily to these states. The 
treaty obligations included all cultural and natural heritage of outstanding 
value and not only objects that are inscribed on the World Heritage List 
(WHL). There is also a duty of cooperation in respect of the international 
community as a whole not to deliberately adopt any measures which might 
damage directly or indirectly world heritage located on the territory of other 
state parties (Article 16 (1) and (3)). Articles 2 and 3 of the WHC contain defi-
nitions of cultural and natural heritage.  
The protection of designated cultural and natural heritage is bestowed 
by inscription on the WHL. There are 936 properties listed (these include: 
725 cultural, 183 natural and 28 mixed properties) in 153 state parties. 
Listing on the WHL is not a unilateral state decision: rather the decision to 
list is bestowed upon the Convention’s organs. It is not necessary to be-
come a party to the WHC to have properties listed. A special procedure 
exists in relation to the listing of cultural and natural properties. There is 
also a List of World Heritage objects in Danger (“Danger List”), Art. 11 of 
the WHC. Properties may also, under certain circumstances, be removed 
from the list (de-listed). The natural heritage to be protected, conserved 
and transmitted to future generations must be of “outstanding, universal 
value” (the Operational Guidelines provide the procedures for the nomi-
nation of such sites). One of the most important features of the WHC is the 
existence of a World Heritage Fund. In the Arctic, objects/areas which fall 
under WHL include, for example, Ilulissat Icefjord (Greenland/Denmark).  
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance  
(The Ramsar Convention)  
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Water-
fowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention on Wetlands) was signed in 1971 and 
entered into force in 1975 (see: www.ramsar.org). There are 162 state par-
ties to the convention including all of the Arctic States. The objective of the 
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Convention is stated in Art.1 (1) as: “to stem the progressive encroachment 
on and loss of wetlands now and in the future,” as “a resource of great eco-
nomic, cultural, scientific and recreational value.” 
In 1982 the Paris Protocol amending this Convention was signed rela-
ting primarily to the amendment procedure of the Ramsar Convention. 
The definition of wetlands is as follows: “areas of marsh, fen, peatland or 
water whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water 
which static or flowing fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine 
water in depth of which low tide does not exceed six metres” (Art. 1 (1)).  
At the centre of the Ramsar philosophy is the “wise use” concept. The 
wise use of wetlands was defined by the Conference of the Parties at its 
3rd meeting in Regina, Canada, in 1987 as “the maintenance of their eco-
logical character, achieved through the implementation of ecosystem ap-
proaches, within the context of sustainable development.” “Wise use” 
therefore has at its heart the conservation and sustainable use of wetlands 
and their resources, for the benefit of humankind. Each party designates 
“suitable wetlands within its territory” for inclusion in the list. Article 2(2) 
enlists the criteria for the inclusion of sites. The Ramsar Convention per-
mits the deletion and restriction of listed sites. Wetlands are widely dis-
tributed across the Arctic (e.g., in Russia), covering about 70% of the re-
gion. Of the 6 Ramsar wetland types represented the most extensive are 
forested and non-forested peatlands.  
The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals (CMS Convention)  
The CMS was signed in 1979 and entered into force in 1983. There are 
116 state parties to the convention, including the following Arctic States: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (see: www.cms.int). The Conven-
tion’s aim is to conserve terrestrial, aquatic and avian migratory species 
throughout their range. Migratory species are defined in Art. 1(1)(a) as 
“the entire population or any geographically separate part of the popula-
tion of any species or lower taxon of wild animals, a significant proportion 
of whose members cyclically and periodically cross one or more national 
jurisdictional boundaries.” The fundamental principles of the Convention 
are set out in Art. 2 –“The parties acknowledge the importance of migrato-
ry species being conserved and of Range States agreeing to take action to 
this end whenever possible and appropriate.” They also acknowledge that 
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such states should pay “special attention to migratory species the conser-
vation status of which is unfavourable and tak[e] individually or in coo-
peration appropriate and necessary steps to conserve such species and 
their habitat.” In Art. 2(2) the Parties acknowledge “the need to take ac-
tion to avoid any migratory species becoming endangered.”  
In Article 2(3) the Convention states that “the Parties: (a) should pro-
mote, cooperate in and support research relating to migratory species; (b) 
shall endeavour to provide immediate protection for migratory species 
included in Appendix I; and (c) shall endeavour to conclude agreements 
covering the conservation and management of migratory species included 
in Appendix II.” 
Migratory species threatened with extinction are listed in Appendix I of 
the Convention. The parties to the CMS aim to protect these animals, con-
serving or restoring the places where they live, mitigating obstacles to mi-
gration and controlling other factors that might endanger them. Besides 
establishing obligations for each state that joins, the CMS also promotes 
concerted action among the so-called “Range States” of many of these spe-
cies. Migratory species that need, or would significantly benefit from, inter-
national co-operation are listed in Appendix II of the Convention. For this 
reason, the convention encourages the Range States to conclude global or 
regional agreements. In this respect the CMS acts as a framework conven-
tion. One such example of an applicable Arctic species here is the narwhal.  
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
CITES was signed in 1973 and entered into force in 1975. It has 175 state 
signatories with all of the Arctic States being parties to it (see: 
www.cites.org). Its aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens 
of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. As such, CITES 
is in effect a trade rather than an environmental Convention. CITES works 
by subjecting the international trade in specimens of selected species to 
certain controls. All import, export, re-export and introduction from the 
sea of species covered by the Convention has to be authorised through a 
licensing system. Each party to the Convention must designate one or 
more management authorities to be in charge of administering that licen-
sing system and one or more scientific authorities to advise them on the 
effects of trade on the status of the species. The species covered by CITES 
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are listed in 3 Appendices, in accordance with the degree of protection 
they require. Thus, Appendix I includes species threatened with extinc-
tion. Trade in specimens of these species is permitted only in exceptional 
circumstances. Arctic species on this list include, for example, all types of 
Arctic whales. Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened 
with extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid 
utilisation incompatible with their survival (e.g., polar bears). Appendix III 
contains species that are protected in at least one country, which has 
asked other CITES signatories for assistance in controlling the trade (e.g., 
the walrus is listed by Canada). Changes to Appendix III follow a distinct 
procedure in relation to changes to Appendices I and II, as each Party is 
entitled to make unilateral amendments to it. 
Roughly 5,000 species of animals and 29,000 species of plants are pro-
tected by CITES against over-exploitation through international trade, 
covered by the 3 Appendices. CITES is recognised as a one of the most 
successful MEAs. Its drawback is, however, its numerous exceptions in 
relation to the level of protection offered.  
6.4 Marine Wildlife  
6.4.1 Introduction  
The conventions described above are also relevant to Arctic marine wildlife. 
There are, however, a number of global conventions which are specially 
aimed at the protection of marine wildlife. The most interesting are those 
aimed at marine mammals (e.g., whales). This chapter shall therefore focus 
on the following global conventions in the context of Arctic marine wildlife: 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS); the 1995 Straddling Fish 
Agreement (SFA) and the 1946 Whaling Convention (ICRW).  
6.4.2 The Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention)  
The LOS Convention entered into force in 1994. It has 164 state signatories. 
All of the Arctic States, with the exception of the United States, are parties to 
it (see: www.un.org). The LOS Convention has a complex set of provisions 
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regulating fisheries both on the high seas and in the EEZs which extend out 
to 200 nautical miles from baselines measuring territorial seas, where 90% 
of the oceans’ fish stocks are located. The nature and control of the jurisdic-
tion of states depends on the zone in which the fish stock in question is 
found. In their EEZs coastal states determine allowable catches and pro-
mote optimal resource use. Article 61 uses the term “maximum sustainable 
yield” while Art. 62 employs the term “optimum utilisation.” Arguably, the 
LOS Convention’s use of terms is intentionally ambiguous in an attempt to 
make it more acceptable and open to broad interpretation. The ambiguity in 
relation to terms is undoubtedly however a contributory factor to the fail-
ure of uniform principles to emerge in respect of the exploitation and con-
servation of marine living resources worldwide.  
Part V of the Convention regulates fishing in the EEZs. The Convention 
takes a holistic view of the conservation of species, and its regulation 
therein is based on their interdependence (see Buck). In addition, there 
are a host of provisions regulating the following issues:  
 
 Conservation (Art. 61). 
 Exploitation (Art. 62). 
 Transboundary and straddling stocks (Art. 63). 
 Highly migratory stocks (Art. 64). 
 Marine mammals (Art. 65). 
 Anadromous stocks (Art.66). 
 Catadromous stocks (Art.67). 
 Sedentary species (Art. 68). 
 And the continental shelf regime (Art. 77(4)). 
 
Living resources in the high seas are regulated in Articles 116–120 with 
marine habitat protection provided by Articles 192–196. With the exception 
of Art. 65, the Convention exhibits a preference for the optimal exploitation 
of resources. As noted, the relevant provisions of the Convention are rather 
vague in setting standards for the exploitation of natural resources.  
As regards jurisdiction over straddling, transboundary and highly mi-
gratory fish resources, they are to be managed cooperatively through 
bilateral or multilateral international agreements between coastal states 
through whose waters these fish stocks range, as well as any states which 
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fish these stocks on the high seas. If a coastal state is unable to harvest its 
entire allowable catch it is obliged to grant access to its resources to other 
nations, subject to appropriate terms and conditions. The Convention also 
provides special rights of access to surpluses of living marine resources 
within coastal nation EEZs for nearby developing nations that are land-
locked or geographically disadvantaged (Art.63). 
Regional, sub-regional or bilateral agreements are negotiated to indi-
cate the provision of an equitable allocation to any such disadvantaged 
nation. It is the right of the coastal state to determine whether any har-
vestable surplus exists within its EEZ. Articles 65 (EEZ) and 120 (the high 
seas) regulate the protection of marine mammals, which calls for interna-
tional cooperation through “appropriate international organisations” (by 
which is understood the International Whaling Commission (IWC)).  
Anadromous species (e.g., salmon) spend most of their lives in the 
ocean, but spawn in freshwater. Primary interest in, and responsibility for, 
anadromous fish stocks is given to those states in whose rivers such 
stocks originate. Fishing for anadromous stocks is prohibited in the high 
seas, except in cases where economic dislocation might result. Coastal 
states through whose waters anadromous fish migrate are required to 
cooperate with the nations in whose territory the anadromous stocks 
originated. Catadromous species (e.g., eel) spend most of their lives in 
freshwater, but enter the ocean to spawn. The coastal states where these 
species spend most of their lives have a responsibility to manage them. 
International cooperation is required where these species migrate 
through more than one EEZ. Sedentary species are defined as “[…] organ-
isms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile, on or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in physical contact with the seabed 
or the subsoil” (Art. 77 (4) of the LOS Convention). It is accepted that sed-
entary species are sponges, corals, and clams. However, sedentary status 
is disputed in relations to crabs, lobsters and scallops, as during some 
periods they move unattached to the bottom.  
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6.4.3 The United Nations Agreement for the Implemen-
tation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (The Fish 
Stocks Agreement FSA)  
The FSA was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 2001. There are 78 
state signatories to the agreement. All of the Arctic States, with the excep-
tion of the United States, are parties to FSA (see: www.un.org). As noted 
previously, straddling fish stocks are regulated by Art. 63 of the LOS Con-
vention, which imposes an obligation of cooperation on coastal states and 
on states fishing in the high seas. Again, as outlined above, the formulation 
of this Article is generally acknowledged to lack precision. Therefore the 
aim of the FSA was to complement the Convention in this respect (and 
also concerning highly migratory species). Article 4 states that “nothing in 
this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of states 
under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in 
the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.” The juris-
dictional issues under the FSA Agreement are however rather complex, as 
they deal with all types of jurisdiction over fisheries: flag state jurisdic-
tion; coastal state jurisdiction; and port state jurisdiction.  
The FSA is a framework treaty. The implementation of the Convention 
is entrusted to regional fisheries management organisations at regional 
(and sub-regional) levels. The FSA favours the interests of coastal states 
over those of those involved primarily in high seas fishing. Article 6 of the 
FSA introduces the precautionary principle in relation to stocks regulated 
by it. The FSA is not however a global treaty, and thus cannot command 
the same legal status as, the LOS Convention. 
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6.4.4 The International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (ICRW)  
The ICRW was signed in 1946 and entered into force in 1948. All of the 
Arctic States, with the exception of Canada, are parties to this Convention 
(see: www.iwcoffice.org). The main duty of the IWC (which is a body of 
the Convention) is to keep under review and revise as necessary the 
measures laid down in the Schedule to the Convention which governs the 
conduct of whaling throughout the world. 
In addition, the Commission encourages, co-ordinates and funds whale 
research, publishes the results of scientific research and promotes studies 
into related matters such as the “humaneness” of the killing operations. 
There are three ways in which whales can be captured: commercial wha-
ling (from 1986 there has been a moratorium on commercial whaling, i.e., 
zero quotas); indigenous whaling, and scientific whaling. Norway and 
Iceland subsequently however opted out of the moratorium. The IWC sets 
quotas for commercial and indigenous whaling but permits for scientific 
whaling are granted by the states themselves. The continuous moratorium 
on commercial whaling is very controversial and several states (e.g., Ice-
land, Norway and Japan) oppose to it, which makes the work of the IWC 
very difficult.  
6.5 Regional Treaties  
6.5.1 Introduction  
A number of regional treaties exist which can be viewed as relevant to the 
conservation of Arctic biodiversity. Within the scope of this chapter how-
ever only some will be mentioned. The regional treaty which is clearly of 
fundamental importance in this regard is the Convention on the Conserva-
tion of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats. Arctic regional cooperation 
in this area is manifested by agreements on the protection of polar bears 
and on Cooperation in the Research, Conservation and Management of 
Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic (NAMMCO).  
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6.5.2 The Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats (the Bern Convention) 
The Bern convention was signed in 1979 and entered into force in 1982. It 
has 50 signatories. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are parties to 
it (see: www.coe.int). This Convention is one of the Conventions of the 
Council of Europe, but it also has signatories which are non-members of 
the Council, such as Belarus, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Morocco and Senegal. 
The Bern Convention’s aim is to conserve wild flora and fauna and their 
natural habitats and to promote European co-operation in this field. The 
Convention places particular emphasis on the need to protect endangered 
natural habitats and endangered and vulnerable species, including migra-
tory species. All signatories to the Bern Convention must take action to: 
promote national policies for the conservation of wild flora and fauna, and 
their natural habitats; have regard to the conservation of wild flora and 
fauna in their planning and development policies, and in their measures 
against pollution; promote education and disseminate general infor-
mation on the need to conserve species of wild flora and fauna and their 
habitats; encourage and co-ordinate research related to the purposes of 
this Convention and also co-operate to enhance the effectiveness of these 
measures through the co-ordination of efforts to protect migratory spe-
cies and the exchange of information and the sharing of experience and 
expertise. The Convention has 3 Appendices: Appendix I (plants); Appen-
dix II (animals); Appendix III (lists of animals not included in Appendix II).  
6.5.3 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, 
Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals 
in the North Atlantic (the NAMMCO Agreement)  
This agreement was signed in 1992 and entered into force in the same year. 
Iceland, Norway, Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Denmark) are all parties 
to it (see: www.nammco.no). The main organ of the NAMMCO agreement is 
the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission. The primary focus of the 
agreement is on modern approaches to the study of the marine ecosystem 
as a whole, and to gaining a better understanding of the role of marine 
mammals in this system. NAMMCO provides a mechanism for cooperation 
on conservation and management for all species of cetaceans (whales and 
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dolphins) and pinnipeds (seals and walruses) in the region. The parties to 
NAMMCO aim to strengthen and further develop effective conservation and 
management measures for marine mammals. Such measures should be 
based on the best available scientific evidence; should take into account 
both the complexity and vulnerability of the marine ecosystem and the 
rights and needs of coastal communities to make a sustainable living from 
what the sea can provide.  
6.5.4 The Convention on the Future of Multilateral 
Cooperation in North–East Atlantic Fisheries  
This Convention established a North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC). The parties to the Convention are as follows: Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, the EU, Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation. In addi-
tion, there are also a number of so-called Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties to the Convention: Canada, New Zealand and St Kitts and Nevis.  
This 1980 Convention covers the North–East Atlantic located between 
longitudes 42 degrees west and 51 degrees east and which includes the 
Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea and a large portion of the central Arc-
tic Ocean, reaching all the way to the North Pole. It applies to all fishery 
resources (sedentary species, molluscs and crustaceans, according to its 
2006 amendment). It does however exclude from its scope marine mam-
mals, highly migratory species and anadromous stocks.  
The objective of this Convention is to ensure the long-term conserva-
tion and optimum utilisation of the fishery resources in the Convention 
Area, providing sustainable economic, environmental and social benefits 
(Art. 2(4)). 
Within the NEAFC two schemes are currently operated in relation to 
control measures, namely: the Control and Enforcement Scheme (an elec-
tronic surveillance scheme to control the fishing activities of vessels in the 
Regulatory Area – outside the fishing zones of the coastal states) and the 
non-contracting party scheme to address the problem of non-contracting 
party fishing activity in the NEAFC Regulatory Area. The NEAFC works 
closely with its sister organisations in the North Atlantic Ocean (NAFO – 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation) as well as the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). NEAFC was updated in 2004 
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(adding dispute settlement procedures) and in 2006 (bringing the 1980 
Convention into line with developments in international law and instru-
ments). The Parties have agreed, voluntarily, to use these as the basis for 
the measures taken until the amendments are ratified by all the parties.  
6.5.5 The Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in 
the North Atlantic Ocean (NASCO)  
Only states can be members of NASCO, which was signed in 1982 and 
currently has 6 signatories: Canada, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe 
Islands & Greenland), the EU, Norway, the Russian Federation and the 
USA, (see: www.nasco.int). Iceland withdrew from NASCO as of 31 De-
cember 2009 because of financial considerations, but may re-accede to the 
Convention when the economic situation improves. The Convention ap-
plies to all anadromous stocks that migrate beyond the areas of national 
jurisdiction of the coastal states of the North Atlantic throughout their 
migratory range.  
6.5.6 Agreement Between the Government of Iceland, the 
Government of Norway and the Government of the 
Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of 
Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries  
This 1999 Agreement concerns fisheries in the Barents Sea “loophole” 
with a view to enhancing co-operation in the field of fisheries. Thus, for 
this purpose it establishes principles and procedures for such cooperation 
based on a precautionary approach and in accordance with international 
law (Art.1) (see: www.eelink.net). Article 7 introduced an important pro-
vision that the parties agree to take measures to prevent the landing in 
their ports of catches if it has been established that such catches have 
been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of this 
Agreement and the conservation and management measures referred and, 
subject to obligations according to established international law, to deny 
access to ports to vessels that engage in such activities, except in cases of 
distress or force majeure. 
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6.5.7 Cooperation Regarding Polar Bears (Ursus 
Maritimus)  
The 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (ACPB) which 
was signed by: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the USSR, and the United 
States, (see: animallaw.info) is the primary agreement in this regard. The 
main objectives of the Agreement are as follows: to encourage coopera-
tion in research programmes; to restrict the killing and capture of polar 
bears; prohibit certain hunting methods; and to protect ecosystems of 
which polar bears are a part. In 2000, the United States and the Russian 
Federation concluded a Bilateral Agreement on the Conservation and 
Management of the Alaskan/Chukotka Polar Bear Populations. This 
Agreement is linked to ACPB through its enforcement provisions. For 
more details see Bankes in this textbook.  
6.6 Relevant Conventions not Directly Aimed at the 
Protection of Biodiversity  
A cluster of treaties, both global and regional, exists where the protection 
of the marine environment is the general goal thus contributing also to the 
maintenance of biodiversity. These Conventions include the 1972 Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 
73/78) and the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention) and the 
1996 Protocol to this Convention.  
MARPOL has over the years been updated with numerous amend-
ments. All of the Arctic States are parties to this agreement (see: 
www.austli.ed) which consists of an umbrella Convention and six Annexes 
(Annex I Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil; Annex II Regu-
lations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk; 
Annex III Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in 
Packaged Form; Annex IV Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships; 
Annex V Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships; Annex VI Preven-
tion of Air Pollution from Ships). 
All of the Arctic States are parties to the London Convention which is 
based on the drawing up of “grey” and “black” lists (black lists contain 
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substances the dumping of which is prohibited). The Protocol additionally 
prohibits all dumping at sea though with certain exceptions. Denmark, 
Canada, Iceland and Sweden are parties to the Protocol (see: 
www.admiraltylawguide.com).  
The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) and its 5 Annexes and 3 Appendices is a 
regional treaty which is also relevant here (see:www.ospar.org). OSPAR’s 
annexes focus on the pollution from land-based sources (Annex I); Pre-
vention and elimination of pollution by dumping or incineration (Annex 
II); Prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore sources (Annex 
III); Assessment of the quality of the marine environment (Annex IV); 
protection and conservation of ecosystems and biological diversity (Annex 
V). Despite some success however issues remain in respect of OSPAR’s 
implementation (see: Rayfuse 2008).  
6.7 Non-Binding (“soft law”) Instruments  
One example of such a non-binding instrument is the 1991 Rovaniemi 
Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (see: 
www.libraryarcticportal.org). The governments of Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR and the USA committed themselves to 
the joint Action Plan of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS). The aims of AEPS were as follows: protection of the Arctic ecosys-
tems, including humans; restoration of environmental quality and the 
introduction of sustainable utilisation for the local population including 
indigenous peoples; accommodation of the traditional values and practi-
ces of indigenous peoples as determined by themselves; the evaluation of 
the state of the Arctic environment and, as a final goal, the elimination of 
pollution. In 1996 the AEPS was embraced by the working groups of the 
Arctic Council and included, inter alia, conservation of Arctic flora and 
fauna, and facilitating the exchange of information and the coordination of 
research on species and habitats of flora and fauna. For example, the Arc-
tic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) was established under 
the aegis of the AEPS. 
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6.8 Conclusion  
Arctic biodiversity (terrestrial and marine) is covered by a very large number 
of global and regional instruments. It is also under constant review by the 
CAFF and the Arctic Council in general. There has undoubtedly been an im-
provement in the number of viable species of plant and animal life in this 
region but there are numerous factors, such as climate change and high pollu-
tion levels, which adversely influence the recovery of population levels.  
Despite the sheer volume of work being done in this area it is clear that in-
creasing the already extensive number of international treaties covering the 
issue of Arctic biodiversity alone may not in itself necessarily be the best way 
to protect threatened Arctic populations of plants, animals or fish. On occa-
sions they compete with each other (e.g., the IWC and the NAMMCO Commis-
sion do not always pursue the same policy regarding whaling) while it is also 
frequently, the case that the listing of “endangered” species differs across 
various agreements. Sperm whales are a good example of this as they are 
listed under Appendices 1 and 2 of the Bonn Convention on Migratory Spe-
cies, Appendix 3 of the Bern Convention, and Appendix 1 of CITES. States can 
also opt out of certain conservation decisions adopted by bodies which are 
established by these agreements or submit reservations. In some cases con-
ventions are not fully implemented. Another emerging issue is the protection 
of indigenous peoples’ right to nature and to securing access to (biodiversity) 
which is not always satisfactory and/or sufficient.  
Recent years have undoubtedly seen a growing level of awareness in re-
spect of biodiversity protection as well as an increase in inter-state coopera-
tion. In particular, at the global level, CITES must be mentioned as an uplifting 
example of the MEA which actually works. At the regional level, one excellent 
example of a successful collaborative venture between states is cooperation 
over the protection of species, including migratory species, in the Arctic. The 
CAFF is a very active body, indispensable both in the provision of data and in 
providing leadership on international projects. Moreover, the work done 
within the Arctic Council, particularly with regard to biodiversity and marine 
wildlife in the Arctic, shows that it is not always necessary for an organisation 
to have far-reaching powers to achieve ground-breaking results.  
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Websites 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group of the Arctic 
Council, www.caff.is  
Convention on Biological Diversity, www.cbd.int  
The UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage (the WHC), http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and  
Flora (CITES), www.cites.org  
Questions 
 Compare the legal nature of the CBD and the CITES? Which one is more 
effective in the protection of Arctic biodiversity? 
 Explain the World Heritage Convention’s listing procedure with 
reference to sites listed in the territories of Iceland and Norway. 
 Explain the differences between NAMMCO and the International 
Whaling Commission in respect of whaling protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Polar Bears and 
International Law 
Nigel Bankes 
7.1 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 
Concluded in 1973, the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears and 
their Habitat (ACPB) was primarily developed as a response to commer-
cial over-hunting of bears in some polar bear states, in particular the Uni-
ted States (Alaska) and Norway (Svalbard)(1). The ACPB principally 
sought to address this problem by banning hunting (Article 1(1)) and, in 
particular, banning hunting using large motorised vessels and aircraft 
(Art. IV). Under the Agreement, harvesting may still occur for scientific 
purposes, conservation purposes and in connection with the management 
of other species (Art. III(1)). In addition, and most importantly, the ACPB 
contemplated the continuation of harvesting by indigenous peoples where 
this was already occurring (Alaska, Russia, Canada and Greenland) (2).  
The Agreement did not provide for any institutional mechanism such 
as a conference of the parties although, as matter of practice, the Polar 
Bear Specialist Group (PBSG), a sub-group of the Species Survival Com-
mission of IUCN\World Conservation Union, monitors the implementation 
of the Agreement and in effect serves as a scientific advisory committee 
for the Agreement. In recent years the range states to the Agreement have 
taken measures to create a more formal institutional structure by conve-
ning meetings of the states party to the ACPB. The first such meeting was 
held in Tromsø, Norway in March 2009, and the second in Iqaluit, Canada 
in October 2011(3). The Tromsø meeting dealt with a number of topics 
including: climate change, habitat protection, contaminants, shipping re-
lated activities etc., and harvest management. 
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Most commentators regard the Agreement as a success. According to 
Prestrud and Stirling (at 120–121) the agreement has been successful in 
limiting hunting to sustainable levels but less successful in promoting 
habitat protection. Populations of polar bear have recovered as a result of 
the restrictions on harvesting.  
The Agreement has been less successful in responding to two challen-
ges: climate change, and the overharvest of shared populations of polar 
bears. As to the first, there is a mismatch of both scale and subject matter 
between the global problem of atmospheric climate change, and the ACPB 
as a regional wildlife agreement (4). The ACPB has proven to be either 
unwilling or unable to deal with this problem. Thus, while the Tromsø 
meeting of the parties in 2009 recognised that climate change (at 1) “has a 
negative impact on polar bears and their habitat and is the most im-
portant long term threat facing polar bears” the parties went on to state 
that “Action to mitigate this threat is beyond the scope of the Polar Bear 
Agreement. Climate change affects every nation on the earth and reaches 
well beyond the five parties to the Agreement so the parties look to other 
fora and national and international mechanisms to take appropriate ac-
tion to address climate change” (Ibid.) & (5)( Bankes 2009 & 2009a). 
The second issue arises in those cases in which one of the 19 sub-
populations of polar bear is shared between two jurisdictions, both of 
which allow harvesting. For example, Russia and the United States share 
the Chukchi Sea population, while the United States and Canada share the 
Southern Beaufort Sea (SB) population. Similarly, Canada (principally 
Nunavut) and Greenland share the Kane Basin, Baffin Bay and Davis Strait 
populations. The ACPB had very little to say about the challenges posed by 
the existence of shared populations, and while PBSG reports have fre-
quently commented on the issues associated with shared populations, its 
advisory responsibilities limit it to drawing attention to actual or potential 
problems of overharvest and exhorting the range states of these sub-
populations to reach agreements to address these issues. For the most 
part that has happened in a timely way, either as between the user groups 
themselves (as in the case of the Inuvialuit and Inupiat (6)), or at the state 
to state level (as in the case of the Russia/US agreement with respect to 
the Chukchi Sea population) (7). On the other hand, an agreement be-
tween Greenland and Canada (8) was very slow in coming and was only 
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successfully negotiated after some years of unacceptably high harvests, 
criticism from the PBSG, and the issuance of negative “no detriment” con-
clusions by both Canada and Greenland within the context of Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)(9). Implementation 
of this bilateral agreement is only just beginning.  
7.2 Discussion of Polar Bear in other  
International Fora 
The ACPB is undoubtedly the leading international agreement dealing 
with the conservation of polar bears in the same way as the International 
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) is the leading interna-
tional instrument dealing with whales. But just as the ICRW faces “compe-
tition” from other instruments including the Bonn Convention on Migrato-
ry Species, NAMMCO and CITES (10) the conservation of polar bears is 
also on the agenda of other multilateral environmental agreements. For 
example, polar bear has long been listed on Appendix II of CITES (i.e., 
threatened rather than endangered) but at the last CITES CoP in Doha 
(2009), the United States, following the domestic listing (2008) of polar 
bears as threatened under its Endangered Species Act (11), proposed up-
listing polar bear from Appendix I to Appendix II. Although the up-listing 
proposal failed to get the necessary support, the United Sates has indica-
ted that it will renew its up-listing proposal at the upcoming CITES CoP in 
Thailand in March 2013 (12). One of the implications of Appendix II listing 
is that range states must make a no-detriment finding (NDF) before au-
thoring export of a specimen (e.g., a polar bear hide) (i.e., a finding that 
export will not be detrimental to the survival of the species). As noted 
above, both Greenland (with respect to all of its polar bear populations) 
and subsequently Canada (with respect to the shared Baffin Bay popula-
tion) were forced to issue negative NDF findings for some sub-populations 
of bears (Bankes 2012 & Icon on Ice). 
More recently, the Working Group on Aquatic Mammals of the Scientific 
Council of the Bonn Convention considered a proposal to list polar bear on 
appendix II of the Convention (13 at 3). In the inconclusive discussion that 
followed it was “emphasised that a CMS listing should complement the im-
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portant work already being carried out by Range States, in particular 
through the Polar Bear Agreement and the Arctic Council Circumpolar Bio-
diversity Monitoring Programme. The listing would not have the purpose of 
triggering another agreement for the Arctic but to both complement exis-
ting CMS Arctic priorities and to facilitate the discussion and possible miti-
gation of climate change impacts by CMS Parties beyond the Arctic”(Ibid.). 
One final development worthy of note is the effort of the Center for Bi-
ological Diversity (a US based ENGO) to use the petition procedure availa-
ble under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(14) to argue that Canada is failing to effectively enforce its domestic envi-
ronmental law by failing to list polar bear as threatened or endangered 
under Canada’s Species at Risk Act. On this point the Commission on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation has ruled that the submission is admissible and 
has asked Canada for its views on the petition (15).  
Further reading/notes 
1. The text of the Agreement is available on the website of Polar Bear 
Specialist Group (PBSG) under the heading “agreements and 
conventions” http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/ For the background to the 
ACPB see in particular Pal Prestrud and Ian Stirling, “The 
International Polar Bear Agreement and the Current Status of Polar 
Bear Conservation” (1994) 20 Aquatic Mammals:113–124, Fikkan et 
al, “Polar Bears: The Importance of Simplicity” in Oran Young & Gail 
Osherenko (eds.), Polar Politics: Creating International 
Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): 96–
151 and Donald C. Baur, “Reconciling Polar Bear Protection Under 
United States Laws and the International Agreement for the 
Conservation of Polar Bears” (1996) 2 Animal Law:9–99. 
2. On indigenous harvesting of polar bears see: Milton M.R. Freeman & 
Lee Foote (eds.), Inuit, Polar Bears, and Sustainable Use: Local, 
National and International Perspectives (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta, CCI Press, 2009). 
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3. Meeting of the parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of 
Polar Bears, Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, 24–26 October 2011. The 
“Outcome of Meeting” document for both this and the earlier Tromsø 
meeting is available at <http://www.polarbearmeeting.org/ 
content.ap?thisId=500038172 > (accessed 15 October 2012). 
4. For an argument that the parties to the Agreement do have a duty to 
take steps to protect the ecosystem of which the bear is a part, and 
that this should include measures to mitigate climate change see: 
Nigel Bankes, “Climate Change and the Regime for the Conservation 
of Polar Bears,” in Timo Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo & Nigel 
Bankes (eds.), Climate Governance in the Arctic (Hanover: Springer 
Verlag, 2009):351–382. 
5. Nigel Bankes, “The Tromsø meeting of the parties to the 1973 
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears: a comment on three 
aspects of the meeting report” http://ablawg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/blog_nb_polarbears_april-2009.pdf 
(2009a), and 2009 note 4. 
6. Agreement between the Inuvialuit (Canada) and Inupiat (Alaska) for 
the management of the Southern Beaufort Sea population, March 
2000, at http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/USA-Canada.html. 
See also Memorandum of Understanding (2008) between 
Environment Canada and the United States Department of the 
Interior for the Conservation and Management of Shared Polar Bear 
Populations at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national 
/20080515polar_memo.pdf 
7. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Russian Federation on the conservation 
and management of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population. 
Washington DC, 16 October 2000 (entered into force 2008), 
http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/US-Russia.html 
8. Memorandum of Understanding (2009) between the Government of 
Canada, the Government of Nunavut and the Government of 
Greenland for the Conservation and Management of Polar Bear 
Populations, A signed text of the MOU is available at 
http://pbsg.npolar.no/export/sites/pbsg/en/docs/GN-MOU-PB.pdf 
The text is undated but press reports suggest that the text was 
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signed on 30 October 2009: CanWest News Service “Canada, 
Nunavut sign polar bear agreement” http://www.canada.com/ 
news/Canada+Nunavut+Greenland+sign+polar+bear+agreement/2
164805/story.html 
9. For the CITES text and other related documents visit the CITES 
website here: http://www.cites.org/ For more details see: Nigel 
Bankes, “An Arctic Governance Issue: The management of shared 
populations of polar bear,” in Øyvind Ravna & Tore Henriksen (eds.), 
in Juss i nord: Hav, fisk og urfolk: En hyllest til Det juridiske fakultet 
ved Universitetet i Tromsøs 25-årsjubileum, (Oslo: Gyldendahl 
Juridisk, 2012):40–70. See also Tanya Shadbolt et al, Icon on Ice: 
International Trade and Management of Polar Bears, Traffic, 2012, 
http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_ 
mammals69.pdf  
10. There is a significant body of literature on this competition in the 
context of the IRWC. See in particular Alexander Gillespie, “Forum 
Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC, CITES, and 
the Management of Cetaceans” (2002) 3 Ocean Development and 
International Law: 17–56.  On NAMMCO see: David Caron, “The 
International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in 
Consensual Structures” (1995) 89 American Journal of International 
Law: 154–174. 
11. The listing decision and related information is available at 
http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/esa.htm  
12. For the listing proposal see: 
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/prop/ 
E-15-Prop-03.pdf and for the position of the Government of Canada  
on the proposal see: http://www.cites.org/common/cop/16/Inf/ 
E-CoP16i-10.pdf  
13. 17th Meeting of the Scientific Council, Bonn Convention, Bergen, 17–
18 November 2011, Report of the Working Group on Aquatic 
Mammals. 
14. 14 September 1993, 32 ILM 1480. This is the so-called 
environmental side agreement to the North American Free Trade 
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15. CEC Determination on Petition, 29 November 2012. The 
Determination, the petition and other relevant documents are 
available on the CEC’s website at: http://cec.org/Page.asp?PageID= 
2001&ContentID=25143&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID=&AA_ 
SiteLanguageID=1  
Questions 
1. Most MEAs provide for a conference/meeting of the parties (C/MoP) 
which brings governments together at the political and diplomatic 
levels on a regular basis. As noted above this has not happened until 
very recently in the case of the ACPB. What do you think are some of 
the implications of this? Has the PBSG served as an adequate 
substitute for a C/MoP? 
2. The ACPB is one of the very few international agreements, if not the 
only such agreement, between the five littoral states (as opposed to 
the Arctic 8 of the Arctic Council). The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, 
while not a treaty, was similarly signed by the littoral states. Do you 
see any parallels between the Declaration and the ACPB? 
3. The PBSG has been very influential in developing a science based 
approach to managing polar bear populations. Visit the PBSG’s website 
and take a look at some of the Group’s recommendations arising from its 
regular meetings. The PBSG emphasises the importance of western 
science. What can you discern of its attitude to the traditional knowledge 
of Inuit and Inupiat harvesters of polar bears? 
4. What is the NDF status of sub-populations of bears in Canada and 
Greenland? Where can you find that information? What types of 
information must a national scientific authority have in order to be 
able to make NDF determinations? 
5. What are the criteria for Appendix I listing under CITES? What are 
the arguments for and against up-listing? See the US proposal and 
Canada’s rebuttal (references/notes above).  
6. What is the position of the EU in relation to the conservation status of 
polar bear? With respect to CITES listing decisions? And with respect 
to the import of polar bear hides etc.? For a discussion on this issue 
see the Icon on Ice 2012:72 report. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. The Antarctic Treaty System 
and the Regulation of 
Antarctic Tourism 
Kees Bastmeijer 
8.1 Introduction 
Antarctic tourism has grown rapidly since the early 1990s. While in 1992 
about 2,000 tourists made landings in Antarctica, this number had in-
creased to more than 16 times that number by 2007–08. During that sea-
son, the total number of Antarctic tourists, including those involved in 
cruise only activities, airborne tourism and land-based activities, exceeded 
46,000 while the total number of persons visiting the Antarctic for tour-
ism purposes, including staff and crew, was estimated at more than 
73,000. In the last few years however, the numbers have dropped signifi-
cantly, in season 2010–11 to around 34,000 tourists and in season 2011–
12 to about 26,000 (see: www.iaato.org). This decline in numbers has 
undoubtedly been caused by the economic crisis. The situation was exac-
erbated further by a regulation recently introduced by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) that prohibits the use of heavy oil as ship 
fuel in the Antarctic region. It is however estimated that in the 2012–13 
season numbers will begin to rise again and that further sustained growth 
in the Antarctic tourism sector can be expected over time. In a world 
where the number of people will increase towards 9 billion in just a few 
decades, a “holiday on ice” in one of the last true wildernesses on this 
globe represents a dream for many. 
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Parallel to the numbers of tourists the diversity of tourist activities has 
also increased over the last twenty years. For many decades Antarctic 
tourism was primarily ship-based; however, since the 2003–04 season so-
called “fly-sail” or “fly-cruise” operations began where tourists are taken 
to the Antarctic peninsula by aircraft and then make excursions on yachts 
or cruising vessels. Other activities in Antarctica include scuba diving, 
camping, kayaking, cross country skiing, mountaineering, long distance 
swimming, excursions by helicopter, sky diving, marathons and the use of 
a hovercraft. 
These developments in Antarctic tourism raise various international 
management questions relating to the safety of tourists, the interaction 
between science and tourism and the direct, indirect or cumulative effects 
on the Antarctic environment. This chapter aims to undertake a compre-
hensive overview of how the states involved in the Antarctic Treaty System 
(ATS) and the tourism sector itself have responded to these developments 
and related concerns. It also provides a gap analysis.  
At the outset, the ATS and the relevance of existing legal instruments 
for tourism activities in Antarctica will be briefly discussed. Next, an over-
view of international Antarctic tourism management over the period of 
1990 to 2012 is provided. Based on this overview, the chapter’s final sec-
tion discusses the main “outstanding questions” in relation to the strategic 
management of Antarctic tourism. 
8.2 The Antarctic Treaty System and Tourism 
8.2.1 The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS):  
A Brief Introduction 
Antarctica, politically defined as the continent, all islands and surrounding 
oceans below the 60 degrees south latitude, is the subject of a unique inter-
national management system: 28 states, each with a substantial scientific 
interest in the area, manage the area collectively through a consensus-based 
decision-making system. This system derives from historic international 
discussions on territorial claims. During the first half of the 20th Century, 7 
states (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the 
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United Kingdom) claimed parts of the continent, but the legitimacy of these 
claims was internationally disputed. In 1959, the 7 claimant states and 5 
other states involved in Antarctic research (conducted during the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year of 1957–58) signed the Antarctic Treaty in Wash-
ington. This treaty entered into force in 1961. A central element of the trea-
ty is the “agreement to disagree” of Art. IV regarding the legitimacy of the 
sovereignty claims: the positions of all states regarding the legal status of 
Antarctica are reserved and the contracting parties agree to manage Antarc-
tica collectively. Since 1961, other states succeeded in showing a substantial 
scientific interest in Antarctica and received the “consultative status” (“right 
to vote-status”) in accordance with Art. IX of the Antarctic Treaty. Today 28 
consultative parties are involved in the Antarctic decision-making process, 
which is based on consensus, while 22 other states are contracting parties 
to the Treaty (non-consultative parties). The most recent new members of 
the “Antarctic family” are Malaysia (accession to the Treaty on 31 October 
2011) and Pakistan (accession to the Treaty on 1 March 2012 and to the 
Protocol on 31 March 2012). These accessions are important for the inter-
national legitimacy of the ATS as in the past these 2 states put much effort 
into the international advocacy campaign for the management of Antarctica 
in the framework of the United Nations. 
Since the Treaty was promulgated, several other conventions and many 
recommendations have been adopted (for an overview, see: http:// 
www.ats.aq). Some of these agreements are in various ways linked to the 
Antarctic Treaty but are in fact independent international agreements. An 
important example here is the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), signed in 1980. For tou-rism, the most 
important legal instrument is the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (the Protocol). The Protocol, which entered into force on 15 
January 1998, establishes a comprehensive system of obligations and prohibi-
tions, addressing most types of activities (including tourism) in the region 
below the 60 degrees south latitude and designates this region as a nature 
reserve, devoted to peace and science (Art. 2). In addition to these more com-
prehensive legal instruments, the Antarctic consultative parties also regularly 
adopt additional measures (legally binding instruments) and resolutions 
(non-binding instruments) at their annual meetings: the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (“ATCMs”). 
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This set of international instruments for the governance of the Antarc-
tic is often referred to as the “ATS.” From the start, safeguarding peace and 
ensuring the freedom of scientific research constituted the two main pil-
lars of the ATS, but with the adoption of the Protocol in 1991, the protec-
tion of the Antarctic environment emerged as a third pillar. At the ATCM, 
the consultative parties discuss the implementation of the Treaty, the 
Protocol and measures and resolutions, as well as the need to adopt addi-
tional management measures. 
8.2.2 The Protocol’s Relevance for Tourist Activities 
One of the consequences of the Protocol for tourist activities is that a prior 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) must be prepared. Depending on 
the possible impacts of an activity on the Antarctic environment (inclu-
ding, e.g., the intrinsic values, such as wilderness values), the proposal for 
the activity must be subjected to a preliminary assessment (PA), an initial 
environmental evaluation (IEE) or a comprehensive environmental evalu-
ation (CEE). The details of this EIA-obligation are laid down in Art. 8 and 
Annex I to the Protocol. Annex II includes general provisions on the pro-
tection of flora and fauna, which are also relevant for tourist activities. For 
instance, taking or harmful interference with flora and fauna must be 
avoided and precautionary measures must be taken to prevent the intro-
duction of non-native species and diseases. Tourist expeditions should 
also take into account the waste management provisions of Annex III (on 
land) and Annex IV (at sea). Annex V constitutes the bases for designating 
Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs), Antarctic Specially Managed 
Areas (ASMAs) and historic sites and monuments. Tourist activities in 
ASPAs are allowed only if the internationally agreed management plan 
allows for such activities and if a permit for entering the ASPA has been 
issued by one of the contracting parties to the Protocol. Tourist activities 
in ASMAs may be conducted in accordance with the code of conduct for 
the area. In general, historic sites and monuments may be visited, but 
damage to the sites or monuments must be avoided. 
The state parties to the Protocol must ensure that these provisions and all 
other provisions of the Protocol have been implemented in the domestic legal 
and administrative systems and are applied in practice to all Antarctic activi-
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ties under their jurisdiction. Many of the state parties deve-loped detailed 
implementation legislation and most of these states (e.g., Germany, Sweden, 
New Zealand, and the Netherlands) connected the EIA obligations to a domes-
tic permit or authorisation system for the conduct of activities in the Antarc-
tic. This enables these governments to deny access to the Antarctic Treaty 
area if it is determined that the activity would be in violation with the domes-
tic legislation. However, not all consultative parties adopted this approach. 
For instance, the United States implemented the Protocol without a general 
authorisation system. Consequently, tourist activities are the subject of EIA 
provisions and other specific provisions implementing the Annexes to the 
Protocol, but the US government has limited means to prevent a tour operator 
from going to the Antarctic.  
The general practice under the domestic implementation systems is 
that tourist expeditions are subjected to preliminary assessments or ini-
tial environmental evaluations (not to CEEs) and that authorisations or 
permits for tourist activities are seldom refused. One of the very rare 
court decisions with respect to refusing a permit for an Antarctic non-
governmental activity relates to an art project that planned to leave a 
permanent bronze sculpture in the Antarctic (Final Report ATCM XXIX, 
para. 172). In 2006, the German court decided that the German competent 
authority had the legal competence to refuse a permit for this activity on 
the basis of the German Antarctica legislation. 
8.3 “Phases” of Tourism Management in the 
Antarctic between 1990 and 2012 
8.3.1 1990–1992: A Tourism Annex to the Protocol? 
Already during the negotiations on the Protocol (1990–91), concerns 
were expressed about the development of tourism and other non-
governmental activities in Antarctica. For example, the report of the nego-
tiations working group II of the Chile session of the XIth Special ATCM 
(1990, 108) states: 
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“Consideration was also given to the convenience of carrying out tourist ac-
tivities by maritime means. This would avoid the proliferation of terrestrial 
support infrastructure in Antarctica. It also considered the possibility of es-
tablishing duly monitored special tourist interest areas, in order to deter-
mine the impact of human presence on the environment and its feasibility 
as a management scheme.” 
These considerations did not however result in specific provisions on 
tourism in the text of the Protocol. In view of the concerns expressed by 
certain states over the development of tourism in Antarctica, the Final 
Report of the XIth Special ATCM (1991, 102), states: “[…] the meeting pro-
ceeded to initiate a study on tourism, and the representatives agreed that 
their study of this subject would be carried out in the XVI Consultative 
Meeting” (see also p. 23). 
Accordingly, the issue of tourism received substantial attention during 
the XVIth ATCM in 1991. Five working papers and eleven information pa-
pers on the issue were tabled. Some of the working papers included pro-
posals for a 6th Annex to the Protocol on tourism and non-governmental 
expeditions. A special sub-working group on tourism was established, that 
also discussed the proposals for a separate annex (Ibid., 29–30). However, 
no consensus could be reached on the desirability of specific regulations 
on tourism activities that would go beyond the general provisions of the 
Protocol. Therefore, the discussions resulted in a procedural agreement, 
laid down in Recommendation XVI-13. With this recommendation, the 
representatives expressed their concerns “about the possible effect of 
increased tourism and non-governmental activities in Antarctica” and 
recommended to their governments (Ibid., 131–132): 
“that an informal meeting of the Parties be convened with a view to making 
proposals to the XVIIth Consultative Meeting on the question of a compre-
hensive regulation of tourist and non-governmental activities in Antarctica 
in accordance with the Protocol and taking into account the proposals 
made at the present XVIth Consultative Meeting, including proposals for a 
future Annex to the Protocol on environmental protection.” 
Furthermore, the recommendation listed a number of issues that were not 
addressed in the Protocol and should receive further attention, including the 
“number of tourist/carrying capacity, permanent infrastructure for tourists, 
concentration/dispersal of tourist activities and access to unexplored areas.”  
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Several of these issues were dealt with in a draft annex to the Protocol 
on tourism, tabled at the XVIIth ATCM by Chile, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain (Doc. XVII ATCM/WP 1); however, the informal meeting prior to the 
XVIIth ATCM (9 and 10 November 1992) as well as the formal discussions 
at that ATCM made it clear that again no consensus could be reached 
among the consultative parties. One of the arguments against a separate 
annex on tourism at that stage was that the Protocol already applies to all 
human activities, including tourist activities, and that a separate annex on 
tourism would adversely affect the adequate implementation and ratifica-
tion of the Protocol. Nonetheless, several states “maintained that more 
precise regulation having legally binding force was required for such ac-
tivities” (Final Report of the XVIIth ATCM, 1992: para. 112). 
8.3.2 1992–2003: Little Decision-making and Reliance 
on Self-regulation 
At the XVIIIth ATCM (1994), consensus was reached on the desirability of 
non-binding guidelines as a compromise between “no action” and “addi-
tional legal regulation” in respect of tourism (Final Report of the XVIIIth 
ATCM, 1994, para. 59): 
“There was agreement that the objective at this Meeting was not to create 
new rules and regulations but to provide guidance to those visiting Antarc-
tica and those organising and conducting tourism and non-governmental 
activities there.” 
The meeting adopted Recommendation XVIII-1 which included a set of 
guidelines for visitors to the Antarctic as well as a set of guidelines for the 
organisers of non-governmental expeditions (Ibid., 35–45). 
Between 1994 and 2000, the item of tourism was discussed at each 
ATCM. Issues that were discussed include requirements on and formats for 
advance notification and post-visit reporting, compliance enforcement from 
gateway ports, concerns related to cumulative impacts, the visitation of new 
(previously unvisited) sites, monitoring, education and training, self-
regulation and tourism activities from non-contracting states. 
These discussions clearly show that several consultative parties were 
concerned about the development of tourism in Antarctica, in particular 
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because of the possible adverse impacts of these activities on science and 
the Antarctic environment. However, these concerns did not result in a 
substantial number of additional measures. Only a limited number of ad-
ditional measures were adopted with regard to the issue of advanced 
notice and post-visit reporting (see: Resolution 3(1995) and the Final 
Report of the XIXth ATCM, 1995, paras 55–58; Final Report of the XXth 
ATCM, 1996, para. 76). The rather more fundamental issues concerning 
Antarctic tourism however received relatively little attention. For in-
stance, the issues reflected in Recommendation XVI-13 (1991, see above) 
were still not discussed. 
At the XXIVth ATCM (2001; para. 106) the meeting “noted that there is 
an increase in the diversity of tourism activities, which may present new 
management challenges.” The consultative parties agreed on the im-
portance of the appropriate management of Antarctic tourism and agreed 
further “that the issue of tourism should be the subject of detailed discus-
sion at XXV ATCM” (para. 112). At that ATCM in 2002, certain contracting 
parties argued that additional legally binding rules should be adopted to 
manage Antarctic tourism. France once again proposed the development 
of a separate Annex to the Protocol on tourism (Doc. XXV ATCM/WP 02). 
Although the issue was discussed intensively, no consensus was reached 
on the need to take any measures that go beyond the Protocol or that 
specify the consequences of the Protocol for Antarctic tourism. According 
to the Final Report of the XXVth ATCM (2002; para. 116): 
“A number of Delegations considered that a new Annex to the Environmen-
tal Protocol concerning regulation of tourism and non-governmental activi-
ties […] is not required. They considered that the Protocol deals effectively 
with the environmental aspects of tourism.” 
During the period 1992–2003, this reluctance to adopt additional legal 
instruments may also be related to a growing recognition of the work of 
the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO, see: 
http://iaato.org). In 1991, the year in which the Protocol was adopted, 
this association was founded by 7 tour operators with the objective being 
in part “(t)o advocate, promote and practice safe and environmentally 
responsible travel to Antarctica.” Currently, more than 100 tourism com-
panies are (associated or full) members of IAATO. IAATO has taken many 
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initiatives to increase the environmental awareness of its members. Most 
important here are the objectives and bylaws that must be respected by 
all members. These objectives and bylaws include the requirement for 
members to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Protocol 
(e.g., in respect of EIA), additional measures outlined by the ATCM and the 
guidelines for tour operators and for visitors.  
IAATO has however, in addition, adopted bylaws that clearly go be-
yond the requirements of the governmental system. Examples here in-
clude: guidelines on watching sea mammals, guidelines on the prevention 
of the introduction of alien species and diseases, and a wilderness guide-
line. Furthermore, the association undertakes various practical coordina-
ting activities, for instance, to increase safety and to prevent the visit of 
more than one ship to any Antarctic site at the same time. IAATO’s work 
has thus clearly developed into a comprehensive and robust self-
regulatory system for Antarctic tourism. 
Since its foundation, IAATO has been very successful in showing the 
value of its work to the Antarctic consultative parties. At each ATCM, 
IAATO tables a comprehensive annual report and a paper that provides an 
overview of Antarctic tourism. The report includes the number of tourists 
that have visited the Antarctic during the previous season, the type of 
tourist activities that have been conducted and the incidents that have 
occurred. Furthermore, in its papers IAATO predicts the number of tou-
rists for the next season and discusses the trends in Antarctic tourism 
(e.g., increasing diversity of activities, growth of land-based activities). 
IAATO also plays an active role in political and legal discussions, both at 
the domestic level and the international level. At the domestic level, one 
example from the USA is the involvement of IAATO in the process of draft-
ing the “Proposed Rule on the Environmental Impact Assessment of Non-
governmental Activities in Antarctica.” At the international level, IAATO is 
actively involved in discussions held within the Commission for Environ-
mental Protection (CEP) and the ATCM’s Working Group on Tourism and 
Non-Governmental Activities. 
Many contracting parties clearly attach high value to IAATO and its 
work. This is perhaps best illustrated by the opportunity they provide for 
it to participate in ATCM-discussions as an expert organisation. In addi-
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tion, it has also been explicitly noted in ATCM reports. For example, the 
Final Report of the XXth ATCM (1996, para. 84) states.  
“the Meeting stressed the importance of effective self-regulation by the 
tourist industry. To this end, the Meeting urged IAATO to: 
 
 Ensure that its members conform fully to the provisions of the 
Protocol; 
 Disseminate ATCM recommendations and other texts relevant to 
tourism; 
 Produce further guidelines and codes of conduct where appropriate; 
 Encourage all tour companies operating in Antarctica to become 
members of the Association.” 
 
As stated above, for this time period, this recognition is probably one of 
the reasons why several consultative parties did not support additional 
legal measures in respect of Antarctic tourism.  
8.3.3 2004–2007: Growing Awareness of the ATCM’s 
Responsibility for Tourism but Still Little Decision-
making 
With the continuing expansion of Antarctic tourism, in term of both num-
bers and in diversity, the question of whether the existing regulations (par-
ticularly the Protocol), paralleled by the IAATO self-regulation regime, 
should be considered sufficient to address the various concerns, became 
more prominent. In 2004, Norway hosted an Antarctic Treaty Meeting of 
Experts on Tourism to promote informal discussions. This was a particular-
ly valuable meeting because some of the more strategic issues were tabled 
and seriously discussed for the first time since the beginning of the 1990s 
(e.g., the allowance of permanent facilities for tourism in Antarctica; options 
for improving supervision of tourist activities in Antarctica through the 
development of an international observer scheme). 
At the ATCMs of 2004–08, issues related to Antarctic tourism were inten-
sively debated in the Working Group on Tourism and Non-Governmental 
Activities. Important issues of debate included the following: 
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 Safety risks related to adventure tourism and the risk of disturbing 
scientific research posed by such activities; 
 Safety and environmental risks related to the increase in large 
passenger ships sailing in Antarctic waters (ships with a capacity of 
more than 500 passengers); 
 The (increased) use of third country flagged vessels for tourism 
activities in the Antarctic; 
 The potential increase of non-IAATO tour operators in Antarctica; 
 Monitoring and addressing the (potential) cumulative impacts of 
visitors in the Antarctic; 
 The possible development of an accreditation system for Antarctic tour 
operators; 
 The question of whether (new) permanent facilities for tourism in 
Antarctica should be prohibited. 
 
Debate on most of these issues has been lengthy and based on well pre-
pared papers. Unlike the period 1992–2003, the argument that tourism 
was sufficiently regulated by the Protocol and IAATO received less em-
phasis. Although consultative parties continued to support cooperation 
with IAATO, the “responsibility” of the ATCM to address tourism-related 
concerns was stressed more explicitly and more often.  
To exercise this responsibility the ATCM adopted various resolutions on 
Antarctic tourism issues. Resolutions (not legally binding) and even a meas-
ure (Measure 2004(4)), which will become legally binding after formal ap-
proval by all consultative parties, were adopted to promote self-sufficiency 
and safety in relation to tourist expeditions, for instance by requiring search 
and rescue (SAR)-arrangements and financial security (e.g., insurance) to 
cover SAR-related costs. Other resolutions aimed at preventing visitor-
based cumulative impacts at landing sites. Two approaches are particularly 
important here. First, for a growing number of landing sites, “Site Specific 
Guidelines” have been developed and adopted in the form of resolutions. 
These resolutions urge the governments of consultative parties to encour-
age tour operators to take these guidelines into account during visits to the 
relevant landing sites. Secondly, Resolution 4(2007) “codified” some im-
portant IAATO bylaws relating to landing in Antarctica. For instance, ac-
cording to the resolution, governments should discourage tour operators 
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that use ships with a capacity of 500 or more passengers from making land-
ings in Antarctica. Finally, in 2007 the ATCM adopted Resolution 5(2007) 
through which the parties are recommended to “discourage any tourism 
activities which may substantially contribute to the long-term degradation 
of the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems.” 
Thus, by the end of this period (ten years after the Protocol entered in-
to force in 1998), only a limited number of additional measures have been 
taken to address concerns related to the ongoing increase in Antarctic 
tourism. Moreover, almost all of the recommendations adopted are not 
legally binding, having instead “resolution status” and, as such, are often 
based on work established by IAATO’s self-regulation system. Only one 
measure specifically related to tourism has been adopted (Measure 
2004(4)). This measure primarily aims to ensure the self-sufficiency of 
tourist expeditions to prevent human safety incidents and to avoid dis-
turbing scientific programmes if and when rescue operations take place. 
Furthermore, the ATCM did not reach consensus on any of the more stra-
tegic policy questions, including certain questions that were already 
raised in the early 1990s. For instance, suggestions by France to develop 
an area-regime for tourist visitation (e.g., areas closed and opened for 
tourism) again received very little attention by the ATCM. Particularly in 
response to certain incidents (e.g., the sinking of the M/S Explorer in 
2007) ship safety issues have received significant attention at the ATCM; 
however, partly due to the existence of different views on the relationship 
between the IMO and the ATCM, the ATCM were not able to adopt any 
resolution in this time period. After 4 years of debate, no consensus could 
be reached in respect of the question whether permanent facilities for 
tourism in Antarctica should be prohibited or regulated in some other 
way. It could be argued that the above-mentioned general policy state-
ment of Resolution 5(2007) is important here but its wording remains 
extremely weak and rather vague (a resolution that recommends the par-
ties to discourage).  
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8.3.4 2008–2012: Careful Steps Towards a More 
Strategic Approach 
At ATCM XXXI (2008) the United Kingdom tabled a paper that included 
the proposal “that the ATCM should develop a Strategic Vision for the 
development of Antarctic tourism over the next decade” (UK, Doc. 
ATCMXXXI/wp051, 2008: 3, at www.ats.aq). The need for a more strategic 
approach regarding Antarctic tourism management by the ATCM had been 
advocated in the literature as well as during several ATCMs, but the UK 
paper signalled the start of the first serious debates at the ATCM on this 
issue. The UK proposal received support from many of the consultative 
parties, which gave the UK reason to table a more comprehensive paper at 
the XXXIInd ATCM (2009), entitled: “Strategic vision of Antarctic tourism 
for the next decade.” Building partly on inter-sessional contributions from 
7 other consultative parties and 2 observers, the UK “developed an outline 
Strategic Vision for consideration by the ATCM” that “aims to establish the 
broad principles by which the Antarctic Treaty parties will manage tour-
ism in Antarctica” (UK, Doc. ATCMXXXII/wp10, 2009, 3, at www.ats.aq). 
The proposed vision included a number of “general principles” as well as 
more concrete policy statements on issues such as: “growth of tourism,” 
“protecting the Antarctic environment,” “safety of tourism activities,” and 
“monitoring and information exchange.”  
Discussion in respect of this paper made clear that the consultative 
parties had divergent views on several of these more concrete issues. 
Furthermore, some consultative parties had problems with the prescrip-
tive character of (parts of) the document.  
“There was some discussion as to whether a strategic vision document 
for tourism should be aspirational, focusing on general themes and goals 
for the future of tourism, or prescriptive, and thereby include a more de-
tailed list of tasks that might be required as part of the implementation of 
such a strategy” (Final Report ATCM XXXII, para. 184).  
Given these different views, the meeting’s attention focused on the part of 
the paper that contained a number of “general principles.” This resulted in the 
adoption of Resolution 7(2009) (Final Report ATCM XXXII, para. 185). With 
this Resolution, the representatives of the consultative parties recall their 
commitment to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment 
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and recommend “that the following general principles be used to inform and 
guide further work in managing Antarctic tourism activities:” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several consultative parties were clearly disappointed with this outcome, 
probably because of the general nature of the wording of these principles 
and the lack of consensus on more concrete issues that have been the 
subject of ATCM discussions for so many years: “Germany, supported by 
other Parties, thanked the UK for the effort to draft a strategic vision. It 
underlined however that the Resolution in its current form does not meet 
the expectations for a “vision”. (Final Report ATCM XXXII, para. 186). 
General Principles (Resolution 7(2009)) 
 All tourism activities undertaken in Antarctica will be conducted in accord-
ance with the Antarctic Treaty, its Protocol on Environmental Protection, 
and relevant ATCM Measures and Resolutions; 
 Tourism should not be allowed to contribute to the long-term degradation of 
the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems, or 
the intrinsic natural wilderness and historical values of Antarctica. In the ab-
sence of adequate information about potential impacts, decisions on tourism 
should be based on a pragmatic and precautionary approach, that also in-
corporates an evaluation of risks; 
 Scientific research should be accorded priority in relation to all tourism 
activities in Antarctica; 
 Antarctic Treaty Parties should implement all existing instruments relating 
to tourism and non-Governmental activities in Antarctica and aim to ensure, 
as far as practicable, that they continue to proactively develop regulations 
relating to tourism activities that should provide for a consistent framework 
for the management of tourism; 
 All operators conducting tourism activities in Antarctica should be encour-
aged to cooper-ate with each other and with the Antarctic Treaty Parties to 
coordinate tourism activities and share best practice on environmental and 
safety management issues; 
 All tourism organisations should be encouraged to provide a focus on the 
enrichment and education of visitors about the Antarctic environment and 
its protection. 
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However, it should be noted that at the same meeting agreement was 
reached on a number of concrete steps towards the more comprehensive 
management of Antarctic tourism. Particularly relevant here is Measure 
15(2009). With this measure, initiated by the US, Resolution 4(2007) 
(landing prohibition for ships carrying 500 or more passengers, see 
above) was “upgraded” to a measure that will become legally binding after 
official approval by all consultative parties.  
Being aware of their responsibility for shipping safety issues in the 
Antarctic, the consultative parties met in 2009 for the Antarctic Treaty 
Meeting of Experts (ATME) on the management of ship-borne tourism in 
Antarctica (Wellington, New Zealand, 9–11 December 2009). The aim of 
the ATME was “to accelerate consideration of the issues associated with 
ship-borne tourism.” The ATME resulted in 17 recommendations which 
received substantial attention during the ATCM in 2010. Although most 
recommendations were explicitly endorsed by the ATCM, decision-making 
(resulting in measures or resolutions) was limited. Resolution 6(2010) 
was adopted to improve “the co-ordination of maritime search and rescue 
in the Antarctic Treaty area.” The resolution relates to information ex-
change in respect of available SAR-facilities, the exchange of vessel sched-
ules, and the desire to have vessels report their geographic position regu-
larly. Resolution 5(2010) aims to improve the “co-ordination among Ant-
arctic Treaty Parties on Antarctic proposals under consideration in the 
IMO” and Resolution 7(2010) requests that “the Parties proactively apply, 
through their national maritime authorities, the existing regime of port 
State control to passenger vessels bound for the Antarctic Treaty area.” 
These are all relevant tools but the most important step towards the more 
comprehensive regulation of ship safety in the Antarctic would be the 
adoption of a mandatory “code for polar shipping” within the IMO.  
With Resolution 8(2009) the ATCM had already expressed “the desire 
[…] that the IMO would commence work as soon as practicable to develop 
mandatory requirements for ships operating in Antarctic waters, which 
would include inter alia matters relating to vessel design, construction, 
manning and equipment, including survival craft and lifesaving equip-
ment, taking particular note of the types of vessels, especially passenger 
vessels, operating in Antarctica.” This mandatory polar code is being de-
veloped by IMO’s “Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment” and 
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although the aim was to finalise this work in 2012, at its 56th Session on 
28 February 2012 the Sub-Committee “agreed to extend the target com-
pletion year for the finalization of Step 1 (SOLAS passenger and cargo 
ships) to 2014 […]” (DE\56\25.doc, http://www.uscg.mil/imo/de/ 
docs/de56-report.pdf, para. 10.33/p. 30). 
The adoption of general principles in 2009 could not prevent the 
ATCM from “falling back” into ad hoc discussions in 2010; no papers with 
the aim of continuing the strategic and pro-active debate on the basis of 
the general principles were tabled. A substantial part of the Working 
Group’s available discussion time was given over to the issue of yachts in 
Antarctica and, indeed, to one incident in particular relating to a yacht at 
“Wordie House” (a historic site). To strengthen the strategic character of 
the debates, in 2011 the ATCM agreed to convene an open-ended In-
tersessional Contact Group (ICG). One of the aims of this ICG, which was 
convened by the Netherlands and supported by the Antarctic Treaty Sec-
retariat through an electronic discussion forum, was to identify the policy 
questions relating to Antarctic tourism that had not yet been adequately 
addressed by the ATCM (“outstanding questions”). Furthermore, the ICG 
discussed whether the development of new regulatory instruments was 
desirable. It also looked at the question of which issues should be consi-
dered a priority. At the ATCM in 2012, the Netherlands tabled a report on 
the ICG’s work as well as an information paper summing up and briefly 
discussing the identified “outstanding questions.” In the following section 
these outstanding questions are listed with the ATCM 2012 discussions on 
each briefly summarised. 
8.4 Regulating Tourism in Antarctica: Outstanding 
Questions for the ATCM 
To emphasise the strategic character of the ICG’s work, and the resulting 
list of outstanding issues, the questions were structured on the basis of 
the “General Principles” adopted by the ATCM in 2009 (see above): 
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Outstanding Questions Related to Principles I & IV 
Note: these questions are transposed from the original text. 
 
a) Would there be benefit in clearly defining the use of the term tourism 
and/or visitor within the ATCM context, e.g., to avoid either confusion, 
or misinterpretation of requirements in the future? 
b) Should the ATCM take (further) action (in addition to Resolution 
7(2010) on Port State Control) in view of the possible future increase 
of vessels (including yachts), used for tourism purposes, sailing the flag 
of states that are not a Contracting Party to the Treaty and/or the 
Protocol? 
c) Should the ATCM take action to improve the supervision of whether 
tourist activities comply with the regulations of the Environmental 
Protocol and the measures/resolutions? For instance: should the 
ATCM develop a joint observation scheme? (See the discussions of the 
ICG 2010–2011 and ICG 2011–2012, chaired by Argentina).  
d) Should the ATCM take action (in addition to Resolution 3(2004)) to 
improve the information exchange and cooperation between 
competent authorities of Contracting Parties to the Protocol? For 
example, should the forum of competent authorities, initiated by 
Germany and the Netherlands at CEP VIII (2005) and CEP IX (2006), 
have a more structured role in the future? Or should the efforts 
primarily be focused on the continued development and refinement of 
the EIES to facilitate information exchange? 
e) Should the ATCM take action to ensure greater consistency of 
interpretation and implementation of the Protocol’s provisions and 
Measures relevant for Antarctic Tourism? For instance, is it desirable 
that the ATCM studies and discusses existing differences among the 
domestic legal and administrative arrangements that are being applied 
to Antarctic tourist activities and the possible consequences of these 
differences (e.g., forum shopping)? 
f) In view of the delays in entering into force of the instruments that are 
meant to be legally binding (e.g., Annex VI, various Measures), should 
the ATCM consider some form of fast tracking procedures? 
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Outstanding questions related to Principle II 
g) How should cumulative impacts by visitation (e.g., at popular tourist 
sites) be measured and managed? For instance:  
i. Should (joint) action be taken to improve long-term 
monitoring? And if so, who should be responsible (e.g., 
National Antarctic Programs/the science community, the 
tourism industry, jointly)? 
ii. Should the issue of cumulative impacts be reflected more 
explicitly in EIA procedures? 
iii. Should – in addition to existing instruments such as Site 
Specific Guidelines – more strategic instruments be 
considered (e.g., opening and closure of areas, 
maximizing numbers of visitors per regions/site)?  
h) Should the ATCM adopt regulatory instruments to prevent or regulate 
the further expansion of tourist activities in Antarctica? 
i. How can Annex I of the Protocol be effectively applied for 
the establishment of new tourism destinations?  
ii. Should the ATCM further regulate the expansion of 
tourist activities into the Antarctic interior?  
iii. Should pristine areas be closed for any type of human 
visitation in the future, including all tourism activities, 
even where none currently take place, e.g., to preserve 
these areas as reference areas for future scientific 
research or because of the intrinsic values of these sites?  
i) Do the (possible) interrelationships between Antarctic tourism 
management and climate change require the attention of the ATCM?  
j) Currently, Antarctica is, in principle, open for any type and form of 
tourism and other non-governmental activities, provided they are 
conducted in accordance with the Environmental Protocol. Would 
further policy guidance from the ATCM on this issue be desirable in 
view of the continuing increase of the diversity of activities in 
Antarctica? More specifically, should Antarctica be open to all types of 
activities or should “priority […] be given to tourism focusing on 
educational enrichment and respect for the environment” (Final 
Report of ATCM XXXII, 2009, para. 208)?  
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k) Should additional regulations be adopted in respect of permanent 
facilities for tourism in Antarctica (such as hotels), for instance, to 
prevent further degradation of Antarctica’s wilderness values or to 
limit the risk of legal debates on ownership? 
l) Should the potentially increasing use by tourists of infrastructure, 
established with the principal aim of supporting scientific activities 
(e.g., air connections, bases, etc.), be considered as a concern, and if so, 
how should the ATCM respond to this concern? 
m) Related to several of the previous questions, how can precautionary 
action be taken, given the dynamic character of the tourism industry 
and the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms at most sites used 
for tourism purposes? 
n) As lead responsibility for many “safety” issues fall largely to others 
such as the International Maritime Organisation, should the ATCM 
engage more actively with such bodies and, if so, how? 
Outstanding Questions Related to Principle III 
o) Are current tourism activities interfering with scientific research at 
frequently visited sites and is further ATCM action needed to prevent 
such interference?  
Outstanding Questions Related to Principle IV 
p) Should the ATCM take action in view of a possible increase of tour 
operators operating outside of the self-regulatory system of IAATO 
(“free riders”)?  
q) Are there any bylaws, guidelines or best practices of the tourism sector 
that require codification in a recommendation or measure of the 
ATCM? 
Outstanding Questions Related to Principle V 
r) Should ATCM and/or individual Contracting Parties to the Protocol 
take additional initiatives to encourage tourism organizations to 
provide a greater focus on the enrichment and education of visitors 
about the Antarctic environment and its protection (in line with 
Resolution 7 (2009))? For instance: 
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i. Should the ATCM develop a trainer’s manual for tourism 
operators with the relevant existing regulations (e.g., 
measures/resolutions on tourism including the general 
and specific site guidelines for visitors, tourism relevant 
regulations of the Environmental Protocol)? 
ii. Should the ATCM establish a system of obligatory or 
voluntary payments by individual tourists or tourist 
organizations (as a payment for “ecosystem services”)? 
What would be the purpose of levying such charges? (e.g., 
financing long-term monitoring, financing educational 
programs)? 
 
Of all the questions raised d), g), h), j) and k) were those most often men-
tioned by the 12 consultative parties that participated in the ICG as being 
priority issues for the ATCM. In structuring and leading the discussions, 
the chairman of the Tourism Working Group ensured that these 5 ques-
tions received special attention. This list was not however adopted by the 
ATCM as its priority list for the coming years. The ICG’s report and other 
papers tabled at the ATCM nevertheless resulted in comprehensive dis-
cussions on issues that are of great relevance for the long-term manage-
ment of the Antarctic. The final report of the ATCM states that “[t]here 
was a broad view that there were gaps in the current framework of regu-
lation for land-based activities, in particular the expansion of tourism 
activities into the Antarctic interior” (para. 222) and that the “Parties re-
cognised that this required consideration of how to regulate use of pris-
tine areas, as interior areas are less likely to have been exposed to human 
impacts” (para. 222). Discussions also related to the increasing diversity 
of types of activities in Antarctica as well as the question of what criteria 
should be used to determine the allowance of activities: “Several Parties 
stated that the determinant of environmental impact assessments should 
be the impact of the activity and not its purpose, while others were of the 
view that the purpose of the activity was relevant to the application of the 
Protocol” (para. 218). On this issue of diversification in respect of Antarc-
tic tourism and in particular the experiences of, and challenges faced, in 
relation to the application of domestic law in respect of those activities, an 
informal contact group will be convened to prepare further discussions at 
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the ATCM in Brussels in 2013 (para. 233). In relation to the issue of the 
allowance of (new) permanent facilities for tourism (e.g., hotels), “[t]here 
was substantial support for the view that tourism activities likely to have 
more than a minor or transitory impact should not be authorised” (paras 
225 and 226). For the purpose of limiting cumulative impacts various 
possible instruments were discussed, including “reviewing site guidelines, 
the possibility of making some guidelines mandatory, closing sites for a 
season or more, and setting precautionary limits on the number of visi-
tors” (para. 216). 
8.5 Conclusion 
It is clear that in 2012 tourism in Antarctica is certainly not unregulated. 
The provisions of the Protocol apply also to tourist activities; IAATO has 
developed quite an impressive system of self-regulation; several important 
resolutions and measures have been adopted by the ATCM; and a number of 
international maritime instruments also apply to Antarctic shipping. How-
ever, taking into account the rapid ongoing developments in Antarctic tour-
ism since the adoption of the Protocol and the clear objectives of the Proto-
col on environmental protection (e.g., comprehensive protection), ever 
greater concerns have been raised about the relatively limited attention 
given by the ATCM to strategic policy questions and the difficulties that are 
clearly being experienced in reaching consensus on the need to adopt addi-
tional regulatory instruments. 
The list of outstanding questions outlined above makes clear that many is-
sues remain open and these questions clearly include issues that are of crucial 
importance for the timely and adequate protection of the values identified as 
important in this respect (see Art. 3 of the Protocol). Should the ATCM close 
and open areas to tourism in order to better address the issue of cumulative 
impacts? Should Antarctic tourists be allowed to use infrastructure that was 
basically build to aid scientific research? Should hotels and other permanent 
tourist facilities in Antarctica be prohibited in order to ensure the long term 
protection of the region’s wilderness values?  
Many of these questions directly relate to the issue of how the consul-
tative parties want Antarctica to look in 10 or 20 years and what the in-
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ternational management of Antarctica – for the benefit of all mankind (a 
central objective of the ATS) – means for the “tourism dossier.” The ATS 
has often been praised for its proactive approach in addressing possible 
future policy concerns (e.g., regulating mining activities before they began, 
prohibiting dogs because of possible disease risks, etc). Nevertheless, it 
remains uncertain whether the ATCM will be able to adopt this approach 
in respect of the joint regulation of Antarctic tourist activities. The discus-
sions held at the ATCM in 2012 do however constitute a reason to be 
hopeful in this respect, as they clearly indicate a willingness among the 
consultative parties to discuss the outstanding questions in detail. It has 
also been announced that these discussions will be continued at the ATCM 
in Brussels in 2013, although this remains heavily dependent on the con-
sultative parties preparing well for the debates by engaging in inter-
sessional discussions and by producing well developed working papers. 
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Questions 
 The consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty have regularly stated 
that they manage the Antarctic for the benefit of all mankind 
(preamble Antarctic Treaty, various recommendations, the 30th 
anniversary of the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty and the 
preamble of the Protocol). Looking at this statement from a legal 
perspective, what could or should this more concretely mean for the 
management of Antarctic tourism? 
 To what extent and in what way have international agreements 
between states, containing standards for Antarctic tourism, been made 
legally binding for individual tourists and/or tour operators? 
 What are the consequences of the obligation to conduct an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (Protocol, Art. 8 & Annex I) for 
tourist activities and what are the strong and weak characteristics of 
the Antarctic EIA-system in comparison with the EIA-system in your 
own country? 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Renewable Energy in  
the Arctic: Regulatory 
Frameworks 
Maria Pettersson 
9.1 Introduction 
The adoption of renewable energy is seen as one of the main ways to im-
prove living conditions in some parts of the Arctic especially in areas that 
are particularly exposed to the effects of climate change. Thus, the provi-
sion of domestic carbon-free electricity in some Arctic locations can en-
hance energy security, minimise environmental impacts and mitigate 
climate change. Many renewable energy sources are also available for off-
grid applications, which make them an attractive option for energy supply 
in inaccessible Arctic areas.  
This chapter highlights the potential for renewable energy develop-
ment in the Arctic and the role of law in this development. While, to date, 
many renewable energy technologies have emerged that are technically 
and in many cases also economically feasible to use (e.g., wind power and 
hydropower), there are many other factors that can hinder this develop-
ment and, therefore, they must be considered in the context of the imple-
mentation and dissemination of renewable energy technologies. Notwith-
standing national and global incentives for renewable energy develop-
ment, the actual implementation of the energy policy objectives will, at 
least in part, be down to the legal conditions for the planning, installation 
and operation of these facilities.  
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The main focus of this chapter is therefore on the impact of the regula-
tory framework on the development and implementation of renewable 
energy technologies in the Arctic. The chapter is structured as follows: in 
the first part, the concept of renewable energy is outlined while the vari-
ous renewable energy sources are described, with reference also made to 
the particular situation regarding availability, power generation and fu-
ture potential in the Arctic States. In the second part, general legal func-
tions vis-à-vis the extraction and utilisation of renewable energy resources 
are examined, for example, rules regarding land use, environmental con-
sideration and concession etc., followed by a number of national exam-
ples. Lastly, the challenges and possibilities for future renewable energy 
development in the Arctic are discussed, such as they relate for example, 
to climate change. 
9.2 Renewable Energy in the Arctic 
Renewable energy is defined as energy sprung from natural processes, 
like sunshine and wind, which are replenished at a faster rate than they 
are consumed. Among the more common sources of renewable energy we 
find solar, wind, hydro and biothermal sources. Numerically, for example, 
in 2010 renewable energy supplied about 16% of the global final energy 
consumed and represented close to 20% of the global supply of electricity 
(REN21, 2011:11). These numbers are expected to grow significantly over 
the coming decades with the primary policy drivers here being climate 
change and security of supply (energy security).  
The energy sector accounts for a large proportion of all global green-
house gas emissions; the combustion of fossil fuels, such as coal and oil, is 
assumed to have increased the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, causing a warming of the global climate that exceeds its natural 
variability (climate change). Renewable energy sources have the potential 
to provide energy with zero emissions of greenhouse gases and an in-
creased use of renewable energy is therefore a very important strategy in 
mitigating the adverse effects of climate change. An increased proportion of 
renewables in the energy mix also contributes to energy diversification, and 
thus to security of supply, by expanding the technology portfolio, increasing 
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the geographical diffusion of the energy sources, reducing energy imports, 
and by offering some protection against the geopolitical shocks which gen-
erally produce the ups and downs in the price of fossil fuels.  
The potential for renewable energy is generally very high in the Arctic 
region. Although the source of the energy varies with respect to the differ-
rent countries’ geographical location, climate, topography etc., vast re-
serves of e.g., hydropower and wind power are located across the region. 
Renewable energy sources can therefore play an important role in crea-
ting a more sustainable future in the Arctic by providing clean energy to 
territories that have hitherto been dependent on fossil fuels. 
Next, different types of renewable energy sources and their relative 
importance for the Arctic States are briefly described. 
9.2.1 Hydropower 
Hydropower, or hydroelectric power, is produced by converting the ener-
gy in flowing water into electricity. The most common approach for the 
large scale extraction of electricity from flowing water is to build a dam in 
a river to store water. The water is then released through a turbine that 
activates a generator and produces electricity. For small scale applica-
tions, a smaller dam or a canal can be used to channel the river water 
through the turbine.  
Hydroelectric power is the largest of the traditional renewable energy 
sources and one that is extensively utilised all across the Arctic. Five of the 
Arctic States are in the top ten list of the world’s largest hydropower pro-
ducers: Canada (10.9%), the United States (9%), Russia (5%), Norway 
(3.8%) and Sweden (2%) (IEA, 2011:19). Expressed as a percentage of 
total domestic electricity generation Norway leads with 95.7%, followed 
by Canada (60.3%), Sweden (48.3%), Russia (17.8%) and the US (7.1%). 
In Iceland, Finland and in Greenland hydropower also represents a signifi-
cant share of the country’s total electricity supply (IEA, 2011:19).  
Despite the already extensive development of hydroelectric power in 
the Arctic, the feasible potential for further expansion remains significant. 
While hydroelectric development in the United States decelerated in the 
late 2000s as a result of the economic recession, installed capacity in Can-
ada, Russia and Greenland has continued to increase. In addition, in Swe-
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den and Norway some expansion has occurred recently, although only on 
a relatively moderate scale, and has in the main consisted of the construc-
tion of small-scale facilities and capacity increases in existing plants. In 
Sweden, further expansion in relation to the major national rivers is also 
prohibited by law.  
9.2.2 Wind Power 
Like most renewable energy forms, wind energy is derived from the sun; 3–
5% of the solar radiation that reaches the Earth is converted into the kinetic 
energy which constitutes the basis for the world’s wind energy resources. In 
terms of global installed renewable energy capacity, wind power ranks sec-
ond to hydropower and is expected to play a key role in the future of renewa-
ble energy development and climate change mitigation.  
Until recently, the development of wind power in the Arctic region had 
been modest. Except for Denmark (although not in Greenland or the Faroe 
Islands) and in the United States (although not in Alaska) the installed ca-
pacity in most Arctic countries was insignificant. Since the beginning of the 
21st century however wind power generation has taken off, driven primarily 
by the need to ensure security of supply and by general environmental con-
cerns, with climate change to the fore. As a result, most Arctic countries now 
have in place various policy instruments to support the development of 
both onshore and offshore wind power, while installed capacity across the 
region is increasing year on year. 
The further potential for wind power generation in the Arctic is huge; 
estimates show that wind could account for 10–20% of the total power 
capacity in the region, and it can also be utilised off-grid. Great wind re-
sources are found in, for example, the mountain areas of Norway and 
Sweden, the Northwest of Russia, the Northeast of Canada, as well as in 
Greenland and Alaska.  
9.2.3 Geothermal Energy 
Geothermal energy derives from the interior of the Earth. The energy can 
be utilised in two ways: directly as a heat source, or indirectly to produce 
electricity by using steam to rotate a turbine generator. The direct use of 
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geothermal energy, primarily for bathing and swimming applications 
together with heating, is widespread in the Arctic. Measured in installed 
capacity, the United States and Sweden lead in this field, with Iceland, 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark (not Greenland or the Faroe Islands) in the 
forefront in terms of average annual use per person. The United States is 
the world leader also in terms of geothermal electricity generation with 
more than 3000 MW installed capacity (although not in Alaska), followed 
by Iceland where more than a quarter of the country’s total electricity 
generation comes from geothermal resources. In 2010, the installed ca-
pacity in Iceland was 575 MW (Energy statistics database 
www.nationmaster.com). In addition there are several more geothermal 
power development projects already underway in Iceland. In Greenland 
the potential for geothermal energy for small-scale applications is being 
tested while in Alaska geothermal energy for both energy production and 
heating is currently under consideration. In both Greenland and Alaska 
the major challenge is the remote location of most geothermal resources. 
9.2.4 Solar Energy 
From a global perspective, solar energy is the most abundant source of 
energy. It is available in many applications, both directly as solar radia-
tion, and indirectly in the form of e.g., wind power, hydropower and ocean 
energy. To take advantage of this direct solar energy, two basic types of 
devices are used: (a) photovoltaic collectors (solar pv), which convert 
sunlight directly into electricity and (b) solar thermal collectors, which are 
used to heat e.g., air or water. Solar photovoltaic is one of today’s fastest 
growing power generation technologies and is in use in all Arctic States 
except Iceland, where the preconditions for the extensive use of solar 
power are modest due to relatively low insolation. The potential for solar 
power use in Russia is great but thus far, in terms of utilisation at least, 
progress has been slow. The largest installed capacity among the Arctic 
States is found in the United States (although not in Alaska) and Canada 
(which has one of the world’s largest operational photovoltaic facilities, 
located in Sarnia, Ontario). The contribution made by solar photovoltaic 
systems in terms of electricity supply in the other Nordic countries, in-
cluding Greenland, remains, however, minimal. 
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9.2.5 Ocean Energy 
The ocean can produce two types of energy: (a) thermal energy as a result 
of heat from the sun (not discussed further here) and (b) mechanical  
energy generated by tidal and wave movements. Tidal power is produced 
by converting the highly predictable fall and rise of the water level that 
occurs as a result of the tides into electricity, while wave power is exploited 
mechanically via a wave energy converter. Neither tidal nor wave power are 
widely utilised anywhere in the world, although there is a future potential 
for electricity generation. In the Arctic areas, potential for the development 
of tidal power is primarily to be found in Russia (e.g., in the Kola Bay and in 
the Sea of Okhotsk), Norway (e.g., Hammerfest) and Alaska (in the Yukon, 
Eagle and Nenana rivers). Tidal power plants (mostly small-scale) are al-
ready installed in some of these areas. The potential for wave power in the 
Arctic States is more modest; only the west coasts of Norway and Canada 
and a few sites in Alaska are suitable.  
9.2.6 Summary 
The development of renewable energy is key to a sustainable future and a 
necessary component in the fight against environmental degradation and 
climate change. Increasing the proportion of domestic renewable energy 
also enhances overall supply security. From a resource availability per-
spective, the potential for renewable energy development in the Arctic is 
very significant. Almost all renewable energy sources are represented in 
abundance, especially hydroelectric power and wind power, while, for 
various reasons, such as, the lack of economic attractiveness (e.g., high 
construction costs or low relative prices on other energy sources), grid 
and system integration issues, institutional constraints, etc., only a frac-
tion of the potential is currently being utilised. 
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9.3 Legal Functions in Relation to the Extraction 
and Exploitation of Renewable Energy 
Many factors are of importance for the development of renewable energy. 
These include: 
 
 Natural conditions, for instance, resource quality and availability; 
 Technological development; 
 Economic and financial conditions, i.e., costs; 
 Social aspects, such as attitudes; 
 Institutional factors; like customs, norms and legal rules.  
 
Hence, despite the relative overall benefits of using renewable energy 
sources, in terms of e.g., reduced emissions and pollution, there are many 
factors that interact and affect the potential to effectively disseminate 
renewable energy technologies, and to implement renewable energy poli-
cy objectives, especially at a local level. In addition, the terms “renewable” 
and “sustainable” are also not always synonymous; the utilisation of a 
renewable energy resource may be in direct contradiction to sustainable 
development. One such example here might be large hydro developments 
which typically involve enormous environmental consequences for both 
the water and the surrounding ecosystems, and may cause the area to 
become uninhabitable. One additional very important factor in the context 
of renewable energy development is therefore the particular energy pro-
ject’s sustainability. A very important function of the legal system is how-
ever to solve conflicts and to weight different interests against each other. 
In this context environmental law aims at balancing the use of natural 
resources in a way that best promotes sustainable development. This 
implies that the law, as such, has both a facilitating and a hindering func-
tion in relation to the extraction and exploitation of renewable energy 
resources (it can also be neutral). 
The regulatory framework for renewable energy can be expressed in 
terms of legal functions, in other words, in the way in which a certain is-
sue is addressed in law. The starting point for the identification of the 
relevant legal functions for the extraction and exploitation of renewable 
energy is the characteristics of the particular energy source. To find out 
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what laws and regulations arise, for example, in relation to the develop-
ment of wind power, we have to determine what resources are necessary 
to harness wind and what other impacts, for instance, in relation to hu-
man health and the environment, such a development would bring.  
The utilisation of natural resources to generate energy thus raises a 
number of legal issues. In the following, some of the primary legal func-
tions in this respect are examined. 
9.3.1 Rights of Use 
The right to develop resources is typically a right of ownership. The main 
rule in most countries is that the ownership of land carries with it a right to 
harvest renewable resources such as forest and wind. If resources cannot be 
individualised the right is often defined as a right of disposition rather than 
a right of ownership.  
Ownership is, however, not the only factor to consider in terms of re-
source rights. Whether the ownership or user right belongs to the state or 
private entities, or a mixture of the two, the right to develop them is normal-
ly also subject to some sort of legal control. The regulations are usually 
aimed at controlling utilisation and steering allocation with respect to e.g., 
the environment, public interest and social structure, and reducing/solving/ 
or otherwise handling conflicts. Although some renewable resources are 
abundant in the sense that they cannot be considered as scarce in the tradi-
tional sense, such as sunlight and, to some extent, wind, the use of the re-
sources to produce energy nevertheless involves competition, primarily due 
to the fact that energy installations in addition to the actual resource also 
require access to land (or water) areas.  
9.3.2 Land Use Planning 
Even in the relatively scarcely populated Arctic, land can be perceived a 
scarce resource. Despite relatively low population density, land-use con-
flicts are not uncommon, in the northern parts of Sweden, Norway and 
Finland where the different interests of, for instance, reindeer herding, 
forestry, energy production (like wind and hydropower), and outdoor 
recreation etc., often are at loggerheads. In the Arctic, land use planning is 
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a fundamental prerequisite for the development of many renewable ener-
gy sources such as: wind, solar and geothermal energy. The use of land is 
typically controlled via physical (spatial) planning laws that regulate (or 
give direction) to what and how land and water areas may be utilised. 
Physical planning thus effectively sets out the ways in which the public 
sector influences the allocation of activities and resource use in areas on 
different levels. It constitutes a fundamentally important instrument in 
controlling the use and management of natural resources. For plans or 
programmes whose implementation is likely to have significant environ-
mental effects, a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) should usual-
ly be produced (the SEA instrument is used in all Arctic countries). The 
purpose of the SEA is to integrate environmental aspects into the plan, or 
programme, to promote sustainable development. Planning instruments 
can thus have both promotive and a counteractive functions in relation to 
the development of renewable energy.  
The starting point for the physical planning in the Nordic Arctic coun-
tries is basically the same: multi-level planning where the legal effect of 
the plans increases with the level of decentralisation, i.e., legally binding 
plans are primarily made at the local (municipal) level.  
9.3.3 Management of Environmental Concerns 
Although an increased share of renewable sources in the energy mix ge-
nerally entails environmental as well as climatic benefits there are, as 
previously indicated, various additional environmental aspects to consid-
er, including human health issues. For example: the noise created by wind 
turbines is a kind of pollution that affects both wildlife and human health. 
Wind power may also cause bird and bat mortality if the location of the 
turbines is not carefully considered, while the turbines may also affect the 
landscape. This is something which is viewed as a significant negative 
externality. Geothermal energy development for instance also involves 
aesthetic concerns as well as extensive land and water use questions. The 
negatives in respect of tidal energy include e.g., adverse impacts on mud-
flats as well as on fish, marine mammals and birds. The most extensive 
environmental impacts of renewable energy, however, probably derive 
from the production of hydroelectric power. The construction of dams 
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often involves irreversible adverse impacts on ecosystems and strongly 
affects the living conditions of both humans and animals. 
Thus, the production of renewable energy involves not only benefits 
but also costs. One way of controlling the negative impacts on human 
health and the environment is through environmental legislation. The 
greater the potential of the environmental impacts of an activity, the more 
restrictive typically are the rules; the overall purpose of environmental 
legislation is to prevent or arrest damage or detriment to human health 
and the environment. On an overarching level, environmental law is ex-
pressed as principles, such as, for example: the precautionary principle, 
the principle of best available technology and the polluter pays principle. 
These principles are then – in varying degrees – translated into substan-
tive national law becoming applicable in e.g., the licensing of various types 
of activities affecting the environment.  
The precautionary requirement under the Swedish Environmental 
Code, for example, means that the operator – to obtain a permit – must 
take the precautions necessary to prevent damage from the activity to 
human health and the environment, such as noise reduction measures, 
compensatory measures, etc. The operator then receives a permit on the 
condition that these requirements are upheld. Also the location of the 
activity requires careful consideration. The site must be “the best possi-
ble” from the point of view of the environment, which means that it is not 
primarily the operator’s access to the site that is crucial for the decision, 
but rather an objective assessment of the suitability of the site from an 
environmental perspective.  
Noise and other pollution (e.g., emissions) can also be controlled by the 
use of legal standards and environmental quality norms determining gen-
eral permissible emission or noise levels. Denmark uses legal standards 
e.g., to control noise pollution from wind power farms, thus avoiding an 
individual examination of permissible noise levels for each installation.  
9.3.4 Licensing 
In addition to access to the actual resources, the utilisation of renewable 
energy like wind, sun and water also includes the construction of various 
types of facilities. This means, as discussed above, that there are potential 
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effects on human health and the environment, thus giving rise to licensing 
requirements. An application for a permit shall, in most countries, include 
an environmental impact assessment (EIA) where the direct and indirect 
environmental impacts – in the broadest sense – of the planned activity 
are described. To exemplify, the construction of an offshore wind farm in 
Sweden will, depending on the size and location, require at least three 
permits (e.g., a permit for environmentally hazardous activity, a water 
operation permit, and building permission), including, in some cases, 
permission from the government. 
9.3.5 Summary 
A number of legal functions affect the development of renewable energy. 
Since the law aims at protecting a great variety of interests, private, as 
well as public, the legal functions may promote but also counteract such 
development. The starting point for determining applicable law for a par-
ticular renewable energy activity is the specific features of that develop-
ment. Most renewable energy installations are however subject to laws 
and legal rules governing land use, environmental impacts and permits. 
9.4 The Future of Renewable Energy Development 
in the Arctic – Challenges and Opportunities 
The development of renewable energy in the Arctic faces both cha l-
lenges and opportunities, not least considering the issue of climate 
change. A warmer climate involving among other things melting sea 
ice, thawing permafrost and more extreme weather conditions has 
implications for both the access to and exploitation of renewable ener-
gy resources. Renewable energy development is also affected by cli-
mate policy. In general, climate change mitigation strategies involve 
the diffusion of carbon-free energy technologies. Together with the 
resource potential for wind and hydroelectric power for example, the 
development potential for renewable energy should in general be high 
or very high throughout the whole of the Arctic region. There are, 
however, other potential barriers to renewable energy technology 
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dissemination, as well as other aspects to consider in this context. In 
the following section some of the most common implementation issues 
are considered. 
9.4.1 Costs 
The development of many renewable energy technologies, such as solar 
photovoltaic systems, tidal and wave power, and, to some extent, geo-
thermal energy is hindered by e.g., high construction costs. Since new 
energy technologies must compete with existing energy sources at today’s 
price, appropriate economic and regulatory measures like taxes, subsidies 
and Research & Development (R&D) support are crucial for the develop-
ment and dissemination of renewable energy technologies to significantly 
lower their relatively high costs. Policy support for renewable energy 
investments has increased significantly since the end of the 1990s. Today, 
regulatory policies and/or fiscal incentives and public grants, such as 
capital subsidies and renewable energy credits, to support the dissemina-
tion and development of different renewable energy technologies are in 
place in all Arctic States.  
9.4.2 Opposite Interests 
The development of renewable energy in the Arctic may also be at odds 
with other activities and interests connected to the use of land and water 
resources. This includes both activities that are linked to indigenous peo-
ples, such as: reindeer herding, fishing etc., and other activities such as 
forestry, as well as recreational (outdoor) interests in general and also 
nature preservation interests, including the protection of biological diver-
sity. All of these are typically subject to some kind of legal protection and 
must be considered in the context of renewable energy development. The 
potential complexity involved in decision-making relating to land use 
requires well thought out rules and processes that uphold the overall 
principles on which the system is based.  
Balancing rules are rules that are intended to handle conflicts and pro-
vide guidance for the assessment of various conflicting activities or 
measures, in order to – in each case – make a decision that best serves the 
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aims of the particular legislation. At the overarching level, the main (envi-
ronmental) goal in most Arctic countries is sustainable development. Thus, 
for instance, in Sweden, Finland and Canada this goal is also expressed in 
legislation (i.e., the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Finnish 
Environmental Protection Act and the Swedish Environmental Code). The 
purpose of the Swedish Environmental Code is, for example, to promote 
sustainable development. With reference to balancing rules in general and 
the Swedish provisions on resource management in particular, this means 
that, in a situation where two interests collide, and if there is no further 
guidance for the choice, the one that is most conducive to sustainable 
development should take precedence. This is, however, rather too general 
as a way of providing concrete guidance in individual cases, not least since 
two conflicting interests can, potentially, each promote sustainable deve-
lopment. Therefore, the balancing rules also entail more substantive guid-
ance; for example, such that areas that are particularly suitable for energy 
production should be protected from activities that can significantly ham-
per, e.g., the extraction of wind power. Still, the rules are fairly general in 
design and provide significant discretion in each individual case.  
In other Arctic countries, for example Russia, the balancing of interests 
is in practice often based on negotiations, where developers voluntarily or 
for example, in relation to the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) certifi-
cation principles or the like, negotiate solutions with landowners and 
indigenous peoples. This may also lead to very different outcomes de-
pending on e.g., the parties’ bargaining position. To be applicable, over-
arching principles thus need to be accompanied by careful planning and 
substantive rules that are clear and predictable enough to reduce uncer-
tainties regarding both content and application. 
9.4.3 Licensing and Appeals 
Another factor of importance in the context of renewable energy deve-
lopment is the legal procedure for licensing, including the system for ap-
peals. It is often the case that, for example, the installation of a wind farm 
or hydroelectric power plant raises several permit requirements for 
which EIAs need to be prepared. In Sweden and Norway, for example, the 
extensive permitting requirements have had a clear inhibitive effect on 
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the installed capacity of wind power in particular. In general, cumbersome 
licensing processes, especially in combination with a high degree of uncer-
tainty regarding the outcome, increase the rate of return requirements 
and thereby reduce the incentives to invest. 
The extent of the licensing process is also affected by the opportunity 
to appeal against decisions. It is also a fact that the more permits that 
must be applied for; the more decisions there are to appeal. One way to 
reduce the time between application and final authorisation without com-
promising environmental concerns is to introduce legal standards for the 
control of environmental impacts where suitable. Legal standards, that set 
limits for noise pollution, distance to residential or conservation areas 
etc., can reduce the incentive to appeal by clearly establishing the limits 
that apply, thereby reducing the chances of a successful appeal. 
9.4.4 Public Participation 
In the context of any development, public participation is an issue that has 
to be considered. In the short term, and from a one-sided development 
perspective, the requirement for public participation in the process can be 
perceived as a barrier to implementation; the consultation process with 
citizens, stakeholders and authorities is often time-consuming. However, 
in the long term, the public participation process is usually a facilitating 
factor that helps to generate legitimacy for the project. It is important that 
the deliberations take place as early as possible, preferably already at the 
planning stage, for several reasons: (a) to detect potential obstacles re-
garding location, user rights etc., early; (b) for the deliberation to be per-
ceived as meaningful and constructive; it is difficult for people to feel in-
volved if decisions about e.g., size and location have already been made, 
(c) the sooner people are involved, the greater the potential benefits of 
their participation, for example, in terms of local knowledge.  
9.4.5 Local Self-governance 
Another important question concerns local municipal self-government 
and decentralised decision-making. On the one hand, strong local self-
governance implies a bottom-up approach where decisions are made by 
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those affected, and where local knowledge can be applied and local con-
cerns are taken into account, etc. On the other hand, strong local self-
governance may imply that local interests are given priority over national 
(or even global) interests to increase the share of renewable energy. Mu-
nicipal self-government is indeed a potential barrier to development in, 
for example, Sweden, where e.g., issues relating to spatial planning are a 
municipal matter. As a consequence, the municipality can hinder deve-
lopment simply by avoiding to plan for it, or by using its veto. The overall 
system is similar in Denmark and Norway, with the important difference 
being that it is possible to ensure that national planning objectives are 
considered on a local level.  
9.4.6 Grid-connection 
Finally, the ability to increase the share of renewable energy in the Arctic 
is also affected by the potential for grid-connection. On the one hand, large 
scale developments in particular may be constrained by an inability to 
connect into the power grid, for example, in parts of Siberia or Greenland. 
In Greenland the primary obstacle to the development of solar and wind 
power is the problem of power distribution. On the other hand, many 
renewable energy sources have great potential for off-grid applications, 
for example, wind and solar power, which make them favoured options 
especially in the Arctic context where many remote settlements still rely 
on diesel generators. 
9.5 Conclusion  
The key reason for developing renewable energy in the Arctic (and else-
where!) is probably the imminent threat of climate change and the neces-
sity to hasten the transition from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy 
sources. Increased use of renewable energy is, however, also important in 
reducing the local environmental impacts of fossil fuel use, as well as in 
satisfying the need for security of supply, not least in the remote areas of 
the Arctic.  
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When talking about renewable energy in the Arctic it must, however, 
be kept in mind that the Arctic is far from being a homogeneous region. 
There are significant differences both within and between the Arctic 
States, for example, in terms of resource endowments, demographic struc-
ture, climate conditions, and economic and technological development etc. 
Thus, there are no simple “solutions” (legal or otherwise) as regards in-
creasing the use of renewable energy in the Arctic region as a whole. It 
rather becomes a question of identifying individual and area-specific diffi-
culties, based on the general factors that are assumed to influence the 
possibilities for diffusing and developing renewable energy, for example, 
the design of the regulatory framework. 
To approach the potential for renewable energy in the Arctic quite a 
few obstacles must therefore be overcome. Among the major challenges in 
terms of adapting the institutional and regulatory framework are (in no 
particular order):  
 
 Conflicting rights and interests may lead to powerful lobbying against 
renewables. Even though the Arctic areas are often sparsely populated 
and the rivalry in use of natural resources is perhaps less explicit than 
in more urban areas, there are other potential conflicts to consider. For 
example, the rights of indigenous peoples. This may collide with other 
land-use, or other conflicting interests, such as the exploitation and 
transportation of, say, natural gas or oil. One way to deal with such 
conflicts legally is to ensure that the process of developing renewable 
energy includes extensive public and stakeholder participation and 
consultation, as well as thoughtful balancing rules that provide clear 
guidance in the direction of sustainable development. This can, for 
example, be achieved through the EIA and SEA, but also by other legal 
means, such as rights to compensation, or via the licensing process. 
 The licensing of renewable energy installations is often singled out as 
an important institutional barrier to penetration. This is true in many 
cases. To facilitate the development and diffusion of renewable energy 
technology it is therefore important to streamline the licensing 
procedures. For example, by clarifying the purpose of the licensing 
process (e.g., ensure the operator’s capability and financial strength 
and avoid damage and nuisance to people’s health and the 
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environment), and adapting the process (and assessment) to the 
specific requirements that – given the purpose – is deemed reasonable 
for the particular activity.  
 The lack of power grid access poses a major challenge for the 
development of renewable energy in remote Arctic areas. Although 
this issue cannot be solved by legal rules per se, it is still a matter of the 
design of the institutional framework. Reinforcement of the grid 
requires large investments that are not normally funded by the 
company interested in investing in renewable energy, but by the state.  
 Construction costs. In order to make investments in renewable energy 
economically viable it is often necessary to introduce various 
incentives to reduce the large investment and construction costs. 
Importantly, economic policy instruments are also based on legal rules. 
Furthermore, taxes, certification schemes or feed-in tariffs do not exist 
independently of the law. Hence, to realise financial incentives, a 
functioning legal system must already be in place.  
 
In conclusion then, in addition to resource availability and favourable 
economic conditions, a key precondition for the efficient and timely de-
velopment and diffusion of renewable energy in the Arctic is that the insti-
tutional and regulatory frameworks are well adapted to the specific condi-
tions that apply in the Arctic regions. For instance, they are adapted in 
terms of local environmental impact and vulnerability, including the im-
pact of such developments on indigenous communities. 
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Questions 
 Why is renewable energy diffusion and development considered 
important, in general, and in the Arctic in particular? 
 What are the conditions for the development of renewable energy in 
the Arctic? Provide examples.  
 What are the main barriers to the development of renewable energy, in 
general, and in the Arctic in particular? How can these barriers be 
eliminated or mitigated to increase the share of renewable energy in 
the Arctic?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Oil and Gas Regulation in 
the United States Arctic 
Offshore 
Betsy Baker 
10.1 Geography and Recent History 
The United States is an Arctic nation because of the State of Alaska. The 
U.S. Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA) defines the U.S. Arctic 
without expressly naming Alaska but by referencing geographic features 
that are either in or border on the state:  
“All United States territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States 
territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon 
and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and 
the Beaufort, Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain” (15 U.S.C. § 
4111 section 112).  
By including the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Chain, the ARPA definition 
extends the U.S. Arctic well south of the Arctic Circle (latitude 66° 33’44” 
N); for example, the Aleutian Island of Amatignak is at 51°15’44” N. To the 
North, Barrow, at 71°76’26” N, is well above the Arctic Circle and the larg-
est community in the North Slope Borough, where – at Prudhoe Bay 
(Sagavanirktok) – the history of hydrocarbon exploration in Alaska is 
rooted. The U.S. Arctic Research Commission provides a map of the area 
defined under ARPA at http://www.arctic.gov/maps/ARPA_Alaska_only_ 
150dpi.jpg (O’Rourke 2013). 
Inuit have lived and hunted on the North Slope of Alaska, its ice, and its 
waters for thousands of years (Dorough 2010). By contrast, hydrocarbon 
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exploration and production have occurred sporadically for just under a 
century in Arctic North America, beginning with the discovery of the Nor-
man Wells in Canada’s Northwest Territories in 1920. The high cost of pro-
duction and transport limited that first oil rush but, with the 1968 discovery 
of abundant reservoirs in Prudhoe Bay, oil boomed again in the Canadian 
and U.S. Beaufort Sea (Emmerson 2010). Development of the Prudhoe fields 
led to construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which delivered the first 
North Slope oil to the port of Valdez, Alaska, on Prince William Sound, in 
1977. Oil has been a mainstay of the Alaska economy ever since, the state 
collecting $170 billion in state petroleum revenues through 2012 in today’s 
dollars (Goldsmith 2012). Those revenues soared in 1980–1985, declined in 
the 1990s with the collapse in oil prices, and have risen again since 2006, 
peaking in 2008, through a combination of record oil prices and a change in 
Alaska’s production tax (Ibid.; Leask 1990). 
The history of hydrocarbon development in Alaska is intertwined with 
the negotiation and passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 
1971, which was followed by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conser-
vation Act of 1980 (Sambo Dorough 2010, Mitchell 2001). The history is 
also inseparable from economic development and the transition to a 
mixed subsistence-cash economy in northern Alaska, with its positive and 
negative effects (Berman 1998). Finally, the history of oil in Alaska criti-
cally influenced development of marine oil pollution legislation in the 
United States. The 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, which resulted in 11 mil-
lion gallons (2.91 million litres) of crude oil spilling into Prince William 
Sound, led quickly to the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The OPA 
was a landmark piece of U.S. legislation that provided more rigorous pro-
tections than the regime for civil liability for marine oil pollution then 
developing globally. In 2010 the Exxon Valdez was replaced as the largest 
marine oil spill in U.S. history by the fatal Deepwater Horizon disaster, in 
which 11 men died and more than 158 million gallons (600 million litres) 
of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. As discussed in Part II, below, the 
legislative response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster has been almost 
non-existent and the regulatory response modest. 
  Polar Law Textbook II 177 
10.2 Jurisdiction, Legal and Regulatory Framework 
10.2.1 Overview 
This chapter mainly focuses on developments since 2010. In the three 
years since the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident, Congress has still 
not enacted any new laws for offshore operations or liability in response 
to this watershed environmental catastrophe. This inaction stands in stark 
contrast to the 1990 enactment of the Oil Pollution Act in the wake of the 
Exxon Valdez spill. The responsible federal regulatory agencies, however, 
have begun to make structural and substantive changes. 
10.2.2 State and Federal Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas activity in the U.S. Arctic depends on 
where that activity occurs. The State of Alaska owns and regulates oil and 
gas resources within three miles (5 km) from shore, see, e.g., the federal 
Submerged Lands Act of 1953: “Within their offshore boundaries, coastal 
states have “(1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable 
waters within the boundaries of the respective states, and (2) the right 
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said lands 
and natural resources” (43 U.S.C. § 1311, Vann 2011). The federal go-
vernment exercises jurisdiction over the Territorial Sea beyond three 
miles, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, and the Conti-
nental Shelf, see e.g., the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act (OCSLA), 
43 USC §§ 1331 ff. 
10.2.3 State of Alaska Legal Framework 
Several state agencies and statutes are relevant to Alaska’s jurisdiction 
over offshore activity in the three miles (5 km) seaward of its coast. Rele-
vant state entities include the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commis-
sion, and three Alaska Departments: Environmental Conservation; Fish 
and Game; and Natural Resources, within which two Divisions – Oil and 
Gas, and Mining, Land and Water – and the Office of Habitat Management 
and Permitting, play a role. Finally, the Alaska Coastal Management Pro-
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gram (ACMP), authorised by the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 
1972, was established in 1977. In its early years the ACMP, a voluntary 
programme, was generally considered a success as municipalities pro-
duced coastal zone management programmes with enforceable policies to 
balance conservation with development of natural resources. In 2011, the 
State legislature adjourned without passing the legislation necessary to 
extend the ACMP (ACMP 2011). Other state laws relevant to offshore hy-
drocarbon activity and still in force include: the Alaska Public Land Act, the 
Alaska Fishway Act, and the Alaska Anadromous Fish Act, which require 
permitting for certain activities.  
10.2.4 Federal Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act 
The OCS Lands Act (OCSLA), which governs oil and gas development in 
federal waters, states as Congressional policy in 43 USC §1332(3), that the 
outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the 
Federal Government for the public, which should be made available for 
expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safe-
guards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competi-
tion and other national needs.  
The Department of the Interior (DOI) is responsible for implementing 
OCSLA in all U.S. waters, including the U.S. Arctic. There are no special 
provisions in OCSLA statute relevant only to the Arctic. 
In response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, from 2010 to 2011, DOI 
replaced the Minerals Management Service, which had combined all of these 
functions in one entity, with three new agencies. The Bureau of Ocean Ener-
gy Management (BOEM), oversees the leasing process, environmental and 
economic analysis of plans to develop the OCS; the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) handles permitting, inspections, oil 
spill response and other safety and environmental matters; and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue collects revenues from OCS activity (BOEM 
2011). This separation of resource management from safety oversight, and 
those two functions from revenue collection, was a structural as opposed to 
a regulatory or legal response to Deepwater Horizon. 
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OCSLA divides the process that underlies federal offshore oil and gas ac-
tivity into four potentially overlapping stages: “(1) development of a na-
tionwide five-year leasing program by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior; (2) 
auction of offshore lease tracts by the federal government to the highest 
responsible bidder; (3) exploration of those tracts by successful bidders, 
and (4) development and production of oil and gas resources” (Huntington 
et al. 2012, at 12; BOEM, undated). DOI implements OCSLA through the 
regulations entitled Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf, 30 CFR Part 250. The regulations often require federal decision 
makers to solicit and review public comment on five-year lease plans as 
well as on proposed lease sales. The burden to respond to public comment 
and other information requests under OCSLA and related legislation falls 
disproportionately on Alaska Native communities (Huntington et al. 2012). 
The DOI has put forth two changes to the OCSLA implementing regula-
tions since the Deepwater Horizon event, and implemented one. Both deal 
with Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS). The first 
SEMS regulations, SEMS-I, had been under preparation well before the 
DWH, and were promulgated 15 October 2010. They require operators to 
implement SEMS, rather than doing so on a voluntary basis as had previ-
ously been allowed (DOI 2010). The SEMS-I regulations incorporate by 
reference American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 75 (API 
RP75) and require risk analysis at the operational and job level, and 
stricter record keeping requirements (DOI 2010, Hastings 2012). The 
SEMS-II rule, proposed in September 2011, strengthens SEMS by addres-
sing stop-work provisions, reporting of unsafe conditions, definition of 
authority and the use of independent third-party auditors (DOI 2011). 
Finalisation of the rule is expected in 2013. 
Other U.S. Federal Agencies and Statutes 
In addition to BOEM and BSEE, other federal actors are also potentially 
involved in permitting or otherwise regulating offshore activity in the U.S. 
Arctic. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), also in the DOI, splits over-
sight of Marine Mammal Protection Act authorisations and Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) requirements with the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice, which is in the Department of Commerce under the National Atmos-
pheric and Oceanic Administration (NOAA). The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) reports directly to the President and oversees permit-
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ting under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA) the U.S. 
Coast Guard typically becomes involved in reviewing and implementing 
contingency and discharge prevention plans and takes the lead in imple-
menting the U.S. Canada Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, which 
has a Beaufort Sea annex. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is also in-
volved under the CWA. 
The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et 
seq., requires that federal agencies prepare environmental analyses for 
major federal actions. In Alaska those actions include OCS oil and gas five-
year lease programmes, and individual OCS lease sales, as well as Explora-
tion Plans and Development and Production Plans. The three levels of 
analysis possible under NEPA are a determination of categorical exclusion 
(no further analysis required); preparation of an environmental assess-
ment/finding of no significant impact (EA/FONSI); and preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS). As with OCSLA public participation 
requirements discussed in 10.2.4.1 above, similar requirements for the 
ESA, CWA and CAA under NEPA’s implementing regulations, as well as 
federal consultation requirements, can place great demands on Alaska 
Native communities and groups that want to provide input on federally 
regulated offshore activity (Huntington et al. 2012). 
To expand only briefly on the other federal statutes mentioned above 
that are potentially relevant to offshore oil and gas activity in the U.S. Arc-
tic, the Clean Air Act applies to emissions from offshore operations. Nota-
bly, a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill signed into law in December 
2011 transferred CAA permitting authority on the Arctic OCS from the 
Environmental Protection Agency to the Department of the Interior (U.S. 
2011). The Clean Water Act relates to waste water discharges from off-
shore operations, and the Endangered Species Act to potential harm to 
species or habitat from such operations. The Marine Mammal Protection 
Act deals with possible disturbance (“harassment”) to whales, polar bear, 
and other marine mammals, and the Oil Pollution Act applies, e.g., to Facili-
ty Response Plans for potential discharge of oil to navigable waters. 
 
 
 
 
  Polar Law Textbook II 181 
Executive Actions 
Following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout and spill President 
Obama appointed the “National Commission on the BP Deepwater Hori-
zon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” (National Commission 2011). The 
Commission Recommendations discuss many aspects of Arctic offshore 
activity, identifying as one specific action that the United States should 
“[l]ead in the development and adoption of shared international stand-
ards, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico and the Arctic.” A Commission staff 
working paper on offshore activity in the Arctic provides further im-
portant background information (Ibid.). 
In 2011, the president established an Interagency Working Group on 
the Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in 
Alaska (Ex. Order 2011). The Working Group is to coordinate federal 
agencies involved in those processes, with an emphasis on efficiency, safe-
ty, and responsible development of on and offshore energy in the state.  
10.3 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to introduce a basic outline of laws, regulations and 
recent history relevant to offshore oil and gas activity in the United States 
Arctic. The following list of references is therefore intentionally broader 
than works cited above and is designed to provide resources for readers 
interested in a deeper discussion of the individual topics raised here. 
Further reading 
Alaska Coastal Management Program http://www.alaskacoast.state.ak.us/ 
(website is static as of 1 July 2011). 
Arctic Human Development Report (Akureyri, Iceland: Stefansson Arctic Insti-
tute, 2004). 
AMAP 2007. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Oil and Gas 
2007. Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment, Overview Report, at 
http://www.amap.no/oga/ 
AMAP undated. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme Arctic Oil and 
Gas Assessment, Background Reports for the United States (unpublished, on 
file with author). 
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BOEM, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, The OCS Leasing, Exploration, and 
Development Process (undated), <http://boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_ 
and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/OCS%20Leasing%20Exploration%20Develo
pment%20Process%20Overview.pdf>  
BOEM, Fact Sheet: THE BSEE and BOEM Separation, 19 January 2011, An Inde-
pendent Safety, Enforcement and Oversight Mission, at http://www.boem.gov/ 
About-BOEM/Reorganization/Reorganization.aspx 
Thomas R. Berger, Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Com-
mission (1985).  
Matthew Berman, Sustainability and Subsistence in Arctic Communities, Paper 
prepared for presentation to the Western Regional Science Association annual 
meeting, Monterey, California, February 1998. 
Jennifer Dagg et al., Comparing the Offshore Drilling Regulatory Regimes of the 
Canadian Arctic, the U.S., the U.K., Greenland and Norway (Pembina Institute) 
June 2011. 
Doug Hastings et al., Recommendations for Improved Oversight of Off-shore Drill-
ing Based on a Review of 40 Regulatory Regimes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Law School, Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, June 2012). 
DOI 2010. U.S. Department of the Interior, Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in 
the Outer Continental Shelf-Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 
Fed. Reg. 63,610 (15 October 2010); 30 C.F.R. § 250.1900. 
DOI 2011. U.S. Department of the Interior, Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in 
the Outer Continental Shelf-Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management 
Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,683 (proposed by BOEMRE on 14 September 2011). 
EPA undated, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Basic Information: National 
Environmental Policy Act, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html 
Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (New York: Public Affairs/ 
Perseus 2010). 
Executive Order No. 13,580, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,989 (12 July 2011).  
Scott Goldsmith, TAPS at 35: Accounting for the Oil Revenues, Institute of Social 
and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, Web Note No. 12, July 
2012, at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/news/?p=342 
Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Develop-
ment Principles in Inuit Nunaat (2011). 
Linda Leask et al., Trends in Alaska’s People and Economy, Prepared for the Alaska 
20/20 Partnership, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of 
Alaska Anchorage, (Alaska Humanities Forum 2001). 
Donald Craig Mitchell, Take My Land, Take My Life, The Story of Congress’s Histor-
ic Settlement of Alaska Native Land Claims 1960–1971 (Fairbanks: University of 
Alaska Press, 2001). 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to 
the President (2011). See also Macondo, The Gulf Oil Disaster, Chief Counsel’s 
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Report (2011) and Staff Working Papers. All are available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/  
Mark Nuttall and Terry Callaghan, Arctic: Environment, People, Policy (Amster-
dam: Harwood, 2004). 
Henry P. Huntington et al., Less Ice, More Talk: The Benefits and Burdens for Arctic 
Communities of Consultations Concerning Development Activities, Carbon and 
Climate Law Review, Vol.1 (2012): 33–46. 
Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service R41153, 2 January 2013. 
Dalee Sambo Dorough, “Inuit of Alaska: Current Issues” in Natalia Loukacheva ed., 
Polar Law Textbook (Copenhagen: NCM TemaNord 538: 2010):199–217. 
Mark Schrope, Dirty blizzard buried Deepwater Horizon oil; One-third of oil from 
2010 spill may be mixed with sea-floor sediments, 26 January 2013, at http:// 
www.nature.com/news/dirty-blizzard-buried-deepwater-horizon-oil-1.12304.  
U.S. 2011. Consolidated Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2012, P.L. 112–74 § 432 
(2011). 
United States, Oil Pollution Act of 1980, 101 H.R.1465, P.L. 101-38033, codified at 
U.S.C. §2701 et seq. (1990). 
Adam Vann, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework, Congressional 
Research Service, RL33404, 2 May 2011. 
Alex Williams et al., The Future of Arctic Enterprise: Long-term Outlook and Impli-
cations, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment University of Oxford, 
November 2011, with Royal Dutch Shell and IUCN. 
Questions 
Note: These questions are designed to require some basic research be-
yond the information provided in the text. 
 
 Why might the United States’ definition of the U.S. Arctic include areas 
below the Arctic Circle? How have other Arctic States defined the 
Arctic? 
 What are Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) and 
what potential do they have to strengthen regulation of offshore oil 
and gas activity? 
 In what ways do oil and gas activities within and beyond three miles 
from the Alaska shoreline differ? 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Good Governance  
in the Arctic 
Gudmundur Alfredsson 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it examines the main contents and 
characteristics of available international standards and monitoring activi-
ties relating to good governance and, secondly, it looks at the relevance, 
applicability and application of good governance in the Arctic. In addition, 
commonalities in terms of human rights and democracy will be identified, 
with a focus on indigenous peoples. 
At the international level, good governance has been introduced to en-
sure sustainable human development. The origins of the notion of good 
governance emerged from within the development agencies and global 
financial institutions, like the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (www.imf.org) and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development (www.oecd.org). More recently the 
United Nations (www.un.org) has become involved through, in the main, 
the United Nations Development Programme (www.undp.org and 
ww.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/
oslo_governance_centre/), the Human Rights Council and the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (www.ohchr.org). Non-
governmental organisations, such as Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org), are also actively engaged in promoting good 
governance and monitoring compliance.  
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11.2 Links to Human Rights and Democracy 
Multiple links exist between the themes of good governance, human rights 
and democracy. In the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, in paragraph 3 of article 46 it says: “The provisions set forth in 
this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of 
justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, 
good governance and good faith.” These connections will be further ex-
plored in this chapter by the highlighting of parallels or overlaps between 
the three themes. All are mutually reinforcing and share the goal of im-
proving quality of life in our societies. 
A series of human rights instruments overlap with many of the com-
ponents of good governance and democracy. The freedom of expression 
covers political speech, while the freedom of association covers the right 
to form and participate in political parties, the freedom of assembly covers 
political demonstrations, and the freedom of information and the right to 
education enable the public to make informed choices. Under article 21 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 25 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the will of the people is the 
foundation of government, and it is to be achieved through free and peri-
odic elections with secret ballots. There are multiple overlaps here with 
good governance components, like transparency, accountability, equal 
participation and the rule of law. International standards on good gover-
nance, human rights and democracy rely to a considerable degree on dif-
ferent academic disciplines and originate with a variety of inter-
governmental organisations. While the three themes share the purpose of 
improving our societies and the quality of life therein, and, while they 
have much in common, they are also different. One can say that they are 
travelling on parallel but sometimes distinct tracks and use different 
terms and approaches while addressing the same or similar issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Polar Law Textbook II 187 
11.3 The Good Governance Guidelines 
While some good governance guidelines are of a general character, the ma-
jority is set out in hundreds of reports and documents addressing specific 
country conditions or particular resource situations. The goal, as mentioned 
above, is to ensure sustainable development by enhancing the integrity, 
effectiveness and efficiency of a country’s public and private sectors. When 
one types “good governance” into the search engines of the websites of the 
international organisations concerned, thousands of hits come up.  
The good governance guidelines may concern national and local ad-
ministration and politics, development, the environment, food security, 
natural and revenue resources, good financial governance, good corporate 
governance, and good international governance. Not surprisingly, consid-
ering the originating organisations and the contents, economists are the 
leading drafters. For the most part, the guidelines are not intended to be 
legally binding unless and until they emerge as customary law or can be 
based on treaty law as with the anti-corruption treaties. 
The guidelines are mainly directed to governments. Private sector enti-
ties are however also targeted, and it is for governments to regulate them. 
The emphasis is on developing countries, on the basis that development will 
not be successful and sustainable unless and until the various good gover-
nance components prevail. For many years, governments did not tolerate 
reference to good governance within the UN human rights programme, but 
recently the importance of good governance for human rights has been 
acknowledged in resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council 
(www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx). 
11.3.1 Contents 
The main content components of the good governance guidelines are non-
corruption, transparency, accountability, equal participation and inclusive-
ness, decentralisation, law reform and the rule of law. Additional compo-
nents include the responsiveness of institutions within a reasonable time, 
effectiveness and efficiency, and the achievement of consensus in democrat-
ic processes. It can however be said that the anti-corruption efforts have 
become a cornerstone of good governance activities. 
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Non-Corruption 
Corruption has been defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain” (www.transparency.org/whatwedo). The obvious opposite is bad 
governance and nobody wants that. 
Anti-corruption efforts crucially call for the ability of a free press to 
identify, report on and evaluate the performance and proper behaviour of 
elected and appointed officials. Anti-corruption efforts also require com-
petent police and independent and impartial prosecutors and judges; the 
roles of the police and prosecutors in fighting corruption are acknowl-
edged in the 1979 UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (ar-
ticle 7 and the attached commentary) and the 1990 UN Guidelines on the 
Role of Prosecutors (paragraph 15).  
The UN Convention against Corruption, adopted in 2003 and ratified by all 
of the Arctic States addresses, across several chapters, anti-corruption efforts 
through prevention, criminalisation, law enforcement, international co-
operation, asset recovery, technical assistance, and mechanisms for imple-
mentation. Principle 10 of the UN Global Compact, a policy instrument for 
businesses, reads: “Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery” (available at “www.unglobalcompact.org 
/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/principle10.html”). 
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, adopted in 1997 and ratified by all 
the Arctic States, requires each State Party to make foreign bribery a 
crime holding their companies to account for their behaviour abroad. The 
Convention has 39 parties and is overseen by the OECD Working Group on 
Bribery (www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-bribery-
convention/oecdconventiononcombatingbriberyofforeignpublicofficials-
ininternationalbusinesstransactions.htm”).  
The website of Transparency International is rich in information and ideas 
about anti-corruption efforts in both the public and private sectors. For pre-
vention purposes, the website presents Integrity Pacts, which are agreements 
between government agencies offering contracts and the companies bidding 
for them, where the parties commit to abstaining from bribery, collusion and 
other corrupt practices for the extent of the contract. The Integrity Pacts also 
suggest the need for a monitoring system to be put in place and led by civil 
society groups (www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/integrity_pacts/3/). 
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Witness accounts and whistleblowers are encouraged (www.transparency. 
org/topic/detail/whistleblowing). GATEWAY is offered as a tool for collect-
ing, sharing and expanding knowledge on corruption assessments 
(www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/gateway_corruption_assessment_ 
toolbox/0/). E-learning tools on corruption are available at 
(www.thefightagainstcorruption.unodc.org/). Corruption inevitably brings 
about human rights problems. Where there is corruption, equal rights will 
have been violated inasmuch as persons who unfairly make use of family or 
political connections or have the ability and willingness to pay bribes get 
more than their fair share of the public goods available. In addition to person-
al injustices, funding is siphoned away from economic and social develop-
ment, and justice is denied when corruption extends to prosecutors and the 
judiciary. Some of the other good governance components mentioned below, 
such as transparency, accountability and the rule of law, are also essential in 
the combating of corruption. 
Transparency 
Transparency is about public authorities operating in the light of full 
public scrutiny with individuals, NGOs and the press able to access full 
information on the records and activities of the authorities. Officials 
are more likely to be honest when they know that the public is entitled 
to know about what they are doing. It is thanks, in part, to Transparen-
cy International that transparency has become a household word 
around the world. 
Transparency is applicable to all branches of government. As an ex-
ample, the 2007 Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency 
(www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/guide.htm) applies the princi-
ples of the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency 
(www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm) to problems faced by 
countries that derive a significant share of their revenues from oil or 
mineral resources. Countries known for transparency and proud of 
their records are Canada, Estonia and Sweden. For example, on the 
website of the Swedish Government, there is an informative page 
called “Why public access to official documents?” 
(www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9395/a/86408). For transparency under 
the heading of good governance, obvious human rights and democracy 
parallels here include freedom of information and expression, includ-
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ing political debate. For transparency to be successful, the freedoms of 
the media and the internet, without external or internal censorship, 
must prevail as must a free civil society and vigorous NGOs. 
Accountability 
Public officials, both elected and appointed, should be accountable for 
their conduct. Moreover, elected officials must at regular intervals face the 
public in elections. The private sector and civil society organisations 
should however also be accountable to the public. Accountability cannot 
be properly enforced without transparency and the rule of law, coinciding 
with the demand for checks and balances and the independence and im-
partiality of the judiciary and of prosecutors. 
On the website of Transparency International, social accountability is 
“defined as a citizen-centred approach to building state accountability,” 
covering a range of actions that can be employed to hold government offi-
cials accountable, “including but not limited to participatory budgeting, 
independent budget analysis, public expenditure tracking, citizen report 
cards, community scorecards, social audits, citizen’s charters, public hear-
ings, e-governance and e-procurement, citizens” juries and community 
radio” (gateway.transparency.org/guides/intro/social_accountability). 
Law Reform and the Rule of Law 
Fair, stable and equitable laws, predictability and legitimacy, equal protec-
tion under the law and non-discrimination, these are all parts of the rule 
of law. Enforcement of the law requires an independent and impartial 
judiciary and impartial and incorruptible police and prosecutors. This 
includes appropriate legal frameworks as well as political, managerial and 
administrative processes responsible for responding to the rights and 
needs of the population. The United Nations is able to support Member 
States in ensuring domestic implementation of international standards 
and strengthening the institutions, processes and conditions that ensure 
an effective and just national order (www.unrol.org/). 
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Equal Participation 
The motivation for including equal participation and inclusiveness in good 
governance is to maximise the number of participants in economic deve-
lopment. Equal participation by both men and women is a cornerstone of 
good governance, but the same is true for minorities and disabled persons, 
to mention just some categories that are often victims of discrimination in 
education and employment and whose participation will increase the 
number of people contributing to the economy.  
All human rights and their equal enjoyment across society are thus im-
portant for good governance. This is true in relation to securing equal oppor-
tunities and equal treatment in the enjoyment of standards on, for example, 
education, culture, employment, labour unions, collective bargaining, social 
security and health. As to politics, one must bear in mind that representative 
democracy does not necessarily mean that the majority understands or meets 
the concerns of the most vulnerable in society (www.unescap.org 
/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp). International hu-
man rights instruments are explicit in requiring special measures or positive 
discrimination in the combating of discrimination, like, for example, article 2 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial dis-
crimination (/www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/). 
Decentralisation 
Along with facilitating local democracy and public participation in local 
development, good governance is about the delegation of powers to insti-
tutions that are closer to the people concerned. For minorities and indige-
nous peoples, this is about self-government, autonomy, traditional go-
vernment, self-management or devolution.  
Article 4 of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples provides: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions.” Article 5 moreover states: “Indige-
nous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct po-
litical, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining 
their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, 
social and cultural life of the State.” And article 34 talks about the mainte-
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nance of distinctive indigenous customs, traditions, practices and juridical 
systems or customs.  
The 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of Na-
tional Minorities in Public Life (available at www.osce.org/hcnm/32240), 
adopted under the auspices of the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, also address the representation of minorities in local politics. A 
separate chapter on minority self-governance spells out that such institu-
tions, based on democratic principles, whether non-territorial or territori-
al, should have certain legislative and administrative powers. The basis for 
the Lund Recommendations is to be found in paragraph 35 of the 1990 
Document of the OSCE Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension 
(available at www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304) as well as in para-
graph 7, part IV of the 1991 Report of the CSCE Geneva Expert Meeting on 
National Minorities. Notably all the Arctic States are members of the OSCE. 
The Lund Recommendations also call for special measures to be taken, 
where necessary, to compensate for the existence of groups with small 
numbers of members, in respect of their national or local representation. 
IGOs and other international fora are moving in this direction. Half the 
membership of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII), the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN 
Expert on Minority Issues are indigenous or minority persons. The deci-
sion to grant indigenous representatives the status of permanent partici-
pants in the Arctic Council is another example of such a measure being put 
into practice.  
Both the 2007 UN Declaration and the 1989 ILO Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 
No. 169) foresee a range of special rights and special measures concerning 
rights to land and natural resources as tools for maintaining and developing 
indigenous ways of life and self-management or self-rule. Based on article 
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human 
Rights Committee has confirmed the land rights of indigenous peoples. Two 
such cases are illustrative: Communication No. 167/1984 (Bernard Omi-
nayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada), views adopted on 26 
March 1990, and Communication No. 197/1985 (Kitok v. Sweden), views 
adopted on 27 July 1988 (/www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ 
HRCommitteeCaseLaw.htm). 
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11.3.2 National Implementation 
The domestic implementation of the good governance standards rests with 
governments. States thus carry the primary responsibility for the implemen-
tation of human rights in law and in fact, but international organisations, par-
ticularly in relation to developing countries, are available for technical coop-
eration. Just as with the national implementation of human rights, the various 
components of good governance should be consistently incorporated into 
constitutional law and/or legislative acts. Independent and impartial courts 
and national human rights institutions must be available for addressing 
grievances and providing relief. States are now increasingly adopting legisla-
tion on good governance or the components thereof. Numerous such exam-
ples can be found by searching for good governance on the websites of the 
Council of Europe (www.coe.int) and the Organisation for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (www.osce.org). 
11.3.3 International Monitoring 
Monitoring of compliance in relation to the good governance guidelines is 
in the hands of the above-mentioned intergovernmental organisations, 
with, and this oversight is generally viewed as light touch. The significance 
of the guidelines rests mainly on the weight of the adopting financial insti-
tutions with the developing countries concerned. As is the case with hu-
man rights, political and economic elites frequently oppose the guidelines 
as they threaten their power and privileges. The Inspection Panel of the 
World Bank is authorised to receive complaints about projects supported 
by the Bank from individuals, groups and NGOs, but its jurisdiction is nec-
essarily limited to countries with World Bank sponsored programmes 
while, in addition, the panel’s conclusions are non-binding on the Bank 
(enter Inspection Panel into the search engine at www.worldbank.org).  
Drawing on the naming and shaming tactics of human rights NGOs, Trans-
parency International (TI) does an excellent job of monitoring and publicising 
national practices as they relate to transparency and corruption. The place of 
human rights in the work of TI serves as further evidence of this relationship. 
National TI chapters exist in every Arctic country including Greenland (see 
www.transparency.gl). TI also monitors progress in relation to the implemen-
tation of the above-mentioned Conventions; annual reports on the OECD 
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Convention place countries in enforcement categories (see www. transparen-
cy.org/whatwedo/pub/progress_report_2011_enforcement_of_the_oecd 
_anti_bribery_convention). 
Global and regional organisations actively monitor State compliance 
with international human rights standards, and many of them allow indi-
viduals, and sometimes even groups, to file complaints against States. 
Regional organisations, including the Council of Europe and the Organisa-
tion of American States, have set up human rights courts, and several or-
ganisations have established quasi-judicial expert procedures that are 
authorised to deal with complaints. In addition, it is clear that the human 
rights performance of States is increasingly being monitored, even when 
such States are not party to specific treaty obligations. The good govern-
ance community is also increasingly drawing directly upon human rights 
law as a tool. Human rights standards and monitoring reports can help to 
clarify the meaning of the governance guidelines, for example on political 
freedoms and political participation, while experience of the human rights 
issues can provide guidance as to how to proceed in respect of monitoring 
mechanisms and methods.  
Likewise, good governance and democracy do, in practice, generally con-
tribute to the promotion of greater respect for human rights. Governments 
which are accountable to the people and represent the will of the people as 
expressed in regular, fair and free elections are more likely to care about 
human rights. One possible exception here is respect for minority and in-
digenous rights when the members of the groups often carry insufficient 
electoral weight, further underlining the importance of the special rights 
and special measures available under human rights law.  
11.4 Relevance to the Arctic 
Good governance in the Arctic as a matter of international regulation gives 
rise to interesting questions. If good governance guidelines are drafted for 
developing countries, do they also apply to the rich countries of the north? 
If the guidelines are to maintain their credibility as international instru-
ments, the answer must be in the affirmative. Their credibility would be 
seriously diminished if they were seen to apply only to developing coun-
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tries. It is unimaginable in this day and age to come to a different conclu-
sion and, as such, the Arctic should be no exception here. On top of this the 
guidelines are emanating from organisations that are often dominated by 
the rich countries of the north; it would thus be major hypocritical if such 
guidelines were marked “for export only”. Good governance must then be 
seen as not only relevant but also applicable to the Arctic. It is noteworthy 
then in this context that the Arctic Council discusses indigenous peoples’ 
and human rights issues in a Working Group on Sustainable Development.  
Do the Arctic States live up to international standards on good govern-
ance? Remarkably and rather unfortunately, the Arctic States can often be 
seem to be lagging behind the worldwide trend when it comes to endorsing 
the international human rights standards that concern the indigenous peo-
ples who live in their northernmost areas. Six of the eight Arctic countries 
have not ratified ILO Convention No. 169, and much of the opposition to the 
adoption of the 2007 UN Declaration came from countries in the north. 
Furthermore, the Arctic Council which claims to be the primary intergov-
ernmental forum dealing with the Arctic has shown only a passing interest 
in directly addressing good governance and human rights. It is thus, for 
many, a matter of some regret that the rich and supposedly democratic 
countries of the north are not doing much better in this regard.  
The indigenous peoples of the Arctic are governed from far-away capi-
tals where the groups concerned are likely to be underrepresented or not 
represented at all and where official attention is most likely to focus on the 
exploitation of resources and strategic interests. When discussing law re-
form as a matter of good governance, human rights standards should be 
employed to improve national laws, for example by means of the consistent 
incorporation of international standards into national law. For countries 
rich in natural resources, transparency in relation to both their exploration 
and exploitation is key to the successful management of accumulated 
wealth and the maximization of long-term benefits to society. Indeed, many 
of the “hits” on good governance concern the governance of natural re-
sources (see above under Transparency). 
Some of the Arctic States such as Finland in relation to the Åland Islands 
maintain successful autonomy practices, although the ethnic Swedish minori-
ty enjoys much broader level of autonomy than the Sami. For the Inuit of Nu-
navut in Canada and the Sami in Scandinavia varying degrees of self-
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government have been introduced, but it is doubtful that these arrangements 
fulfil the said international standards. The approaches used are often uneven 
and inconsistent both inside the various countries and in particular when 
comparisons are made between countries. International standards on indige-
nous self-government as well as land and resources rights are fully applicable 
to the Arctic. Furthermore, with distant capitals and culturally distinct popu-
lation groups, ensuring representation in national institutions and local self-
government are especially relevant.  
11.5 Concluding Remarks 
There is much to be gained from building bridges between good governance, 
human rights and democracy. These themes should not be kept in separate 
boxes or structures. The three communities of good governance, human 
rights and democracy have much to learn from each other in relation to con-
tents and methods available for achieving their goals. The good governance 
people can learn about standard-setting and monitoring from human rights 
proponents. And the human rights people should enlist support from the 
governance guidelines as well as the democracy movement and the relevant 
argumentation, that is to say, the lawyers learning from the economists and 
political scientists. Economic explanations, for example on equal rights, effec-
tive participation and the freedom of information, will help explain the bene-
fits of the broader realisation of human rights. With so many things in com-
mon, the opportunities for bringing about cross-fertilisation and mutually 
supportive arguments should be much more actively used. 
International standards on human rights, good governance and democ-
racy may amount to a limitation of sovereignty. That is, in part, the result of 
consent in the form of accepting treaty obligations. It may also be the result 
of the emergence of international customary law. Governments trying to 
defend their conduct on the basis of non-interference in a state’s internal 
affairs or on the primacy of domestic jurisdiction can no longer credibly do 
so; human rights have been acknowledged as matters of international con-
cern. For the governments of the Arctic States, most of whom claim to re-
spect good governance, human rights and democracy in their foreign poli-
  Polar Law Textbook II 197 
cies and are outspoken on the governance, rights and democracy perfor-
mances of other countries, their credibility is thus now certainly at stake. 
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Questions 
 What are the main components of good governance? 
 How does good governance relate to human rights? 
 Should the international good governance guidelines apply to the 
Arctic States? 
 Can you identify good governance problems in the Arctic? 
 How does one overcome the opposition to the introduction of good 
governance?  
 Should the Arctic Council devote more attention to good governance 
issues? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Destiny or Dream Sharing 
Resources, Revenues and 
Political Power in Nunavut 
Devolution 
Tony Penikett 
12.1 General Framework 
12.1.1 What is Devolution? 
Devolution involves the transfer of powers from Canada to the northern 
territories. Devolution can involve the transfer of administrative or finan-
cial powers as well as jurisdictional or legislative powers. The culmination 
of a series of transfers of Province-like powers from the federal govern-
ment to the northern Territories is the acquisition of distinctive and pre-
cious jurisdiction over lands and mineral resources. In Nunavut, however, 
little progress has been made in devolution negotiations since 2008. 
12.1.2 The Constitution 
Canada’s Constitution, which divides law-making powers between the 
provinces and the federal government, provides the backdrop for devolu-
tion negotiations. Section 91 of the Constitution lists matters under fede-
ral jurisdiction and section 92 lists matters of provincial jurisdiction, in-
cluding non-renewable natural resources. When Alberta and Saskatche-
wan joined the confederation in 1905, they were junior partners. These 
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Prairie provinces did not take control of their lands, minerals and energy 
resources until Parliament passed the Natural Resources Acts in 1930. 
12.1.3 The Meech Lake Accord 
In 1987, northern politicians lobbied long and hard against the Meech 
Lake accord, because sections 41(h) and (i) of the proposed constitutional 
amendment, gave the provinces, for the first time, a veto over the creation 
of new northern provinces. The accord was not ratified. Nonetheless, the 
provincial veto seems to have become the rule, if not the law. Nowadays, 
nobody believes that provincial status is on the horizon for Yukon, NWT 
or Nunavut. Yet Yukon’s devolution accord grants jurisdiction over natural 
resources without it becoming a province. Like Hamlet’s ghost, Meech is 
dead, but influential. So, for Canada’s northern territories, devolution may 
be all there is. 
12.1.4 Treaties 
Once the West was won, Indian treaties were considered a closed chapter 
in American history. Then geologists found oil in Alaska and Congress 
quickly passed the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which gave 
native peoples there almost a billion dollars and title to 178,000 square 
kilometres of land. 
The 1970s also saw Denmark grant Home Rule to Greenland and, in 
Canada, the beginning of treaty negotiations with 20 northern indigenous 
groups. These northern treaties negotiated with the Dene, Inuit and others 
to transfer title to huge tracts of land and re-establish aboriginal gover-
nance of those lands. Unlike the Victorian-era treaties that consigned First 
Nations to tiny reserves on marginal land, these northern treaties exist on 
a larger scale. For seven thousand Dene and Tlingit, the Yukon treaty pro-
vides 41,000 square kilometres – more land than is contained in all of the 
First Nations reserves in all of southern Canada. 
Unlike the 19th-century treaties, which were drafted ahead of negotia-
tions and which were brief and to the point, the northern treaties run to 
hundreds of pages. Yukon treaty negotiations produced a document longer 
than the New Testament, but that document contains many important poli-
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cy innovations, including those that promote conservation, such as indige-
nous and non-indigenous co-management of wildlife resources. 
Under the devolution accord signed by its sister territory, Yukon ma-
nages federal lands. This means that the territory can authorise the trans-
fer of ownership of these lands to private (third party) hands, lease these 
lands and license resource extraction on them. It can use and dispose of 
federal lands as though it were the owner. 
12.2 The Nunavut Story 
In the Eastern Arctic, negotiators completed the Nunavut land claims trea-
ty in 1993. The Nunavut treaty had the dramatic result of making the Inuit 
there the largest private landowners in the world, with collective title to 
350,000 square kilometres of land. In 1999, based on a commitment in the 
treaty, Parliament also created a new jurisdiction, the Nunavut Territory, 
a region where the Inuit constitute 84% of the population. A region and a 
government with a sustainable indigenous majority is something quite 
new in the Canadian Federation. 
Confident of a continuing majority in the new territory, the Inuit of 
Nunavut opted for a territorial public government rather than the tribal 
governance alternative. Despite the 1993 land claims settlement and the 
creation of Nunavut in 1999, today, Ottawa still controls 80% of the terri-
tory’s lands and, as energy developments and climate change jointly 
threaten the Arctic environment, these three facts create great uncertainty 
– an outcome anticipated by nobody in Nunavut. 
Consequently, Nunavummiut, the residents of the new territory, have 
usually seen devolution as the logical third step in their journey towards 
autonomy. Because the federal government still has the final say over 
Nunavut’s lands and mineral development policy, Nunavut has, for almost 
10 years, been calling on Canada to devolve this power to Nunavummiut. 
In 2005, the northern affairs minister of the day promised to seek a fede-
ral negotiating mandate from cabinet and the appointment of a chief fede-
ral negotiator. 
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Based on this promise, the Government of Nunavut (GN) Cabinet ap-
proved a devolution negotiation mandate. Devolution negotiations would be 
a three-party process involving the GN, the Government of Canada and Nu-
navut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) – the Inuit land claims organisation. In 
a 2007 letter to GN and NTI negotiators, the special ministerial representa-
tive for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada said that it was time to move 
forward on devolution and indicated that the three chief negotiators should 
attempt to co-author a Negotiations Protocol. 
12.2.1 The Protocol 
Most of Nunavut’s communities are coastal settlements. Uniquely among the 
peoples of the world, indigenous Nunavummiut lived on the sea ice – and this 
fact will significantly influence negotiations. Nunavut’s first premier, Paul 
Okalik, repeatedly stated that devolution negotiations must include such top-
ics as net fiscal benefit, adequate staffing and Nunavut’s “internal waters.” 
However, the premier conceded that internal-waters or seabed-resource 
matters could be deferred to a later phase of negotiations. 
Consequently, the Nunavut Lands and Resources Devolution Negotia-
tion Protocol stipulated that the parties would proceed to negotiate an 
agreement-in-principle for lands and minerals, including a firm commit-
ment to commence second-stage negotiations for an integrated onshore 
and seabed oil and gas management regime. The genius of the protocol is 
that it marries territorial and federal agendas. The territory seeks a juris-
dictional transfer of province-like powers of its lands and waters, while 
the federal government focuses more on administrative capacity building. 
The protocol therefore proposes that these two processes proceed on 
parallel tracks. 
The two governments and NTI signed the protocol on 5 September 
2008. In the four years since the signing, the federal government engaged 
in no serious negotiations over sharing jurisdiction or resource revenues. 
Why has there been no progress? 
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12.2.2 Federal Response 
In January 2010, the federal health minister told the Aboriginal Peoples’ 
Television Network that the reason Canada had not appointed a devolu-
tion negotiator was NTI’s lawsuit. What is the NTI lawsuit? 
The Nunavut land claims agreement anticipated stepped-up funding as 
the parties implemented each stage of the treaty, but Canada’s Depart-
ment of Finance proposed to “flat-line” the funding. Inuit representatives 
expressed pride (Penikett 2006:177–180) over having negotiated an arbi-
tration provision in the Dispute Resolution chapter of the Nunavut treaty, 
but when they tried to proceed to arbitration, the federal finance ministry 
refused to participate. 
Seventeen times the NTI tried to invoke their arbitration right and sev-
enteen times the finance ministry refused. In the end, the Inuit probably 
had no choice but to take Canada to court. The NTI sued for $1 billion for 
breach of contract. While there is no connection between this lawsuit and 
the devolution file, at least one federal minister saw it as reason to stall 
devolution negotiations. 
On 27 January 2011, another cabinet member, Canada’s minister of abo-
riginal affairs and northern development, said that Nunavut Territory and its 
Inuit population were “not at the stage of readiness” to assume responsibility 
for managing their lands – lands they had occupied for centuries.  
12.2.3 Administrative Capacity 
When the aboriginal affairs and northern development minister said Nu-
navut wasn’t “ready”, was he making a general comment about the com-
munity’s intellectual or moral capacity to exercise jurisdiction over lands 
for which they were stewards long before Canada existed? With Nunavut’s 
Inuk MP, sitting at the cabinet table with him, surely this was not the case. 
Was he then passing judgment on the administrative capacities of the 
Nunavut government? 
The minister’s officials have frequently questioned Nunavut’s capacity to 
not only manage its current responsibilities but also to administrate its 
lands and resources. They sometimes point to the dearth of Inuit explora-
tion geologists, mining engineers and chartered accountants in its territorial 
government ranks. However, Nunavut Territory is only 14 years old, and in 
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the many decades of the department’s federal government’s absolute au-
thority over the northern territories, how many Inuit geologists, mining 
engineers or chartered accountants has it trained and hired? 
The answer is none. One federal official recently mentioned low gradu-
ation rates and high suicide numbers as two reasons to doubt Nunavut’s 
capacity for managing its territorial lands and resources. Indeed, the sta-
tistics for both high-school graduation and suicide in aboriginal communi-
ties across Canada are alarming. Half of all aboriginal learners drop out of 
high school. Shawn Atleo, national chief of the Assembly of First Nations, 
said recently that “aboriginal children are more likely to go to jail than to 
graduate from high school” (Everett-Green: F5). 
For young aboriginals, the suicide rate is six times the rate for non-
aboriginal youth (Kennedy). So who in government has responsibility for 
this great Canadian tragedy of shameful aboriginal dropout and suicide 
rates? Given the general absence of aboriginal self-government in Canada, 
surely it is the department of aboriginal and northern affairs and, ulti-
mately, its minister. 
12.2.4 Jurisdiction 
In his Conciliator’s Report on Nunavut land claims implementation, 
Thomas Berger quotes Ejetsiak Peter, chairman of the Cape Dorset District 
Education Authority: “The children who drop out have not developed the 
skills to live off the land, neither do they have employment skills. So they 
are caught between two worlds” (Berger 2006). Berger recommended 
federal funding for a more culturally appropriate education system to 
improve Nunavut’s graduation rates, but Ottawa refused. 
A major study on suicide by two University of British Columbia scho-
lars, M.J. Chandler and C.E. Lalonde, shows that aboriginal communities 
with higher levels of “cultural continuity” or self-government have lower 
suicide rates. By “continuity,” the authors include community efforts “...to 
preserve, rebuild or reconstruct their culture by wrenching its remnants 
out of the control of federal and provincial government agen-
cies”(Chandler&Lalonde:13). 
Stephen Cornell, America’s leading expert on indigenous government, 
argues that, when it comes to cultural survival, it is jurisdiction that 
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counts. Cornell argues that in Canada, as in the United States, federal go-
vernment bureaucracies tend to approach aboriginal self-government 
with a focus on administrative activities, “while the big decisions still get 
made elsewhere” (Cornell 2003).  
Indigenous people want “government”, Ottawa offers them the “state”. 
Administrative capacity can be built but this would require substantial 
federal and territorial investment over time. In democracies, jurisdiction 
rules administration; in a colonial relationship administrative incapacity 
may be used to justify a federal refusal to negotiate lands and minerals 
jurisdiction. 
In Yukon’s devolution deal, the territory assumed jurisdiction over oil and 
gas, then contracted back the management to the National Energy Board. This 
innovation gives the territory time to build administrative capacity while 
allowing it to exercise jurisdiction in a strategically vital field. 
12.3 Indigenous Government 
Since 84% of Nunavummiut are Inuit, the historical arc of indigenous go-
vernment debates in North America might be illustrative. 
In August 1521, (one Serpent in the year Three House of the Aztec ca-
lendar) Hernán Cortés, the Spanish conquistador, beheaded Cuauhtémoc, 
the last Aztec chieftain. Niccolò Machiavelli, a contemporary of Cortés, ob-
served in The Prince that where city-states have a strong history of self-
government, the best thing is to destroy them completely. Consistent with 
Machiavelli’s teachings, Cortés burned the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlán, to the 
ground, thus destroying the largest city in the world and the most powerful 
indigenous American government. 
Ever since, for all indigenous Americans, restoring self-government 
has been a long and painful struggle. 
In 1550, Bartolomé de las Casas, the first Catholic priest ordained in the 
New World, persuaded the Spanish crown to summon a council of 14 jurists 
and theologians to Valladolid to inquire into the legitimacy of the Spanish 
conquest and the treatment of the “Indians.” Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, a theo-
logian, told the council the “Indians” were an inferior race and the Spanish, 
according to natural law, had every right to colonise and convert them by 
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force. In a five-day response, Bartolomé de las Casas argued that indigenous 
American nations had great cities, kings, judges and laws, that they were self-
governing peoples long before the Spanish invasion.  
After the conquest of Mexico, the European powers fought for control of 
the rest of North America. All actively sought allies among Indian nations 
too weak to fight off the invaders but too strong to be ignored. As United 
States Chief Justice John Marshall later wrote, “The English, the French and 
the Spaniards were equally competitors for their friends and their aid” 
(Norgren:174). 
After British and Iroquois forces defeated the French army at the 
Plains of Abraham in 1759, France signed the 1763 Treaty of Paris, the 
British took over the French forts and British settlers quickly occupied 
Indian lands. Pontiac, the Ottawa Nation’s warrior chief, began to organise 
an army of resistance. On 7 May 1763, Pontiac’s armies stormed British 
forts and took all but Detroit. 
With Pontiac in mind, the British issued the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, which promised that the Crown would only obtain lands required 
for settlement through publicly negotiated treaties with Indian nations. In 
effect, Britain had recognised Indian governments and aboriginal title to 
ancestral lands. The Proclamation eventually led to the negotiation of 
almost 400 Indian treaties in the United States and Canada, and the crea-
tion of Indian reservations or reserves everywhere except on the West 
Coast and in the Far North. 
In 1831, as the signatory of international treaties with Britain and the 
United States, the Cherokee Nation petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court to recognise it as a “foreign state” but the court ruled that Indian na-
tions were dependents or wards of the United States (Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)). However, a few months later, the court found 
that a state government had no authority on Indian lands (Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: 
“[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence – its right to self-government, by associating 
with a stronger, and taking its protection.” Marshall’s doctrine established 
that the national government of the United States, and not individual states, 
had authority in American Indian affairs. The same rule applies in Canada. 
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When in 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act, the Act deliberately forbade “tribal” government. After considering a 
municipal option for Alaskan native peoples, Congress finally replaced 
tribal governments with state-regulated native corporations, in direct 
contravention of the Marshall doctrine.  
The 1999 Nisga’a treaty negotiated with Canada and British Columbia 
reversed the tide of history by recognising significant province-like self-
government powers. As Chief Joseph Gosnell told the B.C. legislature, “...the 
Nisga’a is an old nation, as old as any in Europe... We governed ourselves 
according to Ayuukhl Nisga’a, the code of our own strict and ancient laws of 
property ownership, succession, and civil order...” (Gosnell: 6). The treaty 
made Nisga’a laws on Nisga’a lands paramount in the following areas: Nis-
ga’a citizenship; structure, administration, management and operations of 
Nisga’a government; Nisga’a lands and assets; regulation, licensing and 
prohibition of businesses, professions and trades; preservation, promotion 
and development of Nisga’a language and culture; direct taxation of Nisga’a 
citizens; adoption; child and family services; pre-school to grade 12 educa-
tion; advanced education; organisation and structure of health care deliv-
ery; authorisation of “aboriginal healers;” annual fishing plans for the har-
vest and sale of fish and aquatic plants; and Nisga’a wildlife and migratory 
birds entitlements. 
Provincial Opposition Leader Gordon Campbell saw the Nisga’a self-
government agreement as “unconstitutional.” However, the B.C. Supreme 
Court ruled otherwise, stating that self-government rights cannot be ex-
tinguished, but they may be defined or given content in a treaty. “The Nis-
ga’a Final Agreement does just that” (Campbell et al. v. British Columbia, 4 
c.n. L. R. 1. (2000)). 
On becoming Premier in 2001, Campbell appealed the Campbell deci-
sion in the court of public opinion with a province-wide referendum. 
Campbell’s 2002 referendum proposed that: “Aboriginal self-government 
should have the characteristics of local government, with powers delegat-
ed from Canada and British Columbia” (Elections BC). The Campbell Go-
vernment won the referendum but was unable to maintain its position in 
self-government negotiations at British Columbia treaty tables after 2002. 
For centuries, First Nations’ vital interests resided in the lands and wa-
ters of their traditional territories – not in the dirt roads and water trucks 
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of their villages (Penikett 2002). In the land-claim and self-government 
agreements negotiated by indigenous communities across northern Cana-
da after 1973, these villagers retained title to some of these lands, mineral 
rights and significant governmental powers, among them taxation. Their 
treaties also guaranteed them co-management of fish and game resources 
and a voice in land planning decisions throughout their territory. Canadi-
ans have learned to think of these kinds of powers as “provincial,” mea-
ning within provincial jurisdiction – and that’s the problem, particularly 
for the provinces that are even less willing to share jurisdiction than fed-
eral ministers (Courchene & Powell). 
As noted, in both Canada and the United States, Indians and Indian 
lands are federal responsibilities. Treaties are negotiated with First Na-
tions, not Indian municipalities. Unlike municipalities, Indian govern-
ments have rarely been the creatures of provincial law. 
Progress in negotiations for indigenous self-government has been painful-
ly slow. At the current rate, British Columbia will still be negotiating treaties 
in the 23rd century. Twenty years after Yukon’s First Nations negotia-ted 
Canada’s first tribal self-government agreements with the territorial and fed-
eral governments, they still represent the majority of all such agreements in 
the country. The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to declare itself on indige-
nous government. Also, for indigenous peoples in the Arctic there remain 
serious unresolved issues, among them devolution. 
The downgrading of indigenous governments from nations and allies 
to corporations and municipalities has been a long and painful process. 
The restoration of province-like powers to indigenous governments 
marks but one step on the long road to recovery.  
12.4 Right? 
The world is much changed since Cold War days when southern capitals 
enjoyed absolute power over northern communities. In 2005, the Go-
vernment of Norway adopted the Finnmark Act, a law transferring 96% of 
a northern area to a new authority with equal representation from the 
indigenous Saami Parliament and the Finnmark County Council, a Nordic 
version of the co-management regimes in Canadian land claims treaties. 
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On 21 June 2009, Greenlanders achieved self-government and a generous 
resource-revenue sharing package with Denmark. 
Given what has been happening in Norway and Greenland, as well as in 
Yukon (which renewed accords with Ottawa in 2012) and in NWT (which 
negotiated lands and resources transfers in 2011), could devolution or 
local control of lands and resources be considered as something of a right 
– a right now enjoyed by all Canadians except the Nunavummiut and those 
First Nations trapped in the logjam of endless treaty and self-government 
negotiations? The United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Article 26, clause 1, reads: “Indigenous peoples have the rights to 
the lands, territories and resources which they traditionally owned, occu-
pied or otherwise used or acquired.” 
But what kind of a right can be trumped by an undefined bureaucratic 
test of administrative capacity? Canadian ministers might reply that the 
Declaration is not legally binding and therefore the “right” is no right at 
all. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada seems to see 
jurisdiction as a reward for good administration, somewhat like a driver’s 
exam, which gives one “jurisdiction” over a vehicle only after passing a 
government-administered test. With a driver’s test the applicant may 
study the exam questions and answers in advance, but the Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development has shared neither the questions nor 
the answers with Nunavummiut.  
If “administrative assimilation” into a federal bureaucratic culture is 
Ottawa’s objective, what are the benchmarks for success? The Minister 
has not said. In any event, no indigenous or northern government can ever 
reasonably be expected to reach Ottawa’s unknown threshold. To some, 
this all seems far too much like the literacy tests once used in the southern 
United States, which were aimed at preventing American blacks from 
exercising their right to vote.  
Obviously, Nunavut’s government faces enormous administrative chal-
lenges in delivering economic development, education, health and housing 
to about 33,500 people spread over 2,093,190 square kilometres. With so 
few people in such a large area, population size is often raised as an issue 
particularly in discussions of indigenous government because, when it 
comes to administration, bigger is often assumed to be better. Is that also 
the case with jurisdiction? 
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Many Canadians would agree that, for many years, our national go-
vernment has suffered from the excesses of partisanship and patronage, 
bullying bureaucracy and the increasing centralisation of power in the 
prime minister’s office. So, if northern and indigenous governments prefer 
consensus legislatures, co-management and decentralised administration, 
why would southern Canadians judge such approaches a failure? After all, 
the two regions, the North and the South, have different political cultures 
and different priorities. When the auditor general favours centralisation 
over decentralisation, as she did in her 2006 report, then indigenous and 
northern leaders may see that as evidence of a federal system that cares 
more about accounting than accountability.  
Of course, compliance with universally accepted accounting principles 
is desirable, as is a commitment to training accountants and finance offi-
cers, but building administrative capacity in northern and indigenous go-
vernments will take huge investments of money and time. So also will 
Nunavut’s land and resource devolution negotiations; northerners well 
remember that their land claim agreements typically took 20 years to 
complete. Obviously, a professional public service is essential to the effec-
tive operation of democratic government, but which comes first, democra-
cy or bureaucracy? Most Canadians would choose democracy. 
12.5 Revenues and the Stakes 
Of course, successful devolution negotiations must produce a net fiscal 
benefit for the territory. Anthony Speca has questioned whether any of 
Canada’s northern territories – Yukon or NWT or, eventually, Nunavut – 
could achieve as good a resource-revenue sharing deal with Canada as 
Greenland received from Denmark. As Speca writes, “Denmark agreed to 
reduce the grant by just half of Greenland’s resource income, and subject-
ed the first DKK 75 million ($14 million) collected annually to no corre-
sponding reduction at all” (Speca:62).  
What is at stake? The Geological Survey of Canada estimates that there 
may be a trillion dollars worth of oil and gas in the High Arctic (George). 
Development of these resources is no doubt decades away. Without devo-
lution and a fair share of energy and mineral resource revenues from their 
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lands, Nunavut will have little capacity to care for the health or the educa-
tion of future generations. Indeed, devolution might be the only prospect 
the territory has for building a private sector and for providing prosperity, 
physical health and mental health for future generations.  
When the world has extracted the last of the North’s diamonds, oil and 
ice, what will be left for the people there? Will they have heritage or sover-
eign wealth funds or will they be left with holes in the ground? Why should 
Ottawa, rather than northerners, get to exercise “provincial” jurisdiction on 
Nunavut’s lands? Is Ottawa ready to answer that question? 
12.6 Sovereignty 
Ironically, the current Prime Minister portrays his administration as the 
great defender of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty but his government seems 
not to appreciate how solidly Canada bases its sovereignty claims in the 
Arctic on thousands of years of Inuit occupancy and continued use of Arc-
tic lands, waters and sea ice. However, this fact is implicitly acknowledged 
in the preamble of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, which states 
“the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area have asserted an aboriginal title 
to that Area based on their traditional and current use and occupation of 
the lands, waters and landfast ice therein in accordance with their own 
customs and usages.” 
12.7 Conclusion 
Where are we now? What is the big picture? Arctic warming – caused by 
human hunger for scarce energy resources – is fuelling a new southern 
rush to tap the oil and gas buried beneath northern lands and waters. 
Climate change is opening up previously inaccessible areas for exploita-
tion and at the same time exposing Arctic communities to greater risk of 
environmental degradation. Though they have contributed very little to 
global warming, Canada’s Arctic residents will be among the earliest vic-
tims of climate change. As things now stand, they will pay the social and 
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environmental costs but may receive little in the way of benefits from the 
extraction of energy riches from their homelands. 
Devolution could provide a solution to this injustice but, it remains to 
be seen what progress Nunavut will make in negotiations with Canada. 
History has no plot, and sometimes time seems to stand still. 
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Questions 
 Yukon’s devolution accord with Ottawa allows it to manage lands and 
mineral resources in the Territory. How does this devolution 
agreement differ from provincial status? 
 What is the difference between the devolution of jurisdiction or 
legislative powers over territorial lands and resources and the 
devolution of federal programmes for the administration or 
management of territorial lands and resources? 
 Is there any basis for the Inuit of Nunavut to claim devolution as an 
aboriginal right? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Faroese Governance 
Kári á Rógvi 
13.1 Introduction 
The Faroe Islands are located in the North Atlantic midway between the 
north of the British Isles (the Shetland Islands) and Iceland. The Faroes 
fall thus just outside the Arctic Circle but they have much in common with 
entities that fall within it, notably Greenland, Iceland and Northern Nor-
way, and can be an interesting case study on governance in the region. 
The Faroe Islands have achieved a very high level of autonomy, preserved 
their own language, a high level of education, a largely sustainable econo-
my with public finances in order and a good credit rating. All this is 
achieved whilst being situated very far from neighbouring countries and 
markets; being dependant on ocean fisheries made difficult by unstable 
and sub-arctic climate; and, likewise, with travel and trade greatly im-
paired by distance and adverse climatic conditions, and inhabiting a num-
ber of steep and not very bountiful islands. For others trying to realise 
self-governance and move from under the shadow of metropolitan rule, 
the Faroes may offer a realistic (though perhaps not ideal) model for 
gradually creating a viable self-governance under marginal conditions and 
with somewhat hesitant approval from the metropolitan power.  
The etymology of the name Faroe, Føroyar in the Faroese language, is a 
compound noun meaning “Sheep Islands,” indicating both the marginal 
agricultural value of the land and the national character, the islanders 
being descendants of agrarian Norse settlers (Vikings) expanding West in 
the late second millennia A.D. Sheep-farming is still highly valued and 
practiced by thousands of people on very small plots and communal 
farms. Though still highly agrarian, the culture has been influenced by the 
explosive growth of fisheries in the 20th century, leading to a more hun-
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ting-based culture. Added to this, and influenced by evangelical move-
ments and later through the media, education and the influx of Danish 
popular culture, Faroese society is complexly interwoven with deep tradi-
tions and modern developments.  
The language is a distinct West-Nordic tongue, derived from Old 
Norse, not very far removed from Icelandic and Nynorsk (New or West-
ern Norwegian) but with a certain infusion of Danish vocabulary and 
expressions. The Faroese language is the high-status language of admin-
istration and culture. Faroese-speakers number less than a hundred 
thousand globally, and around 48,000 people inhabit 16 of the 18 is-
lands. Most to the inhabitants are native Faroese, with some Danes, oth-
er Scandinavians, Icelanders and Greenlanders and others scattered 
among them. A certain influx of Danes has occurred as a result of Danish 
administration and earlier domination of church and trade, and more 
recently as spouses of Faroese students return with them from  
Denmark. However, Danes and others tend to integrate into Faroese 
culture and no minority schools or other institutions indicate permanent 
communities with stronger ties to outside communities. Denmark, which 
claims sovereignty, is seen as another country linked through the 
“Community of the Realm” by Faroese consent. Studies indicate that the 
Faroese are largely bilingual (Faroese and Danish) with a very good 
understanding of other neighbouring languages (Norwegian, Swedish, 
English and Icelandic). Many of the immigrants are therefore able to 
continue to use their native language in the Faroes. 
Most notable to foreigners is often how distinctive the islands are 
compared to other parts of the region. Visitors notice this distinctiveness 
in multi-coloured houses and sheep, numerous dialects and the abun-
dance of local sports teams, of churches, political parties, trade unions, 
musicians and artists. This is not to say that the Faroese are more inclined 
than others to be tolerant but collectively they have such divergent identi-
ties and views that a dynamic society is inevitable. 
The Faroese Løgting (Law-Thing or Parliament) and the Faroe Islands as 
a jurisdiction are among the oldest in the world. The geographical situation 
and association to the Kingdoms of Norway and later Denmark have en-
sured that the Faroes have never been colonised or conquered since the 
Norse settlement around 800 A.D. (save for a welcomed British intervention 
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during World War II) but have been allowed to evolve largely on their own 
terms without being fully integrated into or subjugated by outside powers. 
This, however, has also meant a very high degree of regional and local di-
versity and a certain lack of coherently formulated policies, and both the 
autonomy issue and economic policy tends to move by accident and force 
rather than by reflection and choice. The political discourse is at times very 
abrasive and the lack of consensus on the achievements hitherto as well as 
on the future goals is often perplexing but the Faroese model of governance 
(though in need of refinement) has still accomplished quite a lot.   
Perhaps the relative success of the Faroese can best be seen by the fact 
that the Faroese government has a high credit rating and pays very low 
interest on its loans; it is also not very far from balancing its books. Fur-
thermore, unemployment is low, university enrolment at an all-time high 
and the Faroese own substantial and diverse investments abroad, inclu-
ding running banks in Denmark and other neighbouring countries, search-
ing for oil in British waters and various construction business in Green-
land. The Faroese also provide thousands of highly skilled workers, nota-
bly navigators, engineers and electricians for fisheries, sea transport and 
off-shore oil industries in Greenland, Norway and Denmark.  
The Faroese have also recently achieved a functional infrastructure 
and profitable industrial base. Notably the main island of Streymoy has 
been connected to the second island of Eysturoy by bridge, the second city 
of Klaksvík linked to Eysturoy by sub-sea tunnel, and Vágar (with the 
main airport) also joined to Streymoy via tunnel. This means that 80% of 
the population is connected by road, no longer than an hour’s ride from 
the capitol of Tórshavn. Most of the rest can use modern car ferry. This 
has revolutionised production and the labour market, integrating what 
was earlier a highly fragmented country, where each sub-region tried to 
build the same production pattern centred on a small fish factory. Now the 
factories are fewer but bigger, more specialised and people commute to 
where their skills are best put to use.  
However, none of this can obscure the unrealised potential of the is-
lands with enormous resources available within its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ). There is a patent failure to implement some obviously needed 
reforms. For example, coastal fishing which used to form the crux of the 
Faroese economy is currently hampered by the depletion of stock by an 
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oversized local fleet, as thousands of people still expect it to be possible to 
live on unrestricted coastal fishing and related industries. These people 
are vocally opposed to fisheries regulations and hold great political clout. 
Biological and economic studies show that the main costal species of cod, 
haddock and saithe are not migratory and could easily be managed and 
harvested when reaching commercial maturity but are typically harvested 
2–3 years too early, resulting in both smaller overall catches and relatively 
lower prices. However, the fishing communities usually oppose any re-
strictions claiming the scientists to be wrong; a commonly held view is 
that the last bountiful era (circa 1993 to 2000) was the result of cod im-
migration from outside waters and divine intervention as result of active 
prayer groups, and that current restrictions are just hindering a renewed 
upsurge in catches.  
Furthermore, a very substantial proportion of every generation leaves 
the islands due to the lack of opportunity. Two-thirds of Faroese seeking 
further education go abroad and are unable to choose fully or in part to 
get their education in the Faroe Islands. Expansion of the existing Univer-
sity and Maritime Academy into fields such law, economics, management, 
accounting, business and various other trades and professions that are 
already practised in the Faroes and could be taught by Faroese as well as 
visiting scholars seems a straightforward policy choice. To this could be 
added other studies that would allow a natural development of alternative 
industries including those service industries that are often mentioned but 
never take off, like tourism and textile design. However, the combination 
of budget discipline, path dependence and political inertia means that the 
Faroese still choose the easy short term option of nudging the youth to-
wards affordable and accessible education in Denmark. Alas, this in turn 
means that around half of the most ambitious and best educated do not 
return to the islands, as they find opportunities elsewhere. Even Faroese 
couples expressing an interest in returning do not do so, when they have 
bought a house, started a job or sent their children to school; the ever-
growing Faroese Diaspora in Denmark adds to the easy integration of the 
Faroese emigrants.  
The failures of the Faroese are often disguised by fortunate off-sets. 
Thus, a recent influx of mackerel into Faroese waters hides the collapse in 
haddock and cod; a high birth-rate conceals the ongoing process of emi-
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gration, and a vibrant sports environment and national celebrations like 
the St. Olaf’s festivities (a week centred on 29 July) with their distinct 
display of common identity and good moods combine to mask the increa-
sing lack of trust and capability in government and civic society. 
Contemporary Faroese governance is probably the result of what self-
determination entails namely both the insight and motivation to develop 
and improve but also the dysfunctional results of ingrained cultural beliefs 
and local politics that pressure the system to sub-optimise and avoid nec-
essary but painful reforms and instead continue wasteful priorities. This is 
probably not uncommon to other small communities; the absence of a 
paternalistic metropolitan power does not guarantee good governance on 
its own. The Faroese have, however, largely achieved independence in the 
functional sense with the Faroese, holding almost all powers of govern-
ment and financing it too through a largely sustainable economy. All that 
remains is to redirect the streams of migration back to the Faroes and to 
realise the potential of further education, properly regulated fisheries and 
otherwise even better governance before either the onset of decline that 
emptied the Shetlands and Orkneys (islands groups to our south, formerly 
Norse-identity and vibrant) or the destabilising effect of an oil industry 
too large for us to handle. 
We shall now look more closely at some aspects of Faroese history, de-
velopment and governance. 
13.2 History of the Faroes 
The Faroese were likely first inhabited by Celtic people. They have not left 
much in their wake and are only documented to have included monks that 
were taken to the islands for solace. The Norse came sometime before the 
year 800 AD, partly from settlements already established in the British 
Isles. The resulting population shows signs genetically of being over-
whelmingly Norwegian on the male side with some element of Celts on the 
female side. Language and culture have developed mainly from Old Norse 
with some Celtic influence early on and with much Danish cultural infu-
sion in the last few centuries. 
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The Celtic form of Christianity was probably introduced to the Norse 
early on, and the (Icelandic) sagas tell of the battle between the more or-
ganised formal church of Norway trying to eradicate heathen and auton-
omous Christian beliefs in the Faroes. The advent of the Catholic Church 
coincided with the ambitions of the Norwegian Kings to rule all the Norse 
settlements out West. This resulted in skirmishes and contentions for 
power. The period from around AD 1000 until 1300 was marked by this 
strife that ended in the western lands recognising the power of the Kings 
but retaining substantial autonomy and assurances. We know the content 
of the Old Pact made between Icelandic Chiefs and the Norwegian King in 
1262–64, a similar Pact was probably made with the Faroese but the exact 
content has not survived. 
The Catholic Church in the Faroes also became very impressive in its 
own right, amassing close to half of all land and creating a powerful bish-
opric in the town of Kirkjubø, where it erected a cathedral and had a fully 
functioning synod and seminary until the reformation of 1538. Its crown-
ing achievement (so to speak) was the education of a man called Sverre, 
whose mother claimed that he had been fathered by a Norwegian King. 
Sverre was educated at Kirkjubø and then went to Norway, where he 
claimed the throne and was successful in fighting for it. King Sverre was 
renowned as an administrator and is still remembered in the Norwegian 
National Anthem with the words: “from its heights Sverre spoke up 
against Rome,” for his insistence on national autonomy also in religious 
matters. Sverre was the King until 1202 and his descendants ruled Nor-
way when the pacts were formed with the western isles, including Magnus 
VI the Law-Mender. One might speculate that this has contributed to the 
respect for the Faroese jurisdiction’s distinctness and effective autonomy.  
In late 14th century, however, the Norwegian crown was united briefly 
with the Swedish crown and then more permanently with the Danish 
crown. The Faroe Islands were still regarded as associated to the Norwe-
gian Realm; the phrase often used was our land Faroe whilst both Norway 
and Denmark were considered realms. However, political control of all our 
realms and lands (as an Act of Christian VII in late 18th century puts it) was 
slowly centralised in Copenhagen, somewhat obscuring and dissolving the 
distinctness of the various entities under ultimate Copenhagen rule. The 
relative weakening of Norway in this union, including the impact of  
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foreign, notably hanseatic, traders also appear to have weakened the 
western Norse isles that became increasingly dependent on foreign agents 
and powers. The King in Copenhagen established a monopoly trade and 
from time to time made the Faroes a feudal fief ruled by absentee lords. 
The national economy and institutions seemed to decline for a long period 
of time, although they remained in place and the jurisdiction retained its 
own body of law.  
Around 1538, the King of Denmark-Norway decreed a reformation of 
the church, resulting for the Faroe Islands in the vast church holding be-
coming crown land, the dissolving of the diocese and ecclesiastical control 
being taken away. The language of the Lutheran Church became Danish 
despite one object of the reformation being preaching the gospel in the 
vernacular. Likewise the administrative language of all institutions  
became Danish. 
Despite this, Faroese identity survived as well as its practical autonomy. 
The things still operated as both law courts and parliamentary bodies repre-
senting and governing the locals. There was no democracy in the modern 
sense, rather an oligarchic-traditional system whereby powerful farmers 
were able to retain the distinct character of the land through development of 
case law and petitions to the King and his officials. The small number of Danes 
moving to the islands and the reliance on prominent locals and integrated 
Danish families as basis for recruitment of many of the officials needed pro-
bably added the respect for the traditions of the jurisdiction. 
The loss of Norway proper in the Napoleonic wars and continued cen-
tralisation under absolutism, however, meant that the Løgting was not 
convened from 1814 until 1852. Instead, power was concentrated in the 
hands of the new governors of the Faroes but they continued the policy of 
practical autonomy rather than integration into Denmark proper. The 
Governors were often eminently qualified and were afforded wide-
ranging powers, which they often used to initiate change and develop-
ments like encouraging ocean fisheries, establishing an equitable distribu-
tion of the pilot whale catch and the distribution of crown land to the 
poor, encouraging new settlements, improved infrastructure and estab-
lished a savings bank. Thus, the paradox is that the concentration of pow-
er in the hands of well-educated governors staying for a long time on the 
islands helped introduce reforms based on particular Faroese circum-
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stances and needs, contributing to economic development and population 
growth and thus providing the practical basis for the ultimate movement 
towards democratic and national influence.  
The mentioned reforms provided an opportunity for starting to realise 
the enormous potential of ocean fisheries from the end of the 19th century; 
the Faroese bought sloops and schooners from Britain and started to fish 
all over the North Atlantic, notably around Iceland and Greenland. 
13.3 20th Century Developments and Home Rule 
By the beginning of the 20th century, the Faroe Islands had a very good base 
for further development. Their local identity was strong compared to the 
formerly Norse-identity communities of the Shetlands and Orkneys. Faroese 
people stayed and developed their local communities rather than seeking 
their fortunes elsewhere. Significant economic potential existed in fisheries 
while the governance structure was becoming increasingly robust.  
The Faroese had by this time formed several political organisations 
that sought to advance the development of the economy and culture of the 
islands. The Society of the Faroese a mass movement for cultural and po-
litical autonomy formed in 1888 was pushing for the development of the 
language and other cultural/heritage issues. This ultimately resulted in 
the development of a Faroese written language, media and education. The 
Faroes’ Progressive Society, which was closer to a political party, formu-
lated a programme in 1903 of development, democratisation, education, 
language and equal rights. Although elections were of individuals and 
parties originally were held to be undemocratic, the Progressives appear 
to have won a majority of the half of the Løgting seats then up for election, 
in 1905. However, this unity was lost in subsequent years with Faroese 
politics subsequently dominated by an ongoing tug-of-war between nu-
merous parties. The original split between the Unionist and Independence 
parties came in 1906, with the Social Democrats forming in 1932, Popular 
Party in 1936, and the Republican Party in 1948, with several others form-
ing since, the latest just before the 2012 elections. The majority of the 
parties and members of parliament have an allegiance to the broad inde-
pendence cause, with the Unionists usually holding around 25%, however 
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the independence movement is divided both on how to govern the islands 
and on how far and fast to take autonomy.  
The six to eight parties generally achieving electoral success do not 
form tight coalition blocks nor the long-term governing agreements that 
are the quintessential characteristics of Scandinavian politics, where usu-
ally a red and a blue block compete for control of the government but then 
reach across the aisle for broad agreements on various policies. By con-
trast, the Faroese parties can form coalitions of all permutations and very 
rarely create the kind of long-term broad policy agreements practiced in 
mainland Scandinavia. 
The Second World War brought increased desire for self-government 
and the Danish attempt to stop the evolution of autonomy into outright 
calls for independence led to the forcing of an alternative referendum on 
increased municipal powers or outright secession. The Faroese chose the 
latter, and, suddenly, a Home Rule arrangement was possible, resulting in 
a gradual and dynamic development since 1948. This gradually led to the 
Faroe Islands pushing the Danes to recognise an increased Faroese fisher-
ies zone, Faroese membership in international organisations, particularly 
dealing with marine resources, and the future possibility of entering into 
negotiations over a Faroese Constitution. 
13.4 Economic Development 
To understand modern Faroese governance it is also essential to look at 
the Faroese economy. The Faroese economy was for centuries based on 
village farming with particular emphasis on pasture production of milk, 
with barley, sheep, coastal fishing for cod, seabirds and pilot whaling and, 
later, the growth of potatoes. However, for centuries the main staple 
source of calorie intake was milk produced from the rich grasslands scat-
tered around the islands. Other sources, notably, the protein sources of 
sheep, fish and whale fluctuated significantly in terms of production. 
The Faroese had very much taken the Norwegian pastoral farmer life-
style to the islands but had to adapt it to the harsher prevailing conditions, 
for instance using peat as fuel and placing the cowshed below the main 
dwellings to ensure heat from the cattle. The Faroese like the Norse of 
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Greenland were not inclined to do much fishing and as late as the 19th 
century the enormous quantities of marine resources were only of sec-
ondary economic importance. Even today, the cultural affinity for agricul-
ture can be seen in the thousands of people participating in small holding 
and common farms. Furthermore, the debates on milk and wool produc-
tion and self-sufficiency in agricultural produce form a part of the public 
discourse widely out of proportion to their actual significance in today’s 
fishing, fish farming and service-based economy. 
The Faroese were largely opposed to economic development well into 
the 19th century. However, the liberal Danish regimes eventually succeed-
ed in replacing the King’s monopoly trade with free trade. This gave the 
landless peasants access to a share of the whale catch and the King’s es-
tates for some subsistence farming that made it possible for people with-
out landholdings to be active in the developing fishing industry.  
Economic development however really accelerated when the Faroese, 
after 1870, started buying small ships from Britain and began fishing for 
cod off the coasts of Iceland and Greenland. The catches of larger whales 
(the Faroese traditionally mainly catch pilot whale and other small types) 
contributed to furthering development. This new export-led growth in-
creased the size of the economy and the population grew from about 
5,000 at the beginning of the 18th century to 30,000 by the middle of the 
20th century and rising to almost 50,000 in the last 20 years. 
Currently the Faroese economy remains highly reliant on fishing, fish 
farming and other fishing-related industries. However, a service sector 
has now emerged it remains relatively underdeveloped while education 
and tourism, particularly when compared to Iceland and Northern Nor-
way, are also in a similar position. 
13.5 Resources  
Faroese economic management of resources is undoubtedly viewed as an 
important aspect of governmental capacity. Thus, we shall look further at 
resources that form the heart of the Faroese economy and provide a basis 
for Faroese autonomy. 
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Faroese fish stocks are, in this context, also very significant. Stocks of 
cod and haddock have been overfished recently, as has saithe, which had 
otherwise overtaken the other two as the most important stock for near-
shore fisheries. Historically, the Faroese have fished around Iceland, 
Greenland and elsewhere in the Atlantic area, as well as for herring and 
blue whiting. The Atlantic-Scandic herring collapsed from overfishing in 
the late 1960s. Later other pelagic or deep water fisheries have expanded, 
some of them adequately managed by the Faroese today, e.g., the greater 
silver smelt.  
The Faroese fisheries management regime has the problems with cod, 
haddock and saithe notwithstanding, some advantages over other regimes 
such as the EU common fisheries policy. Notably, the problem with dis-
carded catch is very limited as most quotas to smaller vessels are given in 
fishing days (effort management rather than volume management) and all 
catches are allowed to be landed (though the landing of very small fish 
will lead to certain areas being temporarily closed). Also, the many spawn-
ing grounds are well protected and catches of pelagic species seem to be 
both sustainable and profitable as the quotas are sufficiently large and the 
industry has been able to consolidate to the point where many companies 
are commercially viable. Thus, the crux of the debate especially concern-
ing the pelagic species such as herring, blue whiting and mackerel is what 
the government should charge for the resources, rather than how much to 
subsidise the fisheries industry. In fiscal year 2013, the budgeted direct 
resource payment is close to DKK 150 million. This is a dramatic im-
provement compared to 20 years ago when almost all fisheries were sub-
sidised and politically micro-managed. The industry on land is even more 
consolidated; it used to be dominated by local producers in almost every 
village which went bust on a regular basis only to be reconstructed by 
political intervention.  
The above-mentioned failure of the regime dealing with certain stocks 
has much to do with the government issuing too many fishing days and 
the indirect subsidies through the minimum payment scheme that effec-
tively supports the wages for some unprofitable boats, notably very small 
boats and long-line boats. Thus, measured by the scientific standards of 
minimum spawning stock and fish death, the cod, haddock and saithe are 
biologically overfished. The economic output is even worse, as even a 
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biologically viable regime is likely to be unprofitable. To become commer-
cially viable, an effort needs to be made to oversee further reductions with 
catches delayed until, for instance, the cod are around 5 years of age. To 
move from the current situation of limited stock and catches of around 2 
year old cods, means a virtual ban for three years or a substantial reduc-
tion for longer periods, unless primary sea growth increases. This is very 
difficult to achieve, although the number of fishing days has been reduced 
and many areas, especially close to the land, harbouring very small fish 
are now simply off-limits.  
Recently, the fishing of mackerel has increased dramatically. This new 
development is likely to be a combined result of changing temperatures and 
currents with the absence of other species due to overfishing possibly con-
tributing. In any event, the mackerel stock is widely thought to be feeding in 
Faroese waters during late summer before retreating into Norwegian wa-
ters in the fall. The EU, Norway and the Faroes had agreed on sharing the 
stock in annual agreements, the latest concerning the calendar year 2010, 
according to which the Faroese share was around 5%, resulting in around 
50,000 metric tonnes that were to a large extent traded for either cod in 
Norwegian waters or for mackerel to be fished in Norwegian waters in the 
late autumn when it is usually priciest. The new or previously undiscovered 
feeding pattern led the Faroese to claim around 15% of the catch, increase 
its domestic quota to 150,000 metric tonnes for 2011 and slightly less for 
2012. Iceland and Greenland have likewise issued their own quotas as the 
stock seems to drift ever westwards. The changing distribution of mackerel 
in the Atlantic area from around 2010 highlighted the fact that the Law of 
the Sea Convention is failing in terms of the regulation of “slightly shifting 
stock.” The Convention has provisions on straddling stock and highly migra-
tory stock but not on in-between stocks like mackerel that turn out to 
straddle the international boundaries but to varying degree. As such, there 
is now considerable need for an international regime which is able to allo-
cate varying shares to the participating countries.  
The earlier herring collapse and the near collapse of blue whiting which 
produces similar quantities but less revenue all point to the need for an 
effective regional regime that includes the Faroe Islands and will deal with 
the results of climate change and the effects of industry on fish stocks that 
are impervious to national borders and other man-made concepts. 
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The greatest resent resource success, however, is probably salmon farm-
ing. Faroese waters seem to be ideal for farming as the sea temperature is 
stable year round and never freezes and is also rich in nutrients and is natu-
rally cleaned by strong currents that sweep the fjords effectively. The early 
fish farming regimes failed to regulate the necessary distance between 
farms to avoid the spread of decease and parasites but since around 2000 
the regime has been near optimal resulting in record yields and profitability 
with one producer being listed on the Norwegian stock exchange marking a 
particular milestone in attracting foreign direct investment.  
With regards to non-renewable resources, the Faroe Islands have some 
potential for hydropower, wind power and thermal energy. Currently 
however all of these sources of energy remain underdeveloped. As such, 
the Faroe Islands remain highly dependent on oil, not only for industry, 
which is almost exclusively run on oil, but also for domestic heating and 
electricity which is more than 50% dependant on oil. The Faroese econo-
my suffers greatly as a result of the regular oil price spikes. There is a 
small deposit of coal but not commercially viable.  
Hydrocarbons exist in the Faroese continental shelf beneath very deep 
waters close to the British border. The Faroese have secured sub-soil min-
erals as a special matter, so both the regulatory regime and all income are 
exclusively Faroese. The Danish Realm states claim and concludes agree-
ments on the continental shelf vis-à-vis other states (the remaining claims 
are to the south east and to the north of the islands) but the Faroese serve 
on the committees dealing with the claims, have to approve any deals 
reached and manage all internal aspects of the oil and gas regime. Currently, 
the UN body set up to consider continental shelf claims according to the Law 
of the Sea Convention is considering the Faroese/Danish claims but negotia-
tions have been completed with neighbouring countries on the subsequent 
delimitation pending validation. This may dramatically increase the area 
under Faroese jurisdiction with potential for future mineral exploitation.  
However, the question remains whether the amounts detected are 
commercially viable as the production areas will be very costly to develop 
at such depths. The regime is however in place for exploration and the 
subsequent production of oil and gas and several successful rounds of 
licensing have already been completed, the success being that exploration 
in the form of seismic shooting and drilling has occurred increasing the 
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knowledge of hydrocarbon activity and potential exploitation. Notwith-
standing this it is clear that the explorative phase in itself has been very 
useful to the Faroese as many individuals and companies have increased 
their qualifications and business volumes as well as benefiting from li-
cence fees and other tangible payments, all of which have already had a 
significant impact on the economy.  
As for other resources, while the agricultural potential is negligible it 
nevertheless remains very important to the Faroese culture, most notably, 
the small scale sheep farming that still inspires thousands to part time 
farming, often communally and with several generations participating. 
Similarly, bird catching, pilot whaling and potato farming are deeply 
communal in nature and maintain the country’s agrarian cultural roots. 
Recently, tourism has been heralded as a great new commercial oppor-
tunity. The lack of a service culture and often inadequate facilities, as well 
as strict licensing laws and other regulatory quirks which hindered its 
development in the past have now begun to be addressed. Tourist vol-
umes now seem to be picking up with up to some 20,000 tourists per year 
now visiting. Numbers are nevertheless likely to remain restricted be-
cause of the unstable climate of the islands which makes the planning of 
fishing trips, hiking or even driving around very difficult.  
13.6 Faroese Law and Authorities  
13.6.1 Faroese Law and the Administration of Justice 
The Faroese created their own system of law built primarily upon what 
they knew from home with thing being held both locally (now defunct) 
and nationally (now called Løgting), constituting a form of government 
where traditional law gradually altered through case-law and on occasion 
the passing of general legislative acts. We know, for instance, of a statute 
limiting and organising the use of dogs for shepherding and hunting from 
around 1350 and statute regulating the remuneration of members of the 
Thing from around 1450 – they were paid in woolly cloth depending on 
how far they had to travel. 
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We know, however, of a letter from 1271 recognising that the Faroese 
would keep their own laws regarding certain matters “according to your 
own law-book.” In 1298, these Faroese laws were codified so that we now 
know indirectly what had developed in Faroese law prior to that date. The 
1298 Reform Code contains provisions on a number of issues which var-
ied from court procedure, tenancy, libel, and whaling to agriculture. For 
some reason, however, the name “Sheep Letter” has stuck to this docu-
ment, a title that belittles the considerable achievement of an island com-
munity of perhaps 4–5,000 people developing its distinct legal tradition 
and being able to insist on its continuance and respect from a powerful 
and much larger polity. However, law records from before the late 17th 
century are patchy. 
Historically the six “sýslur” – roughly translatable to counties – were 
the main units of legal administration, with the entire archipelago – the 
“land” – only deciding on a few overarching matters. The locals held a 
Thing that was a hybrid between legislature and court, with many general 
acts and principled decisions providing local law and practice. The em-
phasis was on Norse traditions, thus both sýslur and land (local Thing and 
Løgting) decided disputes and resolved general regulations with emphasis 
on the former, as this was a conservative society that moved incremental-
ly and only appears to have legislated when the general codes or previous 
resolutions were irrelevant, inexplicable or clashing. 
When the Norwegian Kings became overlords in the late 13th century, 
they largely allowed the counties to function but added powers and pro-
cedures. The Kings’ Bailiff, later a Governor headed a very small admin-
istration in the capital Tórshavn, and to a large extent allowed traditional 
local self-government to continue. Thus, in those instances where laws on 
property, farming and other matters needed to be administered according 
to general rules promulgated by the Norse and later Danish overlords but 
set in the particular Faroese context, the Things were allowed to form 
bodies of case law that seem very impressive but have so-far been inade-
quately studied from the legal governance perspective. 
Until the middle of the 19th century the county courts were manned by 
locals who were chosen from among the landed farmers and together pre-
served a body of local and legal insight. After that each county was adminis-
tered by just one sýslumaður (county sheriff) but until the middle of the 20th 
230 Polar Law Textbook II 
century, the person chosen was always, by tradition, a local man. Thus, 
much customary law was preserved up to current times. It is often either 
codified or still continued by the present day legal system, so that the law 
concerning such issues as sheep farming and pilot whaling will be governed 
by tradition, often differing substantially from place to place. 
13.6.2 Local Administration 
The counties have in most matters of local politics and administration 
now been eclipsed by the local municipalities, some of which even strad-
dle the old county borders. The Faroese kommunur (municipalities) were 
formed in the middle of the 19th century to administer the fledgling wel-
fare system but have since been transformed into powerful entities with 
tax rising powers, taking about as much as the land in direct income tax, 
while disposing significant budgets and powers over planning, day care, 
school buildings, roads, harbours, and other local infrastructure. The mu-
nicipalities often have greater room in their budgets for new initiatives 
and in practice now give rise to much of the national political class, as 
most politicians start out as municipal councillors.  
The municipalities started out being aligned to the old counties with the 
capital Tórshavn having its own council but they have since fragmented. 
Although some consolidation has taken place, they still constitute over 30 
entities with the smallest comprising of just 1 or 2 villages, and often with 
fewer than 300 people. Most have between 1,500 and 5,000 inhabitants 
with Tórshavn standing out with around 18,000. With inspiration from 
neighbouring countries and Denmark in particular, very strong municipal 
reform has been a constant theme for decades. However, the matter was 
settled by a referendum in 2012 which resoundingly favoured the status 
quo and no further consolidations are to be expected in the near future.   
13.6.3 The Parliament 
On the national level, the Løgting (Law-Thing or parliament) was tradi-
tionally held in the summer and functioned as a combined legislature, 
appeal court and national festival. The Kings were keen on dampening the 
potency of this body but it remained formidable up until the 18th century. 
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By then the monarchy had, through the office of the sorinskrivari (legal 
clerk), created a legal office that largely replaced the appointed locals as 
judges in appeal cases, and general enactments became rare. 
As noted previously, from 1814 onwards, due to a general tendency 
within the absolutist government to dismantle democratic structures and 
the particular occasion of the loss of Norway proper, the Løgting was not 
convened. However, by that time it had in any case become a shadow of its 
former self. 
As parliament was reconvened in 1852, it was revitalised and many of 
its members were among the most educated and visionary, adding to the 
reforms initiated by Danish governors at the time. With Christian 
Bærentsen as Governor in the early 20th century, a Faroese national for 
the first time held that office and encouraged the Faroese language to be 
used in administration at the same time as Faroese theologians began to 
function as priests.  
13.6.4 Faroese Jurisdiction 
The situation evolved very slowly however until after the Second World 
War when the Faroese finally got the powers they had craved. In 1948 the 
Home Rule compact created a mechanism for transferring policy matters 
from Danish to Faroese rule as “special matters” and branding all others as 
“common matters” stressing self-determination and influence in all issues.  
The Home Rule compact – established by the Home Rule Act sanctioned 
by both the Løgting and the Danish Parliament – shifted constitutional law 
immensely. The words of the Danish Basic Law (constitution) that could be 
read to exclude Faroese legislation, government, taxation, budget powers, 
foreign affair powers and otherwise see Denmark as “unitary” were ignored. 
As history suggests the theory of Denmark as a unitary state was baseless 
anyway but the Home Rule compact expressly recognised the powers of the 
state to be vested in Faroese bodies. Furthermore, policy matters were cat-
egorised as either common or special, meaning that all policy areas were 
subject to Faroese authority, either together with Danes or exclusively held 
by the Faroese. Pursuant to this arrangement the Faroese right away took 
over a number of policy areas such as taxation, fisheries, labour law and 
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internal constitutional matters, setting out immediately to both direct their 
own economy and set up their own institutions.  
Because of economic difficulties in the 1950s and a certain conserva-
tive streak in the policies particularly of the Unionists and Social Demo-
crats at the time, the process of transferring policy areas stalled for a 
number of years after the initial burst of autonomy. It took until the 1970s 
for most matters to be transferred. In particular the period from 1974 to 
1980, with the Social Democrat Atli Dam as Law Man, saw a number of 
policy areas being transferred to Faroese control, with the many areas 
associated with the Danish welfare-state being financed by the Danish 
treasury. This meant a massive expansion in the Faroese public sector and 
the setting up of a Faroese administration and bureaucratic institutions, 
providing and deciding what was previously either not available or decid-
ed in Copenhagen or by the Danish High Representative’s office. 
The administration of the Faroe Islands is today almost exclusively in 
the hands of the Faroese, with the only exceptions being a handful of peo-
ple at the High Representative’s office and courts, in addition to the police, 
who are employed by the Danish State to administer common matters. 
Most of those individuals are Faroese natives, so the effective level of self-
administration is very high. The Løgmaður elected by the Løgting, heads 
the central administration and appoints a number of ministers (eight as of 
2012) who each head ministries with various powers over a number of 
lower agencies and offices. The general lay-out is very similar to the vari-
ous Scandinavian models. Some differences do however exist such as the 
ministers not being members of the parliament (if elected, they decline 
their parliamentary seats whilst in executive office), and due to the size of 
the country, some amalgamations of offices can be seen, such as the co-
ordination of administrative appeal tribunals.   
13.7 Modern Legal System and Developments 
During the last century the Faroese court system was gradually integrated 
into the Danish court system as institutions of the Kingdom, depriving the old 
institutions like county courts, county sheriffs, and lay people of their role. 
This worked against the otherwise prevailing trend of empowering Faroese 
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institutions. Nevertheless a Faroese administration of justice statute remains 
as do some quirky remnants of the old Faroese legal system, like the agricul-
tural commissions from which there is direct appeal to the Danish Supreme 
Court, circumventing the regular court system. 
Lately, however, the Court of the Faroe Islands has been increasingly 
staffed by native Faroese or Danes thoroughly integrated, increasing the prac-
tical use of the Faroese language as the official language at a trial level, leaving 
Danish as the language of the appeal process. The appeal courts have, moreo-
ver, increasingly understood the distinct nature of the Faroese legal system. 
Likewise, the Faroese Labour Law Tribunal established in 2006 uses Faroese 
senior lawyers as presiding judges but the majority of the judges are chosen 
for their insight of Faroese labour relations. It also led to better reasoned 
decisions in a country that is more dependent on case law being gradually 
created due to the less heavy legislative activity and lack of preparatory 
works and other materials often used as contributory in Scandinavian law. 
Apart from the formal court system, the Faroese legal system as a whole 
is becoming more Faroese. Statutes in all special matters are only promul-
gated in Faroese, most administrative decisions and many court decisions 
are in Faroese. Textbooks and further education is being developed in Faro-
ese and both practice and case law, including most administrative appeal 
procedures, is becoming more distinct and more Faroese. The Appeal Court 
sits regularly in the Faroes and the Supreme Court sat for the first time in 
Tórshavn in 2012, a very rare and symbolic occasion that was designed to 
signal the increased awareness of the distinct nature of the Faroese jurisdic-
tion. Crucially, Faroese nationals occupy most administrative posts and are 
more likely to be educated at least partially at the University of the Faroe 
Islands which, for example, offers a distinct law programme focusing on 
certain areas of Faroese Law. 
Historically, the Faroes did not follow Denmark in 1973 and thus re-
mained outside the EU; this also contributed to the setting of Faroese and 
Danish laws on different paths. On several occasions the courts (which are 
Danish institutions but are operating according to legislation approved by 
both parliaments as justice is a common matter) have held that Faroese legis-
lation has primacy and must be interpreted according to their own content 
not for instance in compliance with EU case law that is otherwise binding on 
the practice of comparable Danish statutes.  
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13.8 Constitutional Perspectives 
It will be clear that the Faroese certainly accept the association with Den-
mark, albeit for very different reasons. However, there is an equally very 
strong consensus on effective autonomy, often resulting in further trans-
fers of policy areas, Faroese international participation co-ordinated with 
Denmark, amendments to common legislation or otherwise. The strongest 
indication of this paradigm of autonomy is the unilateral enactment of a 
Form of Government and the internal debate over its revision.  
The first unilateral Faroese constitutional document, the former Form 
of Government Act, was enacted in 1948. The revised latter version was 
enacted in 1992. Thus the Faroes have had their own internal constitution 
all along and have only referred to the Home Rule Act when transferring 
policy areas and in other external instances. The Home Rule Act – the 
metropolitan formal empowering – has thus not functioned as the internal 
constitution, as have the comparable documents in Greenland or in the 
Åland Islands. Rather, the relevant documents have been the exclusively 
internal Faroese documents. This development is then rather more similar 
to that of Norway and Iceland with their own strong constitutional docu-
ments whilst associated with Sweden (from 1814 to 1905) and Denmark 
(from 1874 to 1944) respectively. Their examples have prompted the 
current debate on the progression to an even more full-fledged constitu-
tion with provisions on rights provisions, as well as national identity, self-
determination and procedures for secession. It is noteworthy moreover 
that the Faroese constitutional debate continues without anyone suggest-
ing anything but an internal procedure without Danish participation.  
The Faroes, probably because the Danes accepted autonomy so grudg-
ingly, got no formal recognition in the form of a viceroy or procedures of 
royal assent of legislation (as Åland effectively has today in the form of an 
often-used presidential veto), or being named a Kingdom in its own right 
as Iceland was in 1918. The new high representative represents the Dan-
ish government not the monarch, probably to avoid the earlier Icelandic 
parallel and similar developments in the British dominions. However, this 
served only to increase the effective autonomy as it left the Danes no veto 
procedures or other ways of formally hindering effective self-government. 
The only formal procedure to rein-in the Faroese, by calling for a special 
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court with members of the Supreme Court and politicians from both sides, 
has never been used.  
The Faroese governing coalition from 1998 to 2004 sought to establish 
the Faroe Islands as a sovereign nation associated with Denmark along the 
lines that Iceland had been associated to it in the period after 1918 
(though without a Faroese Kingdom being created). However, this met 
Danish resistance and the Danish government wanted a choice between 
secession and continuing what in Danish is referred to as “the Community 
of the Realm.”  
The Faroese government from 2004 to 2008 was of a more conciliatory 
persuasion and agreed to amendments to the Home Rule compact, the new 
list of policy areas and a new foreign affairs arrangement. The former has 
clarified the statues of the Faroes (defining only five areas as exclusively 
common matters with an ultimate Danish say). The latter has largely been 
accepted as a step backwards as it failed to codify the wide ranging powers 
of the Faroese government in foreign affairs. The Faroese have negotiated 
fisheries agreements since the late 1970s with only nominal Danish partici-
pation and have been founding members, members or associate members 
of several international organisations, such as the Nordic Taxation Regime 
(full member), the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Coordination Organisa-
tion (full member, founder), the International Maritime Organisation (asso-
ciate member) in addition to Faroese sports and other organisations having 
full membership of organisations such as the Paralympics and FIFA. The 
extreme fixation on the notionally unitary character of Denmark resulted in 
a provision that insists on a clause that states that there can be only one 
member from the Danish Realm in any international organisation. Thus 
Danish membership necessarily excludes Faroese membership. Likewise, if 
both the Faroese and Greenland want membership of, say an international 
organisation dealing with maritime resources, this results in an absurd joint 
membership, even if the other members would accept full membership for 
both countries. This appears to negate the earlier successes, like the Nordic 
taxation regime and NAMMCO, and to preclude further developments. The 
Løgting has unanimously resolved to renegotiate this arrangement and has 
objected to the Greenland codification of this new foreign affairs regime in 
their self-government act. 
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The supplementary legislation of 2005 drew up a negative list of policy 
areas not under Faroese control rather than the positive list of 1948. Thus, 
everything except the five policy areas, defined as the Danish constitution, 
Danish citizenship, the Supreme Court, foreign affairs, security, and de-
fence policy, and currency, are now Faroese special matters, except for 
around 20 areas that by Faroese choice will also remain common matters 
for the foreseeable future. These include, for example, banks, aviation, 
family law, police, the lower courts, passports and immigration. In addi-
tion three further policy areas are administered by the Faroese but with 
the Danish treasury funding the administration through the block grant 
that in fiscal year 2012 is DKK 615.5 million (around US $100 million). 
These three are: old age pensions, medical care, and special care.   
Lately, the Prime Minister, who is himself a Unionist, has emphasised 
that he envisages a development towards a “Community of Realms,” em-
phasising the plural, with both the Faroes and Greenland being recognised 
as sovereign nations will full international memberships where needed 
but closely aligned nevertheless in some sort of commonwealth arrange-
ment. The Prime Minister has even mentioned UN membership but em-
phasises the monarchy and Supreme Court as points of continued align-
ment. The Faroes would thus evolve much like the former British domin-
ions towards a gradual independence in real terms but with certain 
important linking institutions and possibly overlapping citizenship and 
other arrangements. This vision is definitely feasible in practical terms as 
both Scandinavian, including Danish history shows, and the evolution of 
the British Empire demonstrates. However, much resistance will probably 
come from Danish officials whose conceptually positivist education makes 
creative discussions very difficult, in addition to Danish political opposi-
tion as Denmark’s geopolitical importance could dramatically decrease if 
the associated countries become to “uppity”. The long-term interest of 
Denmark is probably evolution rather than obstruction followed by seces-
sion, and Denmark would probably gain clout if it joined in the UN and 
other organisations by two friendly associates.  
The Faroe Islands are “not a state but a land with the qualities of a 
state” as the great Faroese lawyer and politician Edward Mitens once re-
marked. Less prosaically the Faroese author William Heinesen likened the 
Faroese place in the world to an insignificant grain of sand on the floor of 
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a dance hall, however “seen beneath a magnifying glass, this grain of sand 
is nevertheless a whole world.” Indeed a whole world that was described 
by John F. West as a social laboratory. 
Herein lays much truth. The Faroe Islands are in their own way a rather 
complete and functioning polity of a higher order. The Faroese generally place 
little importance in formalities and would not accept a permanent arrange-
ment like that of the Åland Islands in the Finnish Constitution or the current 
Greenland arrangement with an explicit Danish veto on secession. The Danish 
Queen remains very popular but only around 10% participated in the 2010 
referendum on female succession rights, as it appears to most people as a 
matter for Danes to figure out who their monarch is. Even the language of the 
Faroese Unionists time and time again stresses popular sovereignty and that 
the Faroese shall govern the Faroe Islands and that self-determination is a 
matter exclusively for the Faroese. 
Thus, the Faroe Islands are likely to ask for further progress to be made, 
primarily in relation to the need for a more comprehensive Faroese constitu-
tion, the need for further representation in an international context, and in 
relation to the particular relationships with the EU and other trading partners 
etc., which strain the very formal and minimalistic approach to constitutional 
law which is very often adopted by the Danish Government. The block grant 
transfer of money from Denmark to the Faroe Islands is just 5% of Faroese 
GDP and will be dwarfed by any oil and gas deposits that are equivalent to 
discoveries in neighbouring British and Norwegian waters. Therefore any 
move towards separation from Denmark is unlikely to be hindered on eco-
nomic grounds; however, the Faroese will not secede just because they can, 
an eventual exit will likely be triggered by Danish inflexibility in other re-
spects such as the crises over consulates and foreign affairs that led Norway 
to secede from Sweden or the banking scandal in 1992 that revealed that the 
Danish government greatly favoured Danish commercial interests over Faro-
ese public interests. 
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13.9 Conclusion 
The Faroe Islands appear to be little studied by outsiders. Presumably, the 
reason why not much focus has been placed on the Faroese model is that it 
evades easy categorisation. Apparently, Greenland has achieved more auton-
omy through its self-government, or the Åland Islands through their special 
status enshrined in the Finnish constitution and the EU Treaties. However, in 
real terms the Faroe Islands have arguably achieved more than most compa-
rable associated polities as the Faroese control almost all policy areas with 
institutions manned by the Faroese themselves, in addition to reaming out-
side the EU the metropolitan power has also, largely, lost the ambition to 
interfere in internal matters. An association where federal pre-eminence is 
only assumed in five enumerated policy areas with no ban on unilateral se-
cession and little dependence on the metropolitan power for resources, per-
sonnel or services is quite remarkable. This under-the-radar and understated 
autonomy is not easily appreciated and disappoints both people inclined 
towards full independence and relative autonomy in an integrated arrange-
ment. The Faroese themselves even largely dislike the arrangement seeing it 
as either too little or too much. 
The governance created by the dynamics of society influenced by shift-
ing and contradicting influences and ideologies is, however, exactly the 
reason for studying the Faroes and why they are much more likely to pro-
vide a workable paradigm for other polar or marginal polities than, say, 
either Iceland or Greenland. The better functioning aspects of Faroese 
governance such as fish-farming, employment services, taxation and pe-
lagic fisheries are the results of trial and error and evolved law and struc-
tures and vigorous debate, not planning or legal transplants. The Faroe 
Islands were called “The Land of Maybe” by the British during the Second 
World War. This is an very fitting label, capturing the dynamic and unpre-
dictable nature of the place but also what makes it exciting to live in and 
instructive to study.  
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Websites 
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www.visitfaroeislands.com – Tourist Information 
www.setur.fo – University 
www.hagstova.fo – Statistics  
www.kringvarp.fo – Broadcasting  
www.sprotin.fo – Dictionaries and other publications 
www.flb.fo – National library 
Questions 
 What is the importance of history for present day Faroese aspirations? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of Faroese fisheries 
management?  
 What is the importance of education if the Faroese are to obtain 
autonomy in real terms? 
 Compare the Faroese and Greenlandic approaches to autonomy. 
 What are the downsides and dysfunctional side-effects associated with 
self-determination as seen in the case of the Faroe Islands and others? 
 Compare the development of small polities with and without their own 
language and culture. 
 What is the case for a Faroese constitution? 
 What would be the effect of a Faroese appeal court? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of politics in small 
communities?  
 How can necessary reforms be achieved in small communities? 
 
14. Greenland and the United 
Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Marianne Lykke Thomsen 
14.1 Introduction 
Since the early days of Home Rule (HR) in the late 1970s, Greenland has 
been actively involved in the promotion and protection of indigenous 
peoples rights, notably through the drafting and negotiation of the Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples within the UN system, starting 
with the independent expert Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(WGIP) established under the Sub-Commission on Human Rights in 1982, 
through to the ad hoc open-ended working group under the Commission 
on Human Rights in the 1990s and to its adoption by the Human Rights 
Council and the General Assembly in 2007.  
Parallel to this process and in a unique partnership with Denmark, 
Greenland also contributed substantially to the process leading to the 
establishment of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) 
under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2001. In addition to 
this, Greenland and Denmark helped promote the appointment of a Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights, also in 2001. The establishment of 
the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) under 
the Human Rights Council in 2007 as the successor to the former Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations is the latest mandate to be established 
within the UN System due to considerable effort and support from Den-
mark-Greenland and other like-minded countries in a constructive part-
nership with indigenous peoples (See also Polar Law Textbook 2010). 
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The three above-mentioned mandates, which are distinct but compli-
mentary, seek to cooperate in a coordinated manner to promote and pro-
tect the rights of indigenous peoples, including the implementation of the 
provisions set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples ( UNDRIP). 
In 2009, when Greenland obtained Self-Government, the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the former HR were expanded considerably. Shortly after 
the inauguration of the Greenland Self-Government, the Premier addressed 
the UN EMRIP in Geneva to share information on the new arrangement and 
to reassure indigenous peoples of Greenland’s continued support. 
This chapter will seek to highlight the interest in, and awareness of, 
UNDRIP in Greenland and how the issue of the applicability and imple-
mentation of the UNDRIP in Greenland often finds its way into political 
debates, despite the fact that Greenland has twice – that is in both the joint 
Greenland-Danish Commission on HR and the joint Commission on Self-
Government – opted for a public governance model as opposed to an in-
digenous self-government one. The government in this way is defined by 
territory and not ethnicity. In practice, however, the Government of 
Greenland in many instances both resembles and acts as if it is in fact an 
Inuit government. Something which is supported by the ethnic composi-
tion of the political leadership and the primary status and use of the 
Greenlandic language in Government and Parliament as well as in society 
at large – except perhaps in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, in which the 
majority of the country’s 11% Danish and foreign residents live. 
Even though political mobilisation took the shape and function of a 
party political structure resembling the Danish or Nordic party models, 
the government declarations made by newly elected governments have 
for many years made specific mention of indigenous rights and solidarity 
among indigenous peoples, and, more specifically, the close cooperation 
among Inuit in an Arctic world. In the current government declaration, the 
Government states its intention to strengthen the recognition of the 
UNDRIP and to seek its implementation (Coalition Agreement 2009–13, 
official draft translation on www.nanoq.gl). 
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14.2 From Provincial Council to Self-Government 
Up through the 1970s, and parallel to indigenous peoples’ mobilisation 
worldwide, Greenland experienced a significant period of political mobilisa-
tion leading to the establishment of the Greenland HR Government in 1979 
followed by the Greenland Self-Government in 2009 (see Kleist 2010).  
Both of these major developments in the political history of Greenland 
involved similar two-step processes starting with an all Greenlandic 
commission laying out the groundwork and the vision from the Green-
landic point of view, followed by a joint Greenlandic – Danish parliamen-
tary commission preparing the actual legal framework. 
The reasons for the political mobilisation and demand for self-
determination are multiple, but central to negotiations for considerable 
transfers of power from Denmark have been the fact that Greenland is 
geographically separate from Denmark and that its original inhabitants – 
Kalaallit or Inuit – are a distinct people with their own culture and lan-
guage and the inherent desire to regain control over their own affairs and 
over the land and resources – both renewable and non-renewable – with-
in the territory of Greenland.  
While the importance of language and culture in Greenland will be dis-
cussed later, it is important to illustrate the sometimes divergent views on 
the importance of the UNDRIP to Greenland and differences in the level of 
overall identification with indigenous peoples. Particularly among the 
younger generations, identification with indigenous peoples is sometimes 
not as strong as among those who have been involved in the global 
movement of indigenous mobilisation. In this regard, the Inuit Circumpo-
lar Council (ICC) plays an important role in terms of “educating” the youth 
to understand its own background. From the middle 1970s to the middle 
1980s the Aasiviit (summer gatherings) were instrumental in creating 
awareness of the Inuit heritage as was the Training Center of Indigenous 
Peoples (ITCIP) established in 1997 which helped to (re-)introduce youth 
to their cultural heritage while also promoting the issue of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. Other educational venues for Greenlandic youth include 
the UN Indigenous Fellowship Programme and the member state spon-
sored Junior Professional Officers positions at UN bodies. 
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When the UNDRIP was finally adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2007, the view was expressed by the then Head of the Self-Government 
Commission Secretariat, Mininnguaq Kleist in a radio comment to the 
Greenland Broadcasting Corporation (KNR), that the adoption came too 
late for the Commission to consider and thus would be of little significance 
in Greenland (KNR 18 September 2007). The President of ICC, Aqqaluk 
Lynge promptly spoke out against this assessment, urging M. Kleist to 
caution his statement and early dismissal of the Declaration while negotia-
tions on self-government were still taking place between Greenland and 
Denmark. Lynge argued that the UNDRIP had played a major role in 
achieving the recognition of the Greenland people (as a people under in-
ternational law and thereby the recognition of the right of self-
determination) and that it would also play into negotiations on landown-
ership and subsurface rights. Finally, he expressed the expectation that 
the Greenlanders would be able to build future rights on the Declaration 
(KNR 18 September 2007). 
What was clearly missing in Kleist’s assessment, despite its good inten-
tions, was the fact that the Declaration process has been feeding into the 
Self-Government process all along, either explicitly – in discussions or 
reports – or via the experience and expertise of the Commission members 
with respect to international work on indigenous peoples’ rights.  
14.3 Indigenous Peoples Coming Together 
Greenland has a long history of contact and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples, particularly in the Arctic, which is documented through archaeo-
logical and historical knowledge. 
In terms of the relationship with fellow Inuit in Canada and Alaska, it is 
a matter of choice how far one wants to go back in history. For example, 
the Kivioq legend from Greenland, tells us about a man named Kivioq who 
crossed the Davis Strait in his kayak and landed on Akilineq – the land on 
the other side, meaning Baffin Island in Nunavut. In modern times, the 
Kivioq legend inspired the Greenland (provincial) Council to organise a 
visit by young intellectuals to Baffin Island and Pangnirtung in the early 
1950s. A visit which was later reciprocated. The so-called H.J. Rink Expedi-
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tion to Baffin Island in 1956, named after the Governor’s vessel used for 
the expedition, and the return visit by fellow Inuit from Pangnirtung in 
1958, became an important point of departure for the political and ethnic 
mobilisation of indigenous peoples. As once stated by my former profes-
sor, Professor Emeritus Robert Petersen, who personally took part in both 
the expedition and the subsequent development, it became clear during 
the political movements of the 1970s – and even before, as Inuit in Canada 
and Greenland began to visit each other in the late 1950s – that Greenland 
had not forgotten its part of the common Inuit cultural heritage (Tip of the 
Iceberg 2002). 
Following the initial exchanges between Inuit in Greenland and Cana-
da, Greenland became very active in the political movement leading to the 
creation of Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now Council) (ICC), in 1977 at 
the initiative of Inupiat in Northern Alaska who were struggling for recog-
nition of their land and resource rights in the Alaska Native Settlement Act 
of 1971 (See also Sambo Dorough 2010).  
In 1973, a group of mostly young Greenlandic intellectuals living in 
Denmark and their friends organised the Arctic Peoples’ Conference held 
at the Danish Parliament in Copenhagen with the participation of mostly 
Saami, Inuit and North American Indians. In 1975, the conference in Port 
Albany, Canada included representatives from Australia, New Zealand and 
South America thus making the indigenous peoples movement more glob-
al in scope. At this conference, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples 
came into being and was rapidly followed by other initiatives, which soon 
made indigenous peoples very well connected.  
For the Inuit, however, the ICC continued to be the most important in-
ternational indigenous peoples’ organisation (IPO). Since 1983, the ICC 
has held non-governmental organisation (NGO) consultative status within 
the United Nations ECOSOC and formed, together with the Saami Council, 
the so-called Arctic Caucus, which is an important and very creative inter-
national lobby within the UN.  
The Arctic Leaders’ Summits (ALS) from time to time gathered Arctic 
indigenous peoples in conferences and joint statements, starting with the 
meeting in Denmark immediately following the signing of the Declaration 
on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in Rovaniemi, 
Finland, in 1991. The objective of this first ALS meeting was to launch a 
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cooperative effort among Arctic indigenous peoples to discuss and identi-
fy solutions to common problems and challenges. The meeting resulted in 
the signing of a declaration of cooperation by the three participating or-
ganisations – the ICC, which hosted the conference, the Nordic Saami 
Council and the USSR Association of Northern Small Peoples, which is 
today known as the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North and Far East (RAIPON). The declaration urged governments to take 
decisive action in partnership with indigenous peoples to face the chal-
lenges of rapid global change and to provide adequate resources for Arctic 
indigenous peoples to meet their social, health, economic and educational 
needs. The Arctic States were also urged to support the Arctic indigenous 
peoples’ desire for self-determination (Fægteborg 1993). 
The ALSs became instrumental in promoting what is now Permanent 
Participant (PP) status in the Arctic Council as the three IPO’s at the meet-
ing decided to lobby for seats at the table with States. This goal was sub-
sequently achieved during the Danish-Greenlandic chairmanship of the 
AEPS (Thomsen 2006). Today the ALS seems to have been replaced by 
Inuit Leaders’ Summits, which are targeted more specifically on the situa-
tion of Inuit in the Arctic and have the strong support of the governments 
in the Arctic, whereas cooperation between Saami and Inuit continues in 
the UN through the Arctic Caucus, constituted by the Saami Council and 
the ICC, and between Arctic indigenous peoples more generally within the 
Arctic Council, with the assistance of the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat 
(IPS) located at the Greenland Representation body in Copenhagen.  
14.4 Inuit Hospitality and Partnership with Denmark 
Over the years, Greenland has hosted quite a number of conferences and 
expert meetings concerning the promotion and protection of the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Many activities have been sponsored jointly by Green-
land and Denmark, although Greenland has hosted a number of ICC Gen-
eral Assemblies on its own. The following examples are not exhaustive 
and do not include the many meetings and conferences held at Green-
land’s representation in Copenhagen and even in Brussels for easier ac-
cess, but these examples do provide an indication of how much focus 
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Greenland places on indigenous issues and on international solidarity 
with indigenous peoples. 
In 1991, Greenland hosted the UN Meeting of Experts on Self-
Government. The meeting, held in Nuuk, was the first expert meeting on 
indigenous peoples’ rights ever to be held outside the UN. The meeting re-
sulted in the Nuuk conclusions and recommendations on indigenous auton-
omy and self-government. The Nuuk conclusions predate the UNDRIP, but 
recommend that States consider the ratification of international instru-
ments of relevance to indigenous peoples, including the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and Convention No.169 of the International La-
bour Organisation (ILO) (See E/CN.4/1992/42). The Meeting of Experts 
further recommended to the commission on Human Rights the need to 
consider the possibility of establishing international monitoring mecha-
nisms to deal with indigenous peoples (See also Loukacheva 2010). 
In 1993, Greenland hosted the ministerial meeting of the AEPS and, as 
mentioned above, the three participating Arctic peoples’ organisations – 
the Saami Council, RAIPON, and the ICC were successful in getting seats at 
the negotiating table facilitated not least by the strong support of the Dan-
ish-Greenlandic Chairmanship. The foundation for the Permanent Partici-
pant (PP) status, which later became a centrepiece of AEPS’ successor, the 
Arctic Council, was thereby laid. The Arctic Council is a unique high-level 
intergovernmental forum for cooperation in the Arctic. It functions as a 
consensus forum in which Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations (IPO) 
are prominent and actively involved as PPs (Thomsen 2006). 
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From the beginning the ITCIP attracted significant political attention in 
Greenland and received both funding and in-kind support for a number of 
years until it was able to secure funding from other sources. Most sessions 
have been held in Greenland in either English or Spanish with indigenous 
participants – mainly youth – from Greenland and around the world. The 
political leadership of Greenland has always been willing to contribute 
their time and to share their experience of the HR and Self-Government 
processes for the benefit of both international and local students.  
The initiative has always been regarded as very important because, 
while the political leadership in Greenland has typically expressed self-
confidence with respect to their Inuit identity, young people have some-
times express uncertainty about their status or identity. Participation in 
the ITCIP training sessions has generally been an eye opener for the young 
participants and has helped them formulate questions and answers in this 
regard. For example, in 2005, Sara Olsvig, Member of the Danish Parlia-
ment for Greenland, upon participating in an ITCIP training session as a 
university student, posed the question: “Who are the indigenous?” and set 
out to answer the question herself based on her experience from the ITCIP 
In 1997, the Greenland-based International Training Center of Indigenous Peo-
ples, ITCIP was founded by former principal of the Greenland Teacher Training 
College and then Vice-President of ICC Greenland, Ingmar Egede with the partic-
ipation and support of a number of international and indigenous experts. The 
idea was to provide indigenous peoples with an understanding of the interna-
tional system and the tools needed to transform this knowledge into action at 
the community and international levels. A number of prominent international 
and indigenous experts and leaders have over the years been part of ITCIP, 
either as board members or as part of faculty and curriculum development, 
where the UNDRIP naturally has been one of the core documents. The UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as current and for-
mer members of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and many leaders of indigenous 
organisations is among those individuals who have contributed their time and 
expertise to the important cause. The Premier of Greenland, Kuupik V. Kleist was 
among the founding members. 
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training session and the input from fellow indigenous participants and 
instructors. Her questions and answers were published as articles in the 
national newspaper Atuagagdliutit and were responded to by another 
ITCIP student who had doubts about the particular nature of ethnicity and 
cultural heritage in this case. Questions were raised such as – given the 
nature of modern lifestyles and the resultant overall decline in health due 
to changing diet etc., how indigenous are we really? Yet, in spite of the 
doubt, the conclusion was that being indigenous means a lot in identity 
terms while it was acknowledged that this feeling will likely persist.  
While Greenland, together with Denmark, was instrumental in the es-
tablishment of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, it was also 
fortunate to be able to host the first pre-sessional meeting of the UNPFII in 
Nuuk in 2006. The pre-sessional meeting was a first of its kind with the 
initiative, perhaps surprisingly, picked up initially by China which was 
subsequently to be followed by others.  
The pre-sessional meeting was held in conjunction with a technical 
workshop titled: “A Workshop of the Permanent Forum of Indigenous 
Issues on Partnership Visions for The Second International Decade of the 
World’s Indigenous People,” (E/C.19/2006/4/Add.2) which was cospon-
sored by DANIDA, Greenland HR Government and the ICC. 
While in Greenland, the UNPFII members met with the Standing Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament of Greenland. An important 
result of this meeting was the decision to allow indigenous parliamentari-
ans to participate in the UNPFII meetings in a special category, so enabling 
them to participate outside their state delegations. This initiative now 
seems to have inspired, in a certain way, the preparatory process for the 
upcoming UN World Conference on Indigenous Peoples to be held in 2014.  
In 2007, Greenland’s National Museum and Archives (NKA) hosted a 
conference on the repatriation of cultural heritage. The conference title – 
“Utimut (the Greenlandic Inuit word for returning): Past Heritage – Future 
Partnerships. Discussions on Repatriation in the 21st Century” – referred 
to the very good cooperation and partnership between Denmark and 
Greenland with respect to the repatriation of cultural heritage. 
Successful partnerships of this nature are uncommon in most parts of 
the world where indigenous peoples have been deprived of their culture 
heritage. The UNDRIP therefore – for obvious reasons – includes key pro-
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visions on repatriation and cultural heritage, identity and identification. 
The conference proceedings were published jointly by NKA and IWGIA in 
2008 (Gabriel & Dahl eds. 2008). In 2010, Greenland once again hosted 
the ICC General Assembly (GA) when it was time for ICC Greenland to take 
over the position of international Chair, which so far has circulated be-
tween Alaska, Canada and Greenland. The ICC enjoys huge moral and fi-
nancial support from the Government and the Parliament of Greenland, 
which appoints representatives to the Greenland delegation. It is not un-
common that the Premier and a number of Cabinet Ministers participate 
actively in the GA both as speakers and in caucus meetings. At the 2010 
GA, the Premier of Greenland addressed the urgent need for economic 
development in Greenland, which would also entail large scale extractive 
and other industrial development. 
The most recent example of Greenland’s engagement in the ongoing 
implementation of the UNDRIP and indigenous peoples’ rights is the host-
ing of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Regional Preparatory Meeting for the 
above-mentioned World Conference (WCIP) to be held at the UN head-
quarters, New York, in 2014. This meeting of the Arctic Caucus was held in 
Nuuk in October 2012 and was co-hosted by the Saami Council, the ICC, 
the Sami Parliament of Norway and the Sami Parliamentary Council, Nuuk 
Municipality and the Government of Greenland. The purpose of the meet-
ing was to prepare and sign an Arctic declaration in preparation for the 
WCIP, which will have the overall goal of promoting further the full and 
effective implementation of the UNDRIP, in particular the right of self-
determination, but which is also seen as a venue to promote the full and 
effective participation of indigenous peoples within the UN. 
Prior to this meeting, the Government of Greenland had, together with 
the Sami Parliament of Norway and the International Work Group for Indig-
enous Affairs (IWGIA), co-hosted an international open-ended indigenous 
peoples’ brainstorming meeting in Copenhagen where an indigenous Global 
Coordinating Group (GCG) was established to help coordinate indigenous 
peoples’ contributions to and participation in the UN WCIP. The meeting 
also nominated an indigenous co-facilitator, John B. Henriksen, a Saami 
from Norway to assist the UN in coordinating and promoting the full and 
effective participation of indigenous peoples in all stages of the World Con-
ference. The meeting was opened by the Premier of Greenland Kuupik V. 
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Kleist, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Villy Søvndal and the UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya.  
It is the responsibility of the GCG to ensure that preparatory meetings 
are held in all of the seven regions of the world with the objective of feed-
ing into a global indigenous preparatory conference in Alta, Norway in 
June of 2013, which will be hosted by the Sami Parliament of Norway.  
14.5 Moving the Work to the United Nations 
Attempts by indigenous peoples to get their voices heard at the UN had 
been made much earlier, however it was only after indigenous peoples 
joined forces in the late 1970s that things began to happen. As noted previ-
ously, in 1982 the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) established the 
WGIP. Indigenous peoples were gradually given more space to participate in 
the meetings of the five WGIP experts, and in 1985 drafting of what eventu-
ally became the UNDRIP began. In 1986, the ILO began a parallel process of 
revising and updating ILO Convention No. 107 on Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations (1957) for the first time involving indigenous representatives 
as experts. This revision was concluded three years later by means of the 
adoption of ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples in Independent Countries (see www.leeswepston.net and ILO 2009).  
Along the way, other measures, designed to keep the promotion and 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights on the agenda internationally and 
within the UN system, were applied. The first International Year for the 
Worlds Indigenous People (Resolution 45/164) was a proclamation by the 
UNGA to be followed by the proclamation of an International Day 
(49/214) for the Worlds Indigenous People to be celebrated annually on 9 
August in recognition of the first WGIP meeting in Geneva. In addition, two 
consecutive decades were dedicated to the world’s indigenous peoples. 
The first decade from 1995 to 2004 under the theme – “Indigenous peo-
ple: partnership in action” – was proclaimed in a resolution by the UNGA 
in 1993 (48/163 of 21 December 1993) and coordinated by the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The second and current decade, from 
2005 to 2014, under the theme – “Partnership for action and dignity” – is 
being coordinated by the Under-Secretary-General of Economic and Social 
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Affairs (resolution 59/174). The goals of the decades have been to further 
strengthen international cooperation with a view to solving the problems 
faced by indigenous peoples in areas such as culture, education, health, 
human rights, the environment, and social and economic development 
(See www.IWGIA.org). There is no doubt that all of these actions by the 
UN for the benefit of indigenous peoples, and the resulting diverse range 
of international bodies, mechanisms and experts have each served to pro-
gress the negotiations and the eventual adoption of the UNDRIP in the 
Human Rights Council (HRC) and the GA in 2007 after the more than 20 
years hard work carried out by numerous indigenous and human rights 
experts and governments. As noted previously, in 2000, the CHR adopted 
a resolution to establish the UNPFII that was endorsed by the ECOSOC. 
UNPFII’s mandate is to discuss indigenous issues related to culture, eco-
nomic and social development, education, the environment, health and 
human rights. The UNPFII had a Danish member (Professor Ida Nico-
laisen) from 2002 to 2007 and a Greenlandic member (President of ICC, 
Aqqaluk Lynge) from 2004 to 2007. 
In 2001, the CHR decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur on the situa-
tion of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, 
as part of the system of thematic Special Procedures. The Special Rappor-
teur’s mandate was renewed by the CHR in 2004 and again by the HRC in 
2010, where the name was modernised to Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples. 
In 2008, the HRC established the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) as an advisory body to the HRC. The Expert 
Mechanism provides expert studies and thematic advice to the HRC and 
works closely together with the Permanent Forum and the Special Rap-
porteur, using the UNDRIP as the principle framework for promoting the 
implementation of the rights of indigenous peoples in conjunction with 
the other international human rights instruments. 
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14.6 The Role of Greenland 
Very soon after the introduction of Home Rule, Greenland became actively 
involved in the drafting of the UNDRIP as well as in the revision and up-
date of 1957 ILO Convention No. 107. In 1996, at the request of Greenland, 
Denmark ratified the ILO Convention No. 169, while at the same time 
submitting a joint declaration, co-signed by Denmark and Greenland, stat-
ing that: “There is only one indigenous people in Denmark in the sense of 
the Convention 169, viz the original population of Greenland, the Inuit.” 
(“Bekendtgørelse nr. 97 af 9. oktober 1997” – in English and Danish). 
The proposal to ratify ILO Convention No. 169 was introduced to the 
Danish Parliament by the Greenland member, Hans Pavia Rosing (former 
President of the ICC). It very symbolically coincided with the UN inaugura-
tion, in New York, of the first International Decade of the World’s Indige-
nous People which was attended by the Premier of Greenland. It was gener-
ally recognised at the time that Greenland had achieved a reasonable politi-
cal status in the HR arrangement and therefore did not need the protection 
of ILO Convention No. 169, but was interested in creating a good example to 
the world by way of early ratification. Denmark and Greenland subsequent-
ly jointly promoted the implementation of ILO Convention No. 169 by 
providing funding and experts. When, in 2003, Greenland for the second 
time established an all Greenland Commission on Self-Governance to pre-
pare a proposal for the transfer of more powers, it was decided to deal more 
specifically with indigenous peoples, among others, in a separate working 
group on foreign policy and security issues. Then in the Executive Summary 
it was stated that: “The majority of Greenland’s population is part of the 
Arctic Inuit Culture. This gives Greenland a special obligation and a special 
starting point for the global discussion on how to secure the original inhab-
itants’ human rights in relation to the national states in which they live” 
(Executive Summary 2003). The UN and the PFII, as well as the Inuit territo-
ries in Canada were also specifically mentioned in relation to assessing the 
possibility of a (new) Greenland Representation in North America. Green-
land had a representation in Ottawa from 1998–2002. 
During the two decades of drafting and negotiating of the UNDRIP, regu-
lar updates and progress rapports were given to the Greenland political 
leadership and the general public. The ICC, as well as the government, is-
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sued press releases on meeting results and when comprehensive reporting 
on foreign affairs to the Parliament of Greenland was introduced in 1993, 
reporting on the UNDRIP process became a standing item. The Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Security Issues had been established by law in 1988.  
Greenland had a strong voice and a message to share in this debate be-
cause of the extensive level of self-government it had already achieved 
within the context of HR and thus quickly became a “role model” or exam-
ple of good practice. Over time the political leaders of Greenland actively 
supported the process of the Draft Declaration and other initiatives to 
promote indigenous rights by participating in UN meetings and by firmly 
addressing the issues at numerous venues and to various high-level audi-
ences. Greenland has, in addition, contributed to the UN with the services 
of various experts over the years.  
This good cooperation partnership between Denmark and Greenland 
was frequently showcased to the world in the form of information tools, 
development programmes and strategies of support to indigenous peoples 
worldwide. In 1994, Denmark launched the first “Strategy for Danish Sup-
port to Indigenous Peoples” in partnership with Greenland. This has been a 
great success and a source of inspiration for other UN member states (Dani-
da 1994). The Strategy was revised in 2004 after a review by a team of in-
digenous experts (Danida 2004) and was again the object of further review 
in 2011 (Danida 2011), where the Premier of Greenland together with the 
Danish Minister for Development Cooperation hosted an international sem-
inar at the Greenland Representation in Copenhagen to discuss – based on 
the review – the way forward in terms of ensuring that the right support 
reaches the right peoples. One of the main recommendations of the review 
report was to support the implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights at 
the country level via the UN Indigenous Peoples’ Partnership (UNIPP), a 
cooperation initiative between five UN agencies aimed at local and regional 
capacity building. UNIPP was launched in New York in 2011 on the margins 
of the 10th session of the UNPFII (see www.ohchr.org). 
The joint push for the establishment of various UN mandates for the pro-
motion of indigenous peoples’ rights, which took place in parallel with the 
UNDRIP negotiations, notably the Permanent Forum and the Special Rappor-
teur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, together with a number of initiatives 
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concerning special programmes and development aid to indigenous peoples, 
are very much indicative of a successful partnership in action. 
There are many other examples, such as the UN World Conferences on 
Sustainable Development, including the recent Rio+20, where Greenland 
and Denmark jointly played an important role in promoting indigenous 
peoples’ rights. In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Agenda 21 conference 
acknowledged the rights of indigenous peoples, in Johannesburg in 2002, 
Denmark and Greenland, together with indigenous peoples, launched a 
“Partnership Initiative,” and again in Rio in 2012, where support for in-
digenous peoples’ rights and their role in sustainable development were 
issues, yet again, this was actively promoted. As recently stated by the 
Premier, Greenland’s commitment to supporting indigenous rights inter-
nationally is, in respect of the support and constructive input from indige-
nous peoples and friends around the world, based on the clear belief that 
Greenland has benefitted from this in its own development. The Govern-
ment is of the view that it is only possible to ensure sustainable develop-
ment globally when indigenous peoples’ rights are respected so that all 
the peoples of the world can work together as equal partners (Kleist 2012 
– AG 20 June). As noted previously, one of the first actions of the Premier 
of Greenland following the inauguration of Self-Government was to travel 
to Geneva to address the EMRIP on the new developments in Greenland 
and on the relationship between Denmark and Greenland, which he hoped 
would be an inspiration to others (Kleist 2009). The message was well 
received and responded to both by EMRIP and others. At the press confer-
ence following the commemoration of the 5th anniversary of UNDRIP in 
2012, the Chair of the Permanent Forum, Grand Chief Ed John took the 
opportunity to acknowledge the valuable contribution made by Denmark 
and Greenland and praised the Greenland Self-Government as a good ex-
ample of the substantive implementation of self-determination. One of the 
central notions animating the recent Greenlandic Self-Government negoti-
ations was that “rights come with responsibilities.” This notion fits very 
well with the commitment to the UN shown by Greenland so far. Despite 
its limited resources Greenland has placed a high priority on fulfilling its 
obligations with respect to reporting to UN treaty bodies, and as regards 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process. This can be explained by the 
fact that both at the political level and in the general public there is a 
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strong sense of responsibility towards, but also confidence in, the UN. In 
Greenland’s contribution to the Danish UPR report of 2011, it is stated 
that: “The Government strongly endorses the UNDRIP. While the estab-
lishment of the Self-Government arrangement is an illustration of Den-
mark’s de facto implementation of the UNDRIP vis-á-vis Greenland, the 
Government strives to implement important provisions of the UNDRIP in 
its day to day work, although the government is categorised as a public 
rather than an indigenous government” (A/HRC/WG.6/11/DNK/1). 
14.7 Increasing Focus on Human Rights 
Greenland has a tradition of celebrating just about every UN-designated 
day and has a strong focus on human rights and international aid, which 
has inspired several initiatives, including the recent decision to establish a 
human rights council in Greenland. 
On 15 November 2012, the Parliament of Greenland unanimously adopted 
a parliamentary act providing for the establishment of a human rights council 
in Greenland (Inatsisartutlov nr. 23 af 3. december 2012). The Greenland 
Human Rights Council will cooperate with the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights – Denmark’s National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). 
The initiative is based on a decision in principle from 2008, where the 
Parliament of Greenland had requested the Government to investigate the 
possibility of setting up a Centre for Human Rights and International Stud-
ies similar to the Institute in Denmark. The motivation for the request was 
clearly inspired by the ICC and the ongoing negotiations at the UN on the 
UNDRIP. However, owing to the change of government and the introduc-
tion of Greenland Self-Government in 2009, the decision had never been 
executed despite much support for the issue in the Cabinet. The estab-
lishment of a human rights council is a first step towards enhancing 
Greenland’s capacity in this field throughout its society. Even though it has 
been the ICC in the main that had pushed for action in the human rights 
area and had begun to take steps to establish something of its own, inspi-
ration also came from the preparations made for the first UPR of the King-
dom of Denmark by the Human Rights Council. Public hearings were held 
in Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, where it became clear that 
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there was an overwhelming interest in contributing substantively to the 
report. In Greenland, a wide variety of civil society organisations and oth-
er interested parties provided input to the hearing organised jointly by 
the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the Government of Greenland. Many references were made to 
the UNDRIP, which however were subsequently minimised due to the 
very limited format permitted for the UPR report.  
The Act on the Greenland Human Rights Council does not specifically 
make reference to the UNDRIP, however, during the introduction of and 
subsequent debate on the legislation in the Parliament of Greenland, the 
rights of indigenous peoples played a significant role with frequent refer-
ences made to the UNDRIP. (www.inatsisartut.gl) 
14.8 Framing the Issues 
The UNDRIP is thus gaining more and more support and recognition as 
the universal tool for the promotion and protection of indigenous peoples 
and now plays an increasingly important role in terms of identifying and 
addressing issues of concern, not only for indigenous peoples, but also for 
a wider range of interest groups including NGOs, (educational) institu-
tions, agencies, and governments. Since its adoption six years ago, it has 
succeeded in attracting significant levels of attention and has been recog-
nised as the international instrument or framework with which to define, 
explain and claim rights. Compared to ILO Convention No. 169, the 
UNDRIP quickly attracted much greater level of awareness and legitimacy 
in Greenland. This is probably due to the very substantial and decisive 
contribution of indigenous peoples to the drafting and negotiation of 
UNDRIP, which is now being fed into a multitude of international process-
es, even though setbacks and resistance among some states are still being 
experienced. In all of the activities in respect of the UN mandates on indig-
enous peoples rights, the UNDRIP constitutes the primary basis for action 
as regards implementation internationally and on the ground. Upon the 
adoption of the UNDRIP, the Arctic indigenous peoples, in a statement of 
the Arctic Region, noted that the UNDRIP goes much further than other 
similar human rights instruments – including the ILO Convention No. 169 
258 Polar Law Textbook II 
– in recognising indigenous peoples’ rights, though they continue to call 
for states to ratify the ILO Convention.  
It is then as if ILO Convention No. 169 has been placed on the back burn-
er so as not to interfere with the UNDRIP process. In the joint Strategy for 
the Arctic 2011–2020 the UNDRIP is included as an action point for Green-
land and Denmark, whereas ILO Convention No. 169 is not. This must how-
ever be seen as something of an omission, because Denmark and Greenland 
have both in fact invested substantially in its implementation on the ground 
through financial support and as regards expertise given to the ILO – pri-
marily in support of the UNIPP. The ICC also makes frequent reference to 
state obligations in the convention, in particular with respect to assisting 
indigenous peoples in cooperating across borders, including activities in the 
economic, social, cultural, spiritual and environmental fields (Art.32). 
In Greenland, the UNDRIP was translated into Greenlandic and Danish 
immediately after its adoption by the UNGA and distributed widely in both 
Greenland and Denmark. It was also posted on the official websites of the 
Government and the UNPFII. Where any mention of the UNDRIP was pre-
viously linked, in the main, with the notion of solidarity and of Greenland’s 
responsibilities towards indigenous peoples elsewhere, it has now be-
come a key instrument in the Parliament of Greenland with respect to 
raising critical (human) rights issues with the government and in parlia-
mentary debates, in particular with respect to land and resource rights. At 
the same time, it also serves, in many situations, as a positive measure for 
progress and success in the realisation of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
14.9 Debating UNDRIP in Parliament 
In 2006, a written question to the Cabinet (§36, 1 of 13 December) con-
cerned the possible implications of the delay in getting the draft UNDRIP 
adopted by the UNGA and what means and resources the government 
would contribute towards this goal. Implicit in the questions was the fear 
that further delay implied the risk that the text would be diluted. In 2008 
(§36, 1 of 15 February), a written question to the Cabinet concerned what 
actions the government was prepared to take in order to try to make Aus-
tralia endorse the UNDRIP. The questions were clearly inspired by the 
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official apology by the Australian Prime Minister concerning the so-called 
stolen generation of Australian Aborigines.  
In a parliamentary debate on oral questions in 2008 (FM2008/118 § 
35), the overall question concerned what policy and goals the government 
and the political parties in the parliament had in terms of getting the best 
possible outcome in terms of the Declaration. A series of questions con-
cerned issues such as the government’s vision for continuing cooperation 
between Greenland and Denmark with respect to implementing the 
UNDRIP and its vision for the dissemination of information and educa-
tional material to educational facilities at all levels. 
The key explanation for the above request in this case was twofold: 
Firstly, it was stated that it was important to make national identity, cul-
tural heritage, and internationally protected rights the basis for the con-
trol of our resources. Secondly, the urgency of the matter was emphasised 
because the UNDRIP is important not only to Greenland but to the world 
as a whole and that it brings hope for peace and fundamental freedoms 
and justice to peoples globally.  
Finally, questions were posed in relation to future plans to push for the 
elevation of UNDRIP to a convention so as to make it legally binding, plans 
for further deliberations on the implementation of UNDRIP and a request 
for an annual parliamentary debate on the issue. 
In 2008, (EM2008/80) in response to a report by the Minister for Infra-
structure entitled, The Environment and Mineral Resources regarding the so-
cio-cultural aspects of exploration and the extraction of uranium, reference 
was made to UNDRIP with respect to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
in terms of ensuring indigenous peoples access to information from experts. 
To emphasise the continued opposition to uranium mining it was proposed to 
invite representatives of indigenous peoples in North America and Australia 
to Greenland in order to share their experiences with the impact of uranium 
mining on human health and living conditions.  
In a parliamentary debate in 2011 (EM2011/63 §36) the key message or 
question was whether the UNDRIP should be made legally binding (in 
Greenland), similar to an earlier question about converting it into a conven-
tion. The argument was that implementation of self-determination is still 
incomplete owing to the lack of funding in areas pertaining to three core 
provisions of the UNDRIP, which, it was argued, are not implemented in 
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Greenland. The articles concerned are: numbers 19, 27 and 30 concerning 
FPIC, respect for ownership of land and resources and military presence on 
indigenous peoples’ lands and territories. 
The Government, in its reply, noted that even if the UNDRIP is not a le-
gally binding convention, it nevertheless provides inspiration and guid-
ance in respect of cooperation and partnership between states and indig-
enous peoples. In the context of Greenland, Self-Government is in itself an 
example of the implementation of the provisions and rights contained in 
the UNDRIP. The most important being the right to self-determination, the 
right to lands, territories and resources, and the right, as peoples and as 
individuals, to control one’s own development.  
In 2012, in a written question to the Cabinet (§37, 1 No. 010, 9 Janu-
ary) the issue raised was what actions were intended at governmental 
level in the Kingdom of Denmark with respect to the EU import ban on 
sealskin, which had – in an open letter to the Cabinet – been claimed to be 
in breach of Articles 3, 5, 8, 20, 32 and Art. 46 of the UNDRIP by the Green-
land Hunter’s and Fishermen’s Association, (KNAPK). 
The government in its reply referred back to an earlier reply 
(EM/2011/63) in which it was stated that both previous parliaments and 
governments have endorsed the UNDRIP and its good intensions concern-
ing cooperation and partnership between states and indigenous peoples. 
With the recognition of Greenland’s right to self-determination in the Act 
on Greenlandic Self-Government, the government finds that there is ample 
opportunity to actively apply the good principles for cooperation which 
the UNDRIP represents. 
It was stressed that responsibility for the management of living re-
sources in Greenland rests with the Self-Government and that this is exer-
cised in close cooperation with hunters and fishermen through the KNAPK 
and based on scientific advice from the Greenland Institute of Natural 
Resources and regional and from other international management bodies.  
Despite unsuccessful efforts to avoid the EU adopting an import and 
trade ban, Greenland has, in cooperation with Denmark, succeeded in 
achieving a so-called Inuit exemption, which also recognises indigenous 
peoples’ right to hunt seals. The government therefore urged the parties 
to use the opportunity constructively to market and sell the unique seal-
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skin products both in the EU and globally and expressed its continued 
support for sustainable sealskin production in Greenland.   
Although UNDRIP and its provisions are not at the forefront of every 
meeting or debate, it always seems to create a certain atmosphere of unity 
in the Parliament of Greenland. Questions and debates on the UNDRIP 
tend to be connected with certain issues or activities, including of course 
the foreign affairs reports, which regularly contain updates on the various 
indigenous peoples’ rights processes.  
Another item of huge importance is language and cultural identity, 
which is also often linked to key provisions of the UNDRIP.  
14.10 Language and Cultural Identity in Greenland 
In a statement to members of the Nordic Language Commission at a meet-
ing held in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2011, the Minister for Family, Culture 
and the Church, (Mimi Karlsen) emphasised, not only the recognition of 
the Greenland people in a legal sense, referring to the fact that the Act on 
Greenland Self-Government specifically states the recognition of the 
Greenland people under international law and thereby confirms the right 
of self-determination, but also stressed the fact that Greenlandic has been 
recognised as the official language of Greenland. In Kleist’s view the rea-
son for this is, according to the explanatory notes to the Self-Government 
Act (2010), that language is part of the Greenlandic people’s cultural iden-
tity. There are an estimated 50,000 speakers of Greenlandic in Greenland 
and Greenlandic is the primary language of Parliament with simultaneous 
interpretation to or from Danish. 
In a very comprehensive statement, the minister addressed the UN 
adoption of the UNDRIP, including language rights, and related it to the 
former colonial situation, the historical development of language usage in 
Greenland, and the efforts required to retain Greenlandic, which is part of 
the Inuit languages family.  
As one of its first actions following the inauguration of the Greenland 
Self-Government, the Parliament of Greenland adopted a new Act on Lan-
guage Policy (Inatsisartutlov nr. 7 af 19. maj 2010), in which ethnicity is 
clearly outlined (in the explanatory notes to the Act) in connection with 
262 Polar Law Textbook II 
the mapping of the indigenous language and dialects of Greenland. Hence, 
the Act establishes that Greenlandic consists of three major Inuit dialects 
spoken in North Greenland (Avanersuaq), East Greenland (Tunu) and 
West Greenland (Kitaa). There is one written Greenlandic language, de-
rived from but not identical to the Central West Greenlandic dialect, which 
has become the standard language. One of the objectives of the Act is to 
promote language integration and the strengthening of community and 
identity by providing the framework for language training, in order to 
eliminate various language barriers in the society, which are also per-
ceived as barriers to cultural and social integration. The government is 
already preparing legislative changes to the Act in order to further 
strengthen public use of Greenlandic.  
The emphasis on language and culture in Greenland is generally very 
strong. So when the Bishop of Greenland, Sofie Petersen was elected as a 
member of the central committee of the World Council of Churches in 
2006, her mission was to fight for the retention of indigenous languages as 
bearers of culture and identity: “By speaking the indigenous peoples’ 
cause, I express a sister-solidarity that can contribute to preserving local 
language and identity” (Schultz-Lorentzen 2006). The reasoning behind 
this initiative was that the church has an obligation to supplement the 
work in the UN in support of indigenous peoples’ rights. In Greenland, the 
church is Greenlandic and has a long tradition of using the Inuit language, 
both orally and in writing. 
Another illustration of the high regard held for the Greenlandic lan-
guage and culture is the emotional commentary by Gerhard Petersen 
leader of the Atassut party, which has otherwise traditionally been the 
most pro-Denmark party, in response to a debate in Denmark with respect 
to the Self-Government arrangement on oil and mineral resources. Under 
the heading, “The objective is independence,” he stated that: “Our task is 
to make our country Greenlandic – a society which puts the competencies 
of the citizens to use, where they exist. And not like today where the socie-
ty does not even regard our language and our cultural identity a compe-
tency” (Petersen 2012). 
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14.11 Conclusion 
As has been shown, the many parallel and overlapping processes interna-
tionally, and in Greenland and Denmark, have contributed both positively 
and constructively to the adoption of the UNDRIP and to its implementation 
on the ground both at home and abroad. There is no doubt that the UNDRIP 
is increasingly becoming a source of inspiration in Greenland. The govern-
ment strongly endorses the UNDRIP and the general public is becoming 
increasingly aware of the Declaration and its potential in relation to a varie-
ty of situations and issues. In some instances, growing awareness of the 
UNDRIP as well as a focus on its possible application has, as illustrated by 
the debate between the ICC and the Self-Government Commission Secretar-
iat, sparked some discussion and highlighted existing differences of opinion, 
owing to the nature of the Greenland Self-Government. Generally, however, 
there is in the general public a widespread understanding and acknowl-
edgement of its applicability, which is used with a certain amount of con-
structive ambiguity.  
A pragmatic approach taken by the Government of Greenland to the 
fact that it is a public government rather than an indigenous government 
has frequently been to downplay or simply ignore the fact, both in the 
media and in Parliament, when it makes more sense to focus on indige-
nous peoples’ rights. On the one hand, such an approach probably only 
works because a large majority of Greenland’s population is of Inuit de-
scent, which again is reflected in the composition of both the Cabinet and 
the Parliament. On the other hand, we also see examples of non-
indigenous civil society organisations, which are becoming increasingly 
inspired by, and make numerous references to, specific provisions of the 
UNDRIP in order to underscore the legitimacy of their claims. The overall 
impression is that there is a genuine sympathy for indigenous peoples in 
the society and for promoting their rights, as expressed in international 
instruments such as the UNDRIP. 
Overall, both Greenland and indigenous peoples in general have bene-
fitted from the dedication shown to international cooperation and to the 
rights of indigenous peoples, as this approach has undoubtedly helped to 
contribute to the shaping and defining of some legitimate actions in terms 
of both domestic and foreign affairs. Indigenous peoples in general have 
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also benefitted from the strong support that Denmark, together with 
Greenland, has channelled into the promotion of the rights of indigenous 
peoples internationally. It is no accident that Greenland has acceded to or 
endorsed a number of international human rights instruments and some 
of these have been published in Greenlandic, including: the UN Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights; the ICECSR; the ICCPR; the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child; ILO Convention No.169, and the UNDRIP. 
It will, moreover, be interesting to follow how the UNDRIP will be per-
ceived in Greenland in future if and when major changes occur in society 
owing to growing economic development based on extractive industries. For 
now, it has been noticeable how UNDRIP and indigenous peoples’ rights have 
popped up more frequently during the debates on large scale industrial de-
velopment related to the extractive industries. People from different walks of 
life clearly want decisions to be taken in democratic ways, which includes the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making based on self-determination 
and the principle of free, prior and informed consent. 
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Questions 
 How important is it for Greenland whether or not the UNDRIP is legally 
binding? 
 What are the most important provisions of the UNDRIP? Explain why 
this is. 
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 Is the UNDRIP principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent – in your 
opinion – implemented with the (Act on) Greenland Self-Government? 
 What would be the most relevant indicators for full and effective 
implementation? 
 What does full and effective participation mean? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Sámi Rights and Sámi Law 
in Norway 
Øyvind Ravna 
15.1 Introduction 
15.1.1 The Sámi People  
The Sámi people live in the northern and central parts of Norway, Sweden 
and Finland, and on the Kola Peninsula in the Russian Federation, which 
in Sámi language is named Sápmi (Sámi land).They number in total 
around 50,000–80,000 people who earn their income from both marine 
and terrestrial livelihoods such as reindeer husbandry, agriculture indus-
tries and coastal fishing.  
The Sámi can trace their roots in Northern Scandinavia back more than 
two thousand years. The Sámi are currently recognised as an indigenous 
people in Norway and as one of the two nations the Norwegian State is 
grounded on. This means that Norway is obliged to protect the Sámi lan-
guage, culture and way of life. Norway is also obliged to identify and recog-
nise the traditional Sámi lands, which the country has acknowledged by 
giving the Sámi constitutional protection and by ratifying ILO No. 169 Con-
vention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
(ILO-169).  
In Finland, Sweden and Russia the Sámi have, to varying degrees, 
achieved the legal protection of their language, culture and livelihoods, 
but as an ethnic minority rather than as an indigenous people (none of 
these countries have ratified ILO-169). This chapter is limited, however, to 
the situation in Norway and explores the concept of Sámi law and Sámi 
legal status in that country.  
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15.1.2 The Concept of Sámi Law  
Sámi law can be understood as an academic or legal discipline which includes 
the rules of law aimed at the protection of the Sámi language and culture. The 
interpreting of culture shows that it also includes the rights to land and natu-
ral resources as well as the capacity to maintain traditional livelihoods. Sámi 
Law may also include those parts of Norwegian law where the cultural differ-
ences between the Sámi and the majority society implies that the law works 
differently (Skogvang 2009:25).  
Another way to determine Sámi law as a legal discipline is to define it as 
rules of law that contribute to the definition of Sámi legal positions (Sámi 
Rights Committee in NOU 1984: 18), which can be understood as rules regu-
lating and protecting Sámi rights.  
Sámi law can also be understood as Sami internal lawgiving, e.g., unwrit-
ten rules rooted in Sámi culture. Those rules are Sámi customary law and 
practices, including legal opinions, aimed to regulate the relations and use of 
natural resources etc., between the members of Sámi societies, but also in 
relation to outsiders.  
If we include customs, legal opinions, legal thinking and application of the 
law, both formal and informal, this concept can be referred to as Sámi legal 
culture (Ravna 2010:149).  
There are three sets of norm structures or legal systems that form the 
framework of the Sámi Law (Skogvang 2009:45). Firstly, it is national legisla-
tion, which in turn can be divided into constitutional law, other areas of statu-
tory law and case law. Secondly, it is international law, where the Internation-
al (UN) Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) and ILO-169 
are the key instruments. Thirdly, it is the Sámi’s law and legal culture. In the 
wake of international law, Sámi legal practices were afforded increased legal 
status in Norwegian law as a source of law to be used in courts.  
The aim of this chapter is to review the rules concerning the legal protec-
tion of the Sámi as an indigenous people and minority in Norway. This will be 
undertaken with reference to the three legal systems mentioned above, in-
cluding Sámi customary law and legal culture. The struggle by the Sámi for the 
recognition of their rights to their lands and waters has been central in the 
development of the Sámi legal position. This part of the Sámi law, both as an 
academic discipline and as internal Sami law, will naturally be given a central 
place in our analysis. 
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15.2 Legal Developments Regarding Sámi in Norway 
15.2.1 Introduction 
The protection of Sámi culture and their legal rights has undergone signif-
icant change over the past three decades. If we go back to the 1970s, the 
matter of Sámi rights was centred on questions as to whether the so called 
Sámi-speaking Norwegian population should have the right to be educat-
ed in their own language. Even in the 1980s few people assumed that the 
Sámi were entitled to legal protection as an indigenous people while even 
the importance of their protected status as a minority in Norway was 
highly controversial (Gauslaa 2007:152).  
A significant change in the legal situation was triggered by the contro-
versy over the construction of the Alta-Kautokeino hydro power plant 
around 1980. This undoubtedly led to the emergence of a new perspective 
on the Sámi’s legal status and position, which was reflected in the political 
changes in the state’s Sámi Policy in the following years. 
This ultimately resulted in the abolition of a doctrine which was an 
important part of existing land law, and confirming that the Norwegian 
State was the owner of the land in Finnmark County without considera-
tion for private usage or commonage rights of any kind.  
Subsequently, these major legal advances implied a policy in which the 
Norwegian Parliament acknowledged that the Sámi are an indigenous 
people. The Sámi are thus entitled to the legal protection of their language, 
culture and way of life. This acknowledgement has also resulted in the fact 
that Norway was the first country to ratify ILO Convention No. 169, in 
1990, which posed an obligation on Norway to identify Sámi lands and 
recognise the rights of ownership and possession over the lands the Sámi 
have traditionally occupied. By adopting the 2005 Finnmark Act, state 
ownership of the outlying fields and mountainous areas in Finnmark 
County was transferred to local governance, overseen in part by the Sámi 
Parliament, as an element of that recognition process. 
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Norway’s minority policy and legal developments with respect to the 
Sámi in general, and in relation to the Finnmark Act in particular, are, 
moreover, considered to be pioneering by the UN special rapporteur on 
indigenous rights S. James Anaya in his 2011 report on the situation of the 
Sámi in the Nordic Countries, where it is stated:  
“The Finnmark Act provides important protection for the development of 
Sámi rights to self-determination and control over natural resources at 
the local level, and thus forms an important example for the other Nordic 
countries” (para. 44).  
Even if problems remain in respect of relations between the Sámi and the 
Norwegian State, e.g., over the right to fish in coastal areas (NOU 2008:5), 
and over the legal development and current legal status of Sámi (including 
consideration of their legal culture in Norway), the resolution of such 
issues in itself functions as an important learning process. 
15.2.2 National Legislation 
Legal Developments during the Post-war Period 
Despite the fact that little focus was placed on the question of the Sámi as 
an indigenous people before the 1980s, it is clear that the political will to 
recognise Sámi language and culture dates as far back as the 1950s, as 
seen in the wider context of the general development of human rights 
internationally after the Second World War. Step by step the Sámi were 
gaining better protection for their language and culture. However, in 1978 
the Norwegian parliament decided to construct the Alta-Kautokeino hydro 
power plant by damming one of the main rivers in the Sámi areas. This 
placed the ongoing debate over Sámi rights to lands and waters squarely 
at the centre of the national agenda and showed that post-war policy was, 
despite the rhetoric, worth little when it came to practical governance and 
the exploitation of valuable natural resources. After large-scale police 
actions to remove the Sámi and environmental activists, construction 
finally began in 1979.  
Although the protesters did not manage to stop the power plant con-
struction, it was a turning point in Norway’s acknowledgement of its legal 
commitments to the Sámi people. It was also a key point in the Sámi 
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struggle for their rights to enjoy their culture and language, including 
rights to lands and waters. In the autumn of 1980, as a consequence of the 
political tumult arising during the Alta Case, the Nordli Government had to 
establish the Sámi Rights Committee (SRC). The Committee was given a 
mandate in four points where the first two were to examine: 1) the ques-
tion of the Sámi people’s legal position as regards the right to land and 
water; and 2) to ensure the Sámi people’s ability to develop natural re-
sources in their areas of habitation, while also recognising the non-Sámi 
populations interests (NOU 1984:18 pp. 42–43).The appointment of the 
SRC proved to be the starting point for a legislative process that resulted 
in the legal protection of the Sámi language, culture and way of life 
through a constitutional clause (1988), the establishment of the Sámi 
Parliament (1989) and the ratification of ILO Convention No. 169 (1990). 
The second investigation report of the SRC, published in the NOU 1997:4, 
was the first major step in the process leading to the adoption of the 
landmark Finnmark Act in 2005 (see section 15.2.3 below). This develop-
ment is particularly important in terms of gaining an understanding of the 
process that led to Sámi rights to land and natural resources being pro-
tected in Norway. 
The Sámi’s legal position has been strengthened through legislation 
and new policy, but it has also been further advanced by developments in 
case law. It has, for instance, led to the recognition of reindeer herders’ 
grazing rights; rights that are rooted in the immemorial usage of lands by 
the Sámi (and not just based on legislation alone). Although it has its basis 
in law, the courts have also held that landowners have the burden of proof 
if they want to claim that there are no reindeer husbandry rights on their 
properties within the Sámi reindeer husbandry areas. This has had an 
impact on the legal protection of such rights as in the renowned Selbu 
Case (2001) to which I will return in section 15.2.4.  
Constitutional Law and Sámi Rights 
Article 110a of the Norwegian Constitution protects Sámi language, cul-
ture and livelihood, and reads as follows: 
“It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions 
enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture and 
way of life.” 
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This article was adopted by Parliament on 21 April 1988 and followed by 
a constitutional amendment in May of the same year. The article is based 
on a 1984 proposal from the SRC with one of its main objectives being to 
overturn past assimilation and “Norwegianisation” policies. According to 
the SRC, it put in place a legal obligation saying that Sámi language, culture 
and way of life must be safeguarded and given further development: 
“State authorities will therefore have no legal right to pursue a policy in 
conflict with this principle. The provision sets the requirements for both 
legislation and other government actions” (NOU 1984:18, p. 433). 
It should also be noted here that the Parliamentary Standing Foreign and 
Constitutional Committee stated that with the adoption of the provision, 
the Parliament: 
“In the most solemn and binding form our legal system knows, recognised 
and drawn the consequences of the fact that throughout the history of 
Norway, there has been a particular Sami ethnic group in our country 
(Innst. S. nr. 147 (1997–88), 2).”  
The Constitutional provision is modelled on Art. 27 of the ICCPR. This means 
that the provision must be interpreted in accordance with the “requirements 
of international law to the Norwegian authorities” (SRC II in NOU 2007:13, p. 
191). Thus, the provision creates a legal obligation for the Norwegian authori-
ties in the formulation and implementation of the country’s Sámi policy and 
other issues of importance to the Sámi. 
There is little case law relating to Art. 110a. However, Norwegian Sámi 
politics show that this article has had repercussions beyond its political and 
moral significance alone, including, for instance, the impact it had in acting (in 
2004) as the basis for the establishment of the Sis-Finnmárkku Diggigod-
di/Inner Finnmark District Court, with Sámi-speaking judges and a special 
responsibility to safeguard Sámi customary law (NOU 1999:22, p. 72). 
This commitment has not however been adhered to in all instances 
(Ravna 2009). Admission of this reality did however contribute to the estab-
lishment, by the Courts Administration in 2010, of a working group to study 
“The Sámi dimension of the judiciary.” The report produced by this group 
suggested that, based on the obligation contained in Art.110a, “the Courts of 
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law have a responsibility to safeguard the interests of the Sámi legal tradi-
tions and Sámi customary laws” (Domstoladministrasjonen 2010:21). 
15.2.3 Other National Legislation on Sámi Issues 
This section analyses some of the most important laws that specify and 
apply the notion of constitutional protection while highlighting Norway’s 
international obligations to protect the Sámi culture, language and rights 
to lands and waters. 
The Sámi Act (12 June 1987 no. 56) aims “to facilitate that the Sámi 
people in Norway can maintain and develop their language, culture and 
way of life” (s. 1–1). It is thus complementary to Art. 110a of the Constitu-
tion. Section 1–2 provides for the establishment of the Sámi Parliament, 
which is further regulated in Ch. 2. Chapter 3 deals with the Sámi lan-
guages. Among other things, it determines that “acts and regulations with 
particular interest for the Sámi population shall be translated into Sámi 
language” (s. 3–2). The chapter also contains rules on the extended right 
to use Sámi language in the courts (s. 3–4) and in the health and social 
services (s. 3–5). There are also rules on the right to have a paid leave of 
absence for education and training in the Sámi language. 
The Finnmark Act (17 June 2005 no. 80) is a direct result of Norway’s 
obligation to comply with ILO Convention No. 169 and thus an important 
instrument in the protection of Sámi rights to lands and nature resources. 
Interestingly, although the law group under the SRC concluded that the 
state was the owner of the outlying fields and mountainous areas of 
Finnmark, the Government proposed to discontinue that ownership in the 
bill of the Finnmark Act (Ot. prp. nr. 53 (2002–2003)). This was done on 
the basis of international legal obligations, recognition of the historical 
rights of the Sámi including perceptions that state ownership was based 
on historical misunderstandings that were now difficult to defend.  
The Finnmark Act thus meant that the Norwegian Parliament trans-
ferred the ownership of about 95% of the area in Finnmark (45,000 kms2) 
from the state to a new legal entity named Finnmarkseiendommen (The 
Finnmark Estate). This represents a cardinal change in the management of 
large lands in the Sámi areas, ending the state ownership regime which has 
existed for over 200 years. 
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The purpose of the Finnmark Act (s.1) is to facilitate the management of 
land and natural resources in the county of Finnmark in a balanced and 
ecologically sustainable manner for the benefit of the residents of the coun-
ty and particularly as a basis for Sami culture, reindeer husbandry, use of 
non-cultivated areas, commercial activity and social life. The Finnmark Act 
in s. 3 incorporates ILO Convention No. 169 within the scope of the Act. Of 
fundamental interest is s. 5, where para 1 states that “through prolonged 
use of land and water areas, the Sámi have collectively and individually 
acquired rights to land in Finnmark.” The second paragraph states that this 
also applies to other residents in the county. To determine the scope and 
content of the rights held by Sámi and other people on the basis of prescrip-
tion and immemorial usage, a commission shall be established to investi-
gate rights to land and water in Finnmark and a special court to settle dis-
putes concerning such rights, cf. chapter 5. 
The new ownership body, the Finnmark Estate, “is an independent le-
gal entity with its seat in Finnmark, which shall administer the land and 
natural resources etc., that it owns in compliance with the purpose and 
other provisions of this Act” (s. 6). 
The Finnmark Act in s. 29 (in ch. 5) authorises the establishment of the 
Finnmark Commission, which “on the basis of current national law, shall 
investigate rights of use and ownership to the land to be taken over by 
Finnmarkseiendommen pursuant to section 49.” The majority of the Par-
liamentary Standing Committee of Justice chose the wording “current 
national law” to reveal that Sámi customs and legal opinions shall be em-
phasised in the clarification process. Such sources of law should thus have 
a significant place in the process.  
As with the Finnmark Act itself, the founding of the Finnmark Commis-
sion and the Uncultivated Land Tribunal (s. 36) are justified under the 
same obligations agreed to by Norway in ILO Convention No. 169 Art.14. 
The Finnmark Commission was established in March 2008 beginning 
its work on the two first investigation fields in the winter of 2009. In 
March 2012 the Commission submitted its report on field 1 “Seiland and 
Stjernøya.” In this report however the reindeer herding Sámi’s demands 
for property rights were rejected. Nevertheless, the locals and the rein-
deer owners did receive recognition for their rights in respect of imme-
morial usage. Such recognition did not however afford them rights beyond 
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what the Finnmark Estate has extensive authority to regulate through the 
Finnmark Act, or the Reindeer husbandry administration is entitled to 
regulate through the Reindeer husbandry Act. The report for field 2 “Un-
jarga/Nesseby” was expected to be completed during the autumn of 2012 
and was finally finished in February 2013.  
The Reindeer Husbandry Act (15 June 2007 no. 40) aims to facilitate 
ecological, economic and culturally sustainable reindeer husbandry (s. 1, 
para 1). The Act places greater emphasis on Sámi culture, tradition and 
customs than the previous act of 1978, which among other things appears 
in s. 1 where it is stated that “reindeer husbandry is to be preserved as an 
important basis for Sámi culture and society.” This is also reflected in the 
fact that the reindeer husbandry siida (the Sámi herding community) is 
recognised in law, with grazing rules prepared on the basis of “principles 
of good reindeer husbandry based on Sámi traditions and customs” (s. 
59). Section 3 states that the Act should be applied according to the inter-
national law of indigenous peoples and minorities. 
Chapter 3 deals with the content of reindeer husbandry rights. The 
most important of these rights are the grazing privileges for the reindeer 
in the mountainous areas and the other outlying fields, not depending on 
who is the owner of the land (s. 19). The grazing rights cover the right to 
suitable seasonal pastures, i.e., spring, summer, autumn and winter pas-
tures, including migration routes, calving and mating areas (ss. 20 and 
22). In addition, the reindeer husbandry rights include accessory rights to 
housing, use of motor vehicles, fences and other facilities, wood and tim-
ber, and hunting, trapping and fishing (ss. 21 and 23–26). 
Of importance here is also the codification of laws that have grown out 
of case law. Interesting in that regard is s. 4, para 1 which states that rein-
deer husbandry has its legal basis in immemorial usage, while para 3 notes 
that Sámi reindeer husbandry enjoys legal protection under the expropria-
tion regulations. In addition, para 2 codifies the burden of proof. 
The Consultation Agreement between the Norwegian Government and 
the Sámi Parliament signed 11 May 2005 is also worthy of note here. The 
agreement aims to contribute to the practical implementation of the 
state’s international legal obligation to consult the Sámi: 
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 To achieve agreement between state authorities and the Sámi 
Parliament when it considers introducing laws or measures that may 
affect Sámi interests. 
 To facilitate the development of a partnership perspective between the 
state authorities and the Sámi Parliament, working to strengthen the 
Sámi culture and society. 
 Through the development of a common understanding of the situation 
and development needs of the Sámi community.  
 
In addition, the SRU II drafted a consultation Act in 2007, which is ex-
pected to be heard by the Parliament in the near future (NOU 2007:13). 
The draft of the Finnmark Fishing Act, proposed by the Coastal Fishing 
Committee (NOU 2008: 5) was subject to extensive political debate and 
negotiation, although it was not adopted (and probably never will be). It 
has as its starting point the draft of the SRC (NOU 1997:4) where it was 
acknowledged that Sámi culture and traditions must be emphasised in the 
management of coastal and fjord fishing in Sámi areas. In the SRC draft it 
was also proposed that free fishing be available for boats under a certain 
size. The draft was not passed by the government in conjunction with the 
Finnmark Act (Ot. prp. nr. 53 (2002–2003)). This, in turn, led the Parlia-
mentary Standing Committee of Justice to suggest a legal study on the 
Sámi peoples’ and others’ right to fish in the sea offshore the County of 
Finnmark (Innst. O. nr. 80 (2004–2005), 30–31).  
That study was undertaken by the Coastal Fishing Committee, which in 
their recommendations concluded that people living along the fjords and by 
the coast in Finnmark, “on the basis of historical use and the international law 
of indigenous peoples and minorities, have the right to fish in the sea off the 
Finnmark” (NOU 2008:5, p. 14). A proposal was thus made to settle this ques-
tion in terms of a “fjord right” to fish. The study of the Coastal Fishing Commit-
tee shows that the Norwegian Government position is, in this context, not as 
free as the Marine Resources Act (6 June 2008 No. 37) states in regulating 
access to fisheries in its northern seawaters. 
The Stoltenberg Government has refused to follow up on the Coastal 
Fishing Committee’s unanimous recommendation but has instead adopted 
a rather dismissive position on the bill. An Agreement between the Nor-
wegian Government and the Sámi Parliament was concluded in 2011 in 
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which the latter gained recognition for the right to land 3,000 tons of cod, 
but did not received any recognition in respect of its claim over historical 
fishing rights. 
15.2.4 Case Law Concerning the Rights to Lands and 
Waters 
The Norwegian Courts long considered Sámi use of land and water as a so-
called “innocent beneficial right of use.” A fundamental change in the case 
law however came about through two important Supreme Court judg-
ments during a 14 day period in the spring of 1968. 
In the Brekken Case (Norsk Retstidende (NRt.) 1968:394), the Su-
preme Court found that the Sámi use of lands and waters “for a long time 
had been attached to the place and that it in its core is so fastened that it 
cannot simply be equated with the exercise of an innocent beneficial right 
of use or a public access to land” (401). This led to the Sámi gaining legal 
recognition for their rights to use their traditional hunting and fishing 
sites on private land in the Southern Sámi areas. 
In the Altevann Case (NRt. 1968:429) the Supreme Court confirmed 
the lower courts’ decision and stated that the flooding of Lake Altevann 
was “an interference with such a firm and concentrated use of pastures 
and fishing sites at Altevann that the acquiring authority must pay com-
pensation” (438). The Sámi from the Swedish Sámi Communities of Talma 
and Saarivuoma using these pastures and fishing sites in Norway were 
thus awarded compensation for expropriation in line with the prior 
recognition of immemorial usage. 
Although the Supreme Court recognised that Sámi use could lead to the 
recognition of a right, it should still take several decades before Sámi 
reindeer husbandry use will lead to the confirmation of pastoral rights in 
disputes with landowners. The main reason for that was no longer that 
the use was not considered to establish rights, but rather that it was not 
considered to be sufficiently regular and intensive to meet the condition 
for the acquisition of the right. In three separate Supreme Court judge-
ments on the Southern Sámi areas (NRt. 1981:1215, NRt. 1988:1217 and 
NRt. 1997:1608), the Court evaluated the requirements of regularity and 
intensity in respect of the use of lands from a norm established by the 
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farmers’ use of lands. Rules that under other circumstances could have led 
to the confirmation of the rights of the Sámi reindeer herder thus emerged 
as obstacles to the recognition of such rights. 
In the landmark Selbu Case (NRt. 2001:769) the Supreme Court set the 
views of the three previous judgments aside. This was done by emphasising 
the characteristics of reindeer husbandry and the Sámi use of lands and 
Sámi cultural characteristics when assessing the acquiring of pastoral 
rights. On adopting such an approach to the legal evaluation of such ques-
tions, the Supreme Court found that the reindeer husbandry districts of 
Essand and Riast-Hylling had acquired pastoral rights in the disputed areas 
in Selbu municipality due to immemorial usage of reindeer pastures. By 
virtue of being a plenary judgment, the Selbu case is an important source of 
law in disputes relating to the confirmation and extension of reindeer hus-
bandry rights. It can, as such, be deemed to represent a norm in respect of 
how Norwegian property law should be applied, not only in reindeer hus-
bandry disputes, but also more generally in disputes relating to confirma-
tion and recognition of use and ownership rights in the Sámi areas. 
In this judgment, a unified Supreme Court stated that reindeer hus-
bandry law imposes a burden on landowners to prove that pastoral 
rights do not exist in the reindeer husbandry areas, and that the right to 
practice reindeer husbandry has an independent legal basis grounded in 
immemorial usage. 
Of particular importance here is the fact that the entire Supreme Court 
stated that in testing the rules of immemorial usage, the characteristics of 
the rights had to be emphasised, which means that the requirements for 
the confirmation of rights must be adapted to the Sámi’s use of land in the 
Sámi areas. This also meant that while Sámi reindeer herders have en-
joyed a nomadic way of life, similar practices in respect of other grazing 
animals cannot automatically be transferred to reindeer husbandry. More 
precisely, the first voting judge, who represented the majority of the 
Court, stated that reindeer husbandry demands a significant amount of 
land, and that the use of lands varies from year to year depending on 
weather, wind and the condition of the pastures:  
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“It can thus not be claimed that the reindeer have grazed in a particular ar-
ea every year. Both for this reason and because of the Sámi’s nomadic way 
of life can interruption of use not prevent acquisition of right even if it is of 
considerable length” (NRt. 2001:769 at 789). 
As a consequence, the nature of reindeer herding must be taken into con-
sideration with grazing patterns emphasised in the evaluation on the basis 
of the intensity of use. The surroundings, environment, topography, pas-
ture conditions, weather, etc., thus each have significance.  
The Supreme Court has in this way adapted rules of immemorial usage 
such that the legal norm is today that the requirements for intensity and 
regularity in the use must be evaluated against a standard issued by the 
characteristics of the rights, and where the acquisition of such rights is con-
sidered in relation to the practice of reindeer husbandry more generally. 
In this context it is clear that the Selbu Case has produced a norm as 
shown in the decision on fishing rights for Sámi Reindeer Herders in Tydal 
(LF-2008-50209). 
The clarification of the legal basis of reindeer husbandry and expropri-
ation protection has taken place through case law. This is, as we have 
seen, now enshrined in s. 4 of the Reindeer Husbandry Act. 
In addition to the judgments on reindeer husbandry rights, the 
Svartskog Case should also be highlighted (NRt. 2001:1229). Based on the 
rules of immemorial usage, the Supreme Court found here that the local 
people of Manndalen in the County of Troms, which is populated predom-
inantly by people of Sámi origin, had acquired title to property registered 
to the Norwegian State as an owner. In assessing the current law, it should 
however be noted that the legislation relating to the Finnmark Act high-
lighted these judgments as a guideline for how the traditional Sámi use of 
these lands shall be considered as the basis for the acquisition of a right.  
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15.3 International Law 
15.3.1 Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
Through the Human Rights Act (May 21, 1999 No. 30), the ICCPR of 1966 
was incorporated into Norwegian law with precedence over other legisla-
tion except for the Constitution. Article 27 of the ICCPR reads as follows:  
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, per-
sons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.  
The provision states that minorities are free to use their own languages 
and enjoy their own cultures and religions. Statements from the UN Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), which is the monitory organ of the Covenant, 
show that this article not only provides protection against minorities being 
denied such rights, but that it also imposes an obligation on states to take 
positive measures to support minority languages and cultures. In its General 
Comment No. 23 the HRC (HRC, report, vol. 1, 1994), stated: 
Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they 
depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, 
language or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be 
necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members 
to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practise their reli-
gion, in community with the other members of the group (para. 6.2). 
The Sámi Rights Committee II (NOU 2007:13, 190-1) emphasise that the 
statement shows the relationship between the ICCPR Art. 27 and Art. 110a 
of the Norwegian Constitution. 
ICCPR Art.27 also includes protection of the substantial basis of the mi-
nority culture, i.e., pastures and other natural environments that are of im-
portance for Sámi traditional livelihoods. In the same report, it is also stated 
that the committee understands culture to be manifested in many forms:  
Including a particular way of life associated with the use of land re-
sources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may in-
clude such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live 
in reserves protected by law (para.7).  
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The provision thus sets up a threshold for intervention that could 
threaten the exercise of Sámi culture and livelihoods. The statement also 
points out that this protection from intervention applies in particular to 
indigenous peoples. In the 2008 White Paper on the Norwegian Sámi poli-
cy (St.meld. nr. 28 (2007–2008), 33), the Government endorsed this posi-
tion as it approved the Ministry’s statement that:  
In relation to the Sámi as indigenous people, it is a common interpreta-
tion that the provision [ICCPR Art. 27] also covers the material premises 
for the Sámi overall cultural exercises, also referred to as the natural basis 
for Sámi culture. 
The Comments of the HRC also show that modern ways of exercising 
traditional culture embedded in industries and livelihoods, such as coastal 
fishing and reindeer husbandry, also enjoy protection under Art. 27. As a 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and head of the SRC Dr.Carsten 
Smith ironically replied to the Attorney’s submission to the Coastal fishing 
Committee (NOU 2008: 5); “it cannot be claimed that the Sámi shall con-
tinue to use oars and sails to enjoy the protection of coastal fishing” 
(Smith 2010:22). 
Article 27 of the ICCPR is an important legal provision with a content 
that provides protection against infringement in respect of natural re-
sources and Sámi traditional lands, where it sets up a framework (even 
though it is not precise) for how far such interventions can go. The com-
ments of the HRC show that it can be applied to interventions in Sámi 
coastal, river or inland fisheries. Article 27 also includes a protection 
against intervention in terms of the Sámi reindeer husbandry industry. 
This notwithstanding, it must be admitted that the obligation continues to 
have a greater practical significance in terms of legislative processes and 
political negotiations than in case law. 
15.3.2 ILO Convention No. 169  
As already noted, Norway ratified ILO Convention No. 169 in 1990. Even if 
the legislature omitted to incorporate it through the 1999 Human Rights 
Act, the convention remains a significant source of law which among other 
things sets up requirements for consultations, for indigenous customs to 
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be emphasised in decision-making processes, and for indigenous land 
rights to be identified and recognised. 
In Norway a broad consensus exists that the Sámi people are covered 
by the definition of indigenous peoples in Art. 1. By ratifying the Conven-
tion, Norway has thus committed itself to protect the Sámi lands and cul-
ture. Article 2 includes a governmental responsibility in respect of “devel-
oping, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and 
systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee 
respect for their integrity.” 
Article 6 encompasses the government’s duty to consult indigenous 
peoples. According to para (1)(a), the obligation to consult includes all 
cases where public bodies are considering implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may have a direct impact on indigenous 
people. This led to the agreement on consultations between the Norwe-
gian Government and the Sámi Parliament in 2005, described above.  
Article 8 encompasses the respect for indigenous customs and custom-
ary law. Paragraph (1) states that “In applying national laws and regulations 
to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or cus-
tomary laws.” This provision helps to actualise Sámi customs and custom-
ary law as a source of law (see below). This will in particular apply to the 
legal identification process in Finnmark, since the ILO Convention is incor-
porated in the Finnmark Act, and since the legislature has placed great em-
phasis on fulfilling its international obligations in framing the Finnmark Act. 
Article 8 (2) states that necessary procedures shall be established to resolve 
conflicts which may arise in the application of this principle.  
Of particular interest here however is the question of the legal ranking 
of indigenous customary laws when they are in conflict with national stat-
utory law. This is discussed by SR C II, which does argue that indigenous 
customs are not unconditionally entitled to prevail (NOU 2007:13, p. 222).  
Article 14 states that indigenous peoples have rights of ownership and 
possession over their traditional lands. The purpose of this article is that 
the use of lands that indigenous people have traditionally used shall be 
recognised and given legal protection. The international law group under 
the Sámi Rights Committee has noted that “if the population has been 
sufficiently permanently settled in the area, and they have also been the 
only ones to use this area, the demands of actual possession can normally 
  Polar Law Textbook II 285 
be regarded as having been fulfilled” (NOU 1997:5, p. 35). Article 14, espe-
cially 14 (2) and (3) has been of significant importance in the adoption of 
the Finnmark Act and the establishment of the Finnmark Commission. It 
reads: “Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal 
system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.” The Finnmark 
Commission is supposed to provide such an adequate procedure. 
Article 15 encompasses indigenous peoples’ rights to participate in the 
management of natural resources. It places restrictions on the state au-
thorities in regulating the exploitation of land and natural resources in 
indigenous areas. In para 1, the article states that indigenous people have 
the right to participate in the use, management and conservation of such 
resources. In Art. 15 (2) the requirement for an extended consultation 
duty is set out.  
“In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-
surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, govern-
ments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall 
consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what de-
gree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting 
any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources per-
taining to their lands…” 
Furthermore, this paragraph states that indigenous peoples shall, “wher-
ever possible participate in the benefits of such activities.” 
It has however been questioned whether the 2009 Norwegian Miner-
als Act, which provides for increased landowner fees to the Finnmark 
Estate instead of providing direct benefits to the representative Sámi body 
(The Sámi Parliament), is consistent with Art. 15 (2), see Skogvang 
(2010:63–67).  
15.3.3 Other International Legal Obligations of Norway 
Norway has also endorsed the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages and the Council of 
Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. 
These obligations also have legal effect in relation to the Sámi people. It 
should also be noted that the UN Special Rapporteur Anaya has emphasised 
the importance of the fact that Norway has ratified these conventions. 
286 Polar Law Textbook II 
Other international instruments of interest include the 2007 United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. Since many of the 
commitments in this Declaration are also enshrined in ILO Convention No. 
169 there is little need to discuss this issue here. However, we should note 
that Art. 21 of the Declaration follows Art. 27 of the ICCPR in requiring 
that states implement effective measures to ensure the development of 
the social and economic conditions of indigenous people. The 2005 draft 
Nordic Sámi Convention will also likely prove to be an important interna-
tional legal instrument at least if, in the near future, the negotiations end 
in a treaty in the form of the present draft. However, the analysis of that 
document is also beyond the scope of this chapter.  
The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Protocol 1 
Art. 1, also retains some significance as a rule of law in the Norwegian 
courts when it comes to the legal protection of reindeer husbandry. For 
example, the Supreme Court decision NRt. 2006:1382 on a dispute be-
tween a reindeer owner and the Reindeer administration on the closing 
down of a reindeer herding unit, found that the Reindeer Administration 
under the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food was not entitled to 
proceed with the said closure because, among other things, it violated the 
protecting of property under ECHR, protocol 1, Art. 1. 
The legal clarification Process (see section 15.2.3 above) enshrined in 
the Finnmark Act can also be discussed in relation to the obligations of the 
ECHR, including the provision for trials to be held within a reasonable 
time, contained in Article 6 (Ravna 2011). 
15.4 Sámi Law 
15.4.1 Sámi Legal Traditions and Customary Law  
Sámi legal traditions and customary law such as Sámi internal autono-
mous regulations constitute Sámi law. Although this is not a written law it 
is binding in nature. It is important both in relation to Sámi autonomy and 
also in the application of national Norwegian law related to the Sámi. 
Moreover, it has significance for negotiations in respect of bilateral and 
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multilateral agreements and treaties between states that have a Sámi 
population and the Sámi people (e.g., the Draft Nordic Sámi Convention).  
Sámi law has an independent legal basis; it is complied because people 
who are subject to them feel bound by them. Norway’s ratification of ILO 
Convention No. 169 and subsequent policy developments, have given 
Sámi law a formal place in Norwegian law. This means that Sámi custom-
ary law should be considered both in the legislative process and in the 
application of the law. 
This legal development also meant that Sámi law has increasingly be-
come a part of Norwegian statute (e.g., in parts of the reindeer husbandry 
legislation). The Finnmark Act is to some extent also built upon the foun-
dations of Sámi legal traditions. Thus, in s. 5 it states that the Act does not 
infringe the “rights of the Sámi and others have gained by prescription or 
immemorial usage.” 
Except for the previous Finnmark land legislation and the general legis-
lation on fishing and wildlife conservation, harvesting of outlaying fields in 
the Sámi areas has to a relatively small extent been regulated by statutory 
law. Customary law has thus played a significant role in its regulation. The 
well-known judge and legal scholar Erik Solem (1933), showed that the 
Sámi often had disputes regarding hunting grounds in respect of the snare 
trapping of grouse. In her study Elina Helander (2004) notes that Sámi in-
formants claimed to have some sort of internal autonomy for the exercise of 
this trapping tradition, and that now they are in danger of losing it. 
The right to build the Sámi guohti (a traditional Sámi turf hut), is an-
other tradition that has largely been regulated by Sámi customs. This tra-
dition was violated when the state forest company, which managed the 
unregistered state property of Finnmark, adopted a regulation in 1967 
saying that such turf huts only could be raised with the permission grant-
ed by the state forest company and on certain conditions. 
Other Sámi customs such as: conflict resolution, the importance of fam-
ily relationships, child rearing and hereditary succession still play a role in 
the modern life of Sámi people (Skogvang 2009:85–93). 
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15.4.2 Sámi Law in the Norwegian Courts 
To date, the use of Sámi customary law as a source of law in the courts is 
still in its initial phase. It therefore remains difficult to draw robust con-
clusions on its ultimate legal significance. Thus far, case law points to the 
fact that Sámi law has faced significant problems in working harmoniously 
with Norwegian law as the two have often collided with considerable 
force, and where the Supreme Court has placed strict requirements on 
quality and clarity on Sámi customary law.  
In its 2001 ruling (NRt. 2001:1116) the Supreme Court held that the 
tradition of letting dogs run free in the woods in the summer, was not of a 
quality that let it prevail over the Norwegian Wildlife Act. Additionally, a 
case brought in relation to the spring hunting of ducks in the Sámi munic-
ipality of Kautokeino failed as it was not considered to be a custom that 
deserved legal protection by the courts, (see: NRt. 1988:377). 
The question of the significance of Sámi customary law in the slaugh-
tering of reindeer has also been heard by the Supreme Court on two occa-
sions (NRt. 2006:957 and NRt. 2008: 1789). In neither case did the Sámi 
parties claim that particular methods of killing the reindeer, namely, by 
shooting with a small-calibre rifle or killing with a knife to the heart 
(which was not in compliance with the 1974 Animal Welfare Act), were 
justified by Sámi customary law. It must, however, be noted that the gov-
ernment has shown some willingness to accept Sámi customary traditions, 
e.g., in regulations in respect of the methods of killing reindeer (Regula-
tions 30 July 2008 on the use of the curved knife) and by regulating spring 
hunting for ducks (Regulation 2 May 1994 on the quota regulation of 
spring hunting for ducks). 
In addition, when it comes to fishing for salmon, case law exists to 
show that Sámi customary law is set aside when it contradicts Norwegian 
law. For example, in a decision about fishing in the River Tana (NRt. 2006: 
13), the Supreme Court, somewhat surprisingly, stated that the customary 
law saying that a person outside the household is allowed to fish with the 
authority (proxy) of the right holder, was contrary to Norwegian law and 
thus found such fishing unlawful. The above-mentioned Selbu Case (NRt. 
2001:769) shows however that the Supreme Court has emphasised tradi-
tional Sámi knowledge and customs related to the use of the lands in set-
tling a claim on rights to reindeer husbandry pastures.  
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Beyond these examples, Sámi customary law has faced significant diffi-
culty in being recognised by the courts. This can perhaps be explained by 
the fact that the courts of appeal are not yet sufficiently adapted to protect 
Sámi customary law. But it can probably also be explained by the fact that 
customs that have been tried in courts, have lacked the legal quality re-
quired to obtain legal protection (NRt. 2001:1116). According to Skogvang 
(2009:75-6), the Supreme Court in criminal matters, with the exception of 
the 2006 judgment on salmon fishing in Tana, has evaluated the legal 
sources correctly. 
Finally, it should be noted however that the courts of law in the Sámi 
areas have over time become more aware of their duties in respect of 
familiarising themselves with Sámi customary law. 
15.5 Conclusion 
The Sámi people, including their legal culture, were subject to a grinding 
process of assimilation into the Norwegian state from the 1800s up to the 
post war period. Partly as a result of the focus on international human 
rights law after the Second World War, views in respect of Sámi culture, 
rights and customary law, slowly began however to change.  
In the nearly 70 years that have passed since the end of World War 2 
Sámi language and culture has gained increasing recognition and legal 
protection, both through national legislation, case law and in relation to 
international human rights obligations to which Norway step by step has 
committed itself. This also resulted in Sámi customary law being recog-
nised as a source of law beyond the notion of Sámi internal autonomy. At 
the same time, Sámi Law can be interpreted through four sources of law: 
Norwegian statutory law, case law, customary law and international hu-
man rights treaties. These sources of law are framed within three legal 
systems: Norwegian national law, international law and Sámi law.  
Norway is constitutionally committed to protect Sámi language, cul-
ture and society (Art. 110a). This commitment has among other things 
contributed to the establishment of the Inner Finnmark District Court in 
2004, a court with a special responsibility to safeguard Sámi language, 
culture and legal traditions. Sámi legal traditions and land rights are also 
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given protection and recognition through Norway’s ratification of ILO 
Convention No. 169. This protection is strengthened by the incorporation 
of the convention into the Finnmark Act.  
The Finnmark Act in itself represents the recognition of Sámi rights to 
lands and waters. The Act does however contain certain procedural defi-
ciencies or inaccuracies, suggesting that its revision may be relevant. Rati-
fication of ILO Convention No. 169 also implies that Sámi legal traditions 
should be given a more prominent place in Norwegian law than recent 
case law otherwise suggests. 
Through case law, it has been acknowledged that reindeer pastures are 
protected legally in such a way that Sámi herders are given economic 
compensation in relation to encroachments on their pastures and that the 
legal basis for this is immemorial usage (and not the statutory law itself). 
These rules are now codified in the 2007 Reindeer Act. It is now also the 
law that, in cases of legal disputes, the landowner has the burden of prov-
ing that reindeer husbandry rights do not exist on their private land situ-
ated in the Sámi reindeer herding area. Case law shows that the Supreme 
Court has been able to adapt the provisions of Norwegian property law in 
such a way that they are now able, to a large extent, to protect Sámi lands, 
waters and rights to natural resources. In other areas of law however 
progress has not been as marked. 
When the 1999 Human Rights Act was passed, the international hu-
man rights conventions were incorporated into Norwegian law and given 
precedence. Even if incorporation here did not specifically include ILO-
169, this has contributed to the strengthening of the legal position of the 
Sámi, in particular through the ICCPR Art. 27. 
Despite a solid foundation in law, there major challenges still remain in 
respect of gaining provision for Sámi law, both as a scholarly subject and 
as a legal instrument. One such challenge relates to the clarification of the 
hierarchy between Sámi law and other legal sources in cases where con-
tradictions arise. There are also challenges to be faced in the implementa-
tion of the international conventions that protect Sámi language and sub-
stantial culture under Norwegian law. 
A current question that challenges both obligations in international 
law and internal legislation concerns the right to fish in the coastal areas 
outside Finnmark. The Coastal Fishery Committee concluded that people 
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living by the fjords and along the coast of Finnmark possess historical 
rights to fish in these areas but the government has been reluctant to 
acknowledge this. This means that rules noting that the concept of imme-
morial usage creates rights, an accepted norm when it comes to pastoral 
rights in the mountains and outlying fields, do not reach beyond the slopes 
of the shoreline. This also means that the debate on the right to fish in the 
coastal areas of Sápmi will continue into the future. 
Questions about self-determination and the extent of the rights to both 
non-renewable and renewable natural resources on land have also not been 
resolved. The question of renewable resources leads us back to the Finnmark 
Act. Although the legislature here has shown a willingness to recognise Sámi 
rights to lands and waters, there is still a long way to go to actually achieving 
this goal in practice. One of the main problems here concerns the imprecise 
nature of the rules in relation to the Finnmark estate’s management of land 
rights, which were, on occasion, practised in a contrary manner to local inter-
ests. Furthermore, the de facto extent to which Sámi rights to lands and wa-
ters in Finnmark are recognised by legislators ultimately depends on the legal 
identification processes initiated through the Finnmark Act and the Finnmark 
Commission. These processes are currently ongoing with both procedural 
and substantive questions remaining to be resolved. This means that we can 
surely agree with the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, 
James Anaya, when he stated that “the adequacy of the established procedure 
is not yet known.”  
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Questions 
 Sámi Law is framed in three legal systems and can, as a concept, be 
understood in two main ways. What are these three legal systems and 
two ways? 
 Why can the Selbu Supreme Court Case (NRt. 2001:769) be called a 
landmark case? 
 What are the most important international treaties in relation to Sámi 
Law in Norway?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sammanfattning 
Natalia Loukacheva 
 
 
Utvecklingen i Arktis och Antarktis fortsätter att vara föremål för såväl 
allmänhetens växande intresse som den politiska, vetenskapliga och me-
diala diskursen. Omfattningen av de förändringar som äger rum i 
polartrakterna påverkar även rättsutvecklingen; Arktis och Antarktis 
växande betydelse inom såväl globala som nationella (och subnationella) 
utvecklingsområden påkallar vidare undersökningar om rättens roll för 
hanteringen av angelägna frågor av betydelse för bägge polerna. Även om 
rätten inte ger svar på alla frågor, har den en roll att spela i hanteringen av 
många av de problem som är aktuella i Arktis och Antarktis idag.    
I den första läroboken i polarrätt, Polar Law Textbook (N. Loukacheva 
ed. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, Tema Nord 538: 2010 
(www.norden.org )), presenterades en bred översikt av de polarrättsliga 
frågorna. Denna nya lärobok bygger vidare på polarrätten som ett fram-
växande forskningsområde, nära sammankopplat med andra områden 
inom samhällsvetenskap och humaniora, som vinner allt större erkän-
nande. Samtliga kapitel är skrivna under perioden september 2012 till 
februari 2013 och innehåller ett stort antal aktuella polarrättsliga frågor 
som inte diskuterades i 2010 års lärobok och presenterar därmed i hög 
grad ny polarrättslig kunskap. 
Sedan det fruktsamma samarbetet med den första läroboken i polar-
rätt har Nordiska Ministerrådet, genom det arktiska samarbets-
programmet, visat fortsatt ledarskap för de juridiska frågornas position 
inom det Nordiska, Arktiska och globala samhället genom att stödja fram-
tagandet av ytterligare en lärobok i polarrätt. Idén till den nya boken 
väcktes 2012–2013 i Akureyri, Island, vid Mastersprogrammet i polarrätt. 
Som ledare för det läroboksprojektet utsågs Dr. Natalia Loukacheva, som 
även tjänat som redaktör för boken. Den nya läroboken är ett resultat av 
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en bred samverkansprocess och ett effektivt lagarbete mellan en internat-
ionell grupp av 15 välkända experter inom polarrätt och närliggande om-
råden, häribland akademiker, politiker, praktiker och representanter från 
arktiska urbefolkningar (se vidare författarbio-grafier). Detta samarbete 
var möjligt tack vare författarnas gemensamma övertygelse att det trots 
befintligt kunnande finns behov att ytterligare främja den globala sprid-
ningen av rättslig information och kunskap. 
Generöst stöd för framtagandet av detta pedagogiska verktyg har läm-
nats av Nordiska Ministerrådet. Läroboken kan beställas i pappers-format 
och även kostnadsfritt laddas ner från Nordiska Ministerrådets hemsida i 
syfte att ge alla som är intresserade av polarrätt tillgång till boken. För-
hoppningen är att detta kommer att göra det möjligt även för läsare i av-
lägsna arktiska områden, och över hela världen, att få tillgång till de peda-
gogiska verktyg och den information som presenteras i boken. 
De viktigaste målen med denna lärobok är: att sprida ny kunskap om 
den mest aktuella juridiska och politiska utvecklingen i polarområdena; 
att ytterligare främja juridisk och tvärvetenskaplig utbildning i och för 
avlägsna nordliga områden; och att stärka samarbetet inom den nordiska 
regionen och med berörda parter (läroboken är t.ex. användbar för ini-
tiativ från Arktiska Rådet och dess arbetsgrupper, University of the Arctic, 
och för många utbildningsprogram globalt). Förhoppningen är också att 
läroboken ska kunna användas som utbildningsunderlag för framtida 
distansutbildningar i polarrätt, samt som stöd för Nordisk samverkan och 
tvärvetenskaplig dialog genom att främja ytterligare samarbete inom och 
utanför den Nordiska/Arktiska regionen.  
Trots sin primära pedagogiska inriktning innehåller boken användbar 
information för såväl jurister som icke-jurister, liksom för andra som är 
intresserade av ämnet polarrätt. Författarna i boken utforskar en rad olika 
rättsliga frågor i Arktis och Antarktis, men även frågor berörs, t.ex. rele-
vanta geopolitiska aspekter, säkerhet, styrelseformer, sjöräddning, resur-
ser, biologisk mångfald och andra politiska frågor. 
Boken är upplagd som en lärobok med 15 kapitel där varje kapitel, med 
viss variation, bygger på föreläsningsmaterial och innehåller tips om vidare 
läsning. Boken omfattar frågor inom områden som: polarrätt, geopolitik, 
säkerhet, och Arktiska Rådets arbete (se kapitel av Loukacheva, Heininen, 
Vasiliev och Koivurova); frågor om miljölagstiftning, klimatförändringar, 
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resurser, energi, biologisk mångfald och kontinentalsockeln (se kapitel av 
Baker, Bankes, Bastmeijer, Fitzmaurice, Koivurova, McDorman och Petters-
son) samt; utveckling av styrelseformer, mänskliga rättigheter och rättig-
heter för ursprungsbefolkningar (se kapitel av Alfredsson, á Rógvi, Penikett, 
Ravna och Lykke Thomsen). Trots sin omfattning är bokens räckvidd ändå 
begränsad och lämnar tvivelsutan utrymme för fortsatt forskning och sam-
verkan inom det polarrättsliga området. 
De åsikter som uttrycks i denna lärobok återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis 
Nordiska Ministerrådets ställningstagande. Bidragsgivarna hoppas att 
boken kommer att uppmuntra dem som är intresserade av polarrätt till 
fortsatta studier, forskning eller deltagande i något av de många pågående 
Arktis- och Antarktisrelaterade initiativen.  
Ytterligare information om denna lärobok kan inhämtas av lärobokens 
redaktör Dr. Natalia Loukacheva på: natalial@unak.is eller n.loukacheva@ 
utoronto.ca eller från Nordiska Ministerrådets webbplats: www.norden.org 
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Vaxandi áhugi er á þróun mála á norður- og suðurskautssvæðunum meðal 
almennings, vísinda- og fræðimanna, stjórnmálamanna og fjölmiðla. 
Hnattræn áhrif þeirra umfangsmiklu breytinga sem nú eiga sér stað á 
heimskautasvæðunum ná einnig til lagalegrar þróunar. Mikilvægi norður- 
og suðurheimskautsins fer vaxandi á ýmsum sviðum þróunar á heimsvísu, 
í einstökum heimshlutum, ríkjum og svæðum innan ríkja. Í ljósi þess er full 
þörf á frekari athugun á hlutverki laga í viðbrögðum við mörgum þeirra 
vandamála sem við blasa í tengslum við heimskautin bæði nú og í 
framtíðinni. Enda þótt lög leysi ekki öll vandamál hafa þau hlutverki að 
gegna við lausn margra þeirra. 
Víðtækt yfirlit yfir málefni heimskautaréttarins var veitt í braut-
ryðjendaverkinu Kennslubók í heimskautarétti (Polar Law Textbook), N. 
Loukacheva ritstj. Kaupmannahöfn: Norræna ráðherranefndin, Tema Nord 
538: 210 (www.norden.org). Í bókinni sem hér er fylgt úr hlaði er aftur 
leitað í smiðju heimskautaréttarins, en hann er vaxandi rannsóknarsvið sem 
nýtur síaukinnar viðurkenningar og snertir mörg önnur svið félagsvísinda 
og hugvísinda. Í þessari kennslubók í heimskautarétti er fjallað um fjölmörg 
ný málefni og þróun sem ekki var til umræðu í bókinni sem kom út 2010. 
Allir kaflarnir voru samdir á tímabilinu september 2012 til febrúar 2013 og 
saman mynda þeir auðlegð nýrra upplýsinga um heimskautarétt. 
Í kjölfar gjöfullar samvinnu 2009–2010 hefur Norræna ráðherranefndin, 
undir formerkjum áætlunar sinnar um samvinnu á norðurslóðum, haldið 
áfram forystuhlutverki sínu við að ýta undir lagaleg gildi í norrænu, 
heimskauta- og hnattrænu samhengi með því að styrkja verkefnið 
Kennslubók í heimskautarétti II. Þetta verkefni var vistað 2012–2013 af 
meistaranámi í heimskautarétti við lagadeild Háskólans á Akureyri. Nýja 
kennslubókarverkefninu var stýrt af Dr. Natalíu Loukachevu, sem einnig 
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ritstýrði bókinni. Kennslubókin er afrakstur víðtækrar og samhentrar sam-
vinnu alþjóðlegs hóps 15 vel þekktra sérfræðinga á sviði heimskautaréttar og 
skyldra greina. Hópinn skipa meðal annars fræðimenn, stjórnmálamenn, 
aðilar sem starfa á vettvangi og frumbyggjar á heimskautasvæðum (sjá 
upplýsingar um höfunda). Þessi samvinna byggðist á sameiginlegri sann-
færingu um að þrátt fyrir að ýmsar heimildir séu til sé þörf á frekari 
framþróun lögfræðilegra upplýsinga og þekkingar á heimsvísu. 
Norræna ráðherranefndin veitti veglegan styrk til gerðar þessa 
kennsluefnis. Hægt er að panta það í bókarformi frá Norrænu ráðher-
ranefndinni og einnig er mikils um vert að efnið er aðgengilegt á rafrænu 
formi á heimasíðu Norræna ráðherraráðsins svo að allir sem áhuga hafa á 
heimskautarétti hafi ókeypis aðgang að því. Vonast er til að þetta auðveldi 
lesendum á fjarlægum heimskautasvæðum og um heim allan aðgang að því 
lögfræðilega kennsluefni og upplýsingum sem hér birtast. 
Helstu markmið kennslubókarinnar eru: Að koma á framfæri nýrri 
þekkingu á lagalegri og stjórnmálalegri þróun á heimskautasvæðnunum; 
að styrkja samvinnu á norrænum vettvangi og meðal hagsmunaaðila (svo 
dæmi sé tekið gagnast kennslubókin ýmsu framtaki Norðurskautsráðsins 
og starfshópa þess, Háskóla norðurslóða og mörgum menntastofnunum á 
heimsvísu).  Ennfremur er vonast til þess að kennslubókin skapi grundvöll 
fyrir fjarkennd námskeið í heimskautarétti í framtíðinni og að hún efli 
þverfaglega umræðu með frekara samstarfi aðila á Norðurlöndum, 
norðurslóðum og víðar. Þótt megintilgangur bókarinnar sé menntunarle-
gur hefur hún að geyma gagnlegar upplýsingar fyrir lögfræðinga jafnt sem 
aðra og alla þá sem áhuga hafa á heimskautarétti. Í henni eru könnuð fjöl-
mörg lögfræðileg álitaefni tengd norður- og suðurskautinu, en einnig skyld 
viðfangsefni á sviði alþjóðastjórnmála, öryggismála, stjórnskipunar, leitar- 
og björgunarstarfa, auðlinda, líffræðilegs fjölbreytileika og annarra þátta 
stjórnmálaþróunar.  
Bókin er byggð upp sem kennslubók þar sem allir kaflar hafa að einhverju 
leyti verið skrifaðir í formi fyrirlesturs og hafa að geyma ábendingar um fre-
kara lesefni. Kennslubókinni er skipt í 15 kafla sem spanna viðfangsefni á 
eftirtöldum sviðum: Heimskautaréttur, alþjóðastjórnmál, öryggismál og 
Norðurskautsráðið (t.d. samningurinn um leit og björgun, aðgerðir vegna 
loftslagsbreytinga, o.s.frv.) (sjá kafla eftir Loukachevu, Heininen, Vasiliev og 
Koivurova); umhverfisréttur, loftslagsbreytingar, auðlindir, orka, fjölbreytile-
  Polar Law Textbook II 301 
iki lífríkis og meginlandsflekar (sjá kafla eftir Baker, Bankes, Bestmeijer, Fitz-
maurice, Koivurova, McDorman og Pettersson); þróun stjórnunarhátta 
(sjálfstjórn, góðir stjórnunarhættir, valddreifing), mannréttindi og réttindi 
frumbyggjaþjóða (sjá kafla eftir Gudmundur Alfreðsson, Kari á Rógvi, Peni-
kett, Ravna og Lykke Thomsen). Þótt kennslubókin spanni vítt svið er afmör-
kun óhjákvæmileg og því skilur hún eftir rúm fyrir frekari rannsóknir og sam-
vinnu á sviði heimskautaréttar. 
Þau viðhorf sem lýst er í þessari kennslubók fara ekki nauðsynlega 
saman við afstöðu Norrænu ráðherranefndarinnar. Höfundar bókarinnar 
vona að hún verði hvatning öllum þeim sem áhuga hafa á heimskautarétti 
til að leggja í frekara nám, rannsóknir eða samvinnu um þau fjölmörgu 
verkefni sem starfrækt eru í tengslum við bæði norðurheimskautssvæðin 
og suðurskautið.  
Frekari upplýsingar um kennslubókina fást hjá ritstjóranum dr. Nataliu 
Loukachevu í gegnum netfangið natalial@unak.is eða n.loukacheva 
@utoronto.ca, sem og á vefsíðu Norrænu ráðherranefndarinnar 
www.norden.org 
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